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 Abstract 
 
In the realm of academia and US government, scholars and policymakers argue that 
diplomacy is no longer a viable option towards dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. 
I, however, argue that it is too early to declare diplomacy as a failed solution, due to the lack 
of research on Track II diplomacy between the US and North Korea. While there is a large 
amount of literature on US foreign policy towards North Korea, there is little literature that 
seeks to explain United States Track II diplomacy towards North Korea. My research, 
therefore, makes an original contribution to the study of US foreign policy towards North 
Korea. My dissertation questions why influential United States non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the North Korean 
government during the United States administrations of George W. Bush (2001-2009). It 
argues that non-governmental organizations pursued Track II diplomacy because they 
believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of US Track I, or 
official, diplomacy that took place between the Bush administration and North Korean 
government. To demonstrate my argument, I examine three cases of US Track II diplomacy 
to North Korea: Track II diplomatic conferences of the National Committee of American 
Foreign Policy; the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang, the capital of 
North Korea; and US science diplomatic activities to North Korea, which include the 
Stanford delegation’s visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the 
Nautilus Institute’s DPRK Energy Experts’ Working Group. The analysis demonstrates that 
each case of US Track II diplomacy partially compensated for the US delegation to the Six 
Party Talks’ inability to fulfil a normal function of diplomacy. This study concludes that the 
Bush administration limited its practice of official diplomacy concerning the North Korean 
nuclear issue, hence the vacancy for Track II diplomacy.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Introduction 
 Within the realm of academia and United States government, scholars and 
policymakers argue that diplomacy is no longer a viable option towards dismantling North 
Korea’s nuclear program. Due to the lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the 
United States and North Korea, it is, however, too early to declare diplomacy as a failed 
solution. While there is a large amount of literature on United States foreign policy towards 
North Korea, there is little literature that seeks to explain United States Track II diplomacy 
towards North Korea. This dissertation makes an original contribution to the study of United 
States foreign policy towards North Korea, as it aims to help fulfil this research gap.  
 In this chapter, I first demonstrate that there is a lack of research on Track II 
diplomacy between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). 1  I next introduce my research question and hypothesis. I next discuss my 
methodology and, lastly, the chapter structure of my dissertation. 
 
Demonstrating the Research Gap 
 There is a very long-established literature on the field of US foreign policy, but there 
is little written about Track II diplomacy, or unofficial diplomacy, specifically Track II 
diplomacy between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK). Through the analysis of literature pertaining to United States foreign policy, United 
States foreign policy towards East Asia, and United States foreign policy towards North 
Korea, I will demonstrate four research gaps. The first research gap is the lack of attention 
                                                 
1 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea. I will be referring to this 
region as either DPRK or North Korea. 
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to diplomacy in International Relations theory. The second gap is that the literature on US 
diplomacy is predominantly atheoretical. The works concerning American diplomacy make 
little reference to International Relations theory or diplomatic theory. The next research gap 
is that the literature concerning US foreign policy towards East Asia gives little attention to 
diplomacy between the US and East Asian region. Lastly, there is a lack of scholarly 
literature concerning US diplomacy towards the DPRK, particularly in terms of Track II 
diplomacy. Instead, the literature is heavily policy driven and focused on security. I will, 
therefore, demonstrate that there is a gap in the English-language literature concerning Track 
II diplomacy towards the DPRK.  
 
Disconnect between International Relations theory and study of diplomacy  
 In this section, I demonstrate that the subject of diplomacy has received little attention 
from International Relations theories through the analysis of different International Relations 
theories, represented by Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, and Robert Keohane. 2 
Morgenthau is the most famous classical realist and his work dominated the field of 
International Relations for at least the next two decades after it was first published in the 
early days of the Cold War (1948).3 Mearsheimer and Keohane are also leaders in their 
respected International Relations theory as their works have been cited in numerous scholarly 
articles and books, including textbooks, such as Bruce Jentleson’s American Foreign Policy: 
The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century.4  
                                                 
2 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984); John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2001); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New 
York: Knopf, 1993). 
3 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 14. 
4 Bruce Jentleson, American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 2014), 216-233. 
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 In his work, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Peace and Power, Hans 
Morgenthau explains the role of diplomacy in his theory of International Relations, which is 
known as classical realism.5 Although Political Realism began with an understanding of the 
significance of diplomacy, as shown by Morgenthau, the current theories of Political Realism 
understand diplomacy as unimportant in international politics, as can be seen in the work of 
Mearsheimer. In his theory, Morgenthau explains why states want power and how much 
power states deem satisfactory. Morgenthau argues that states strive for power because states 
are governed by objectives laws that have their roots in human nature.6 States, therefore, 
strive for power because they are led by human beings who have a will for power. In his 
explanation of power, Morgenthau introduces the different factors that make up the power of 
a nation, one being the quality of diplomacy.7 He, therefore, regards diplomacy as an asset 
of the state, as he explains that the quality of a nation’s diplomacy combines the other 
elements of national power into an integrated whole, turning potential power into actual 
power.8 Diplomacy in Morgenthau’s perspective is a component, or reflection, of state power 
and, therefore, an instrument of the state that is dependent on more material capabilities.9 
 In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer explains why states compete 
for power.10 Mearsheimer first provides his understanding of power, which is comprised of 
a state’s population, wealth and military power. He then explains that states measure power 
through the size of the states’ military power, which is divided into latent (economy and 
population) and actual power (military).11 Mearsheimer argues that the aim of a state is to 
                                                 
5 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 529-532. 
6 Ibid., 4. 
7 Ibid. 146. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Christer Jonsson, “Theorising Diplomacy” in Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft, ed. B.J.C. 
McKercher. (New York: Routledge, 2012), 18. 
10 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 29-54. 
11 Ibid., 55-137. 
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become the hegemon—the only great power in the international system.12 States aim to be 
the hegemon, and are predominantly concerned with survival due to three features of the 
international system: the lack of an agency that will protect the states from each other; the 
fact that states always have some offensive military capability; and the fact that states can 
never be certain about other states’ intentions.13 Due to these fears, states recognize that the 
more powerful they are compared to their rivals, the better their chance of survival. The 
national interest of the state is, therefore, defined in terms of power since states realize that 
power is the key to their survival.  
 Mearsheimer argues that because the international system creates powerful incentives 
for states to look for opportunities to gain power, there are rarely states that wish to preserve 
the existing balance of power. States are, therefore, locked in a perpetual great-power 
competition, since the best guarantee of survival is to gain power and become the hegemon. 
If the state was to become the hegemon, it could not be seriously threatened by other states 
due to its mighty power and its survival would, therefore, be ensured.14 While Mearsheimer’s 
work explains why states seek power, his political theory does not mention diplomacy. Given 
his lack of attention to the theory and practice of diplomacy, Mearsheimer’s work implies 
that diplomacy has little connection to a state’s power, nor does it aid in increasing a state’s 
power; diplomacy is, therefore, inconsequential in international politics. 
 In After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
Robert Keohane introduces his theory of International Relations. Keohane argues that in 
order to understand international politics, it is necessary to take “the existence of mutual 
interests as given and examines the conditions under which they will lead to cooperation.”15 
                                                 
12 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 55-137. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 169. 
15 Keohane, After Hegemony, 6. 
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Keohane explains that cooperation has been, and can be, organized in the international world 
economy when common interests exist. 16 Keohane’s After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy defines two key terms—cooperation and 
international regimes. Keohane builds a theoretical framework on the basis of the concepts 
of cooperation and international regimes to show that cooperation between states is possible, 
even in an anarchical international society. 17  He argues that under some conditions, 
cooperation can develop on the basis of complementary interests, and that international 
regimes, or international institutions, affect the patterns of cooperation that emerge.18 The 
extent of cooperation, therefore, depends on the existence of international institutions with 
particular characteristics, such as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.” 19  Keohane’s theory focuses on cooperation that is centred on 
complementary interests, but his theory does not mention the practice of diplomacy. Keohane 
places great importance to international institutions in terms of their role in international 
cooperation, which is somewhat similar to the theories of diplomacy that emphasize the 
necessity of negotiations to reduce or manage conflict resolution. Keohane, however, does 
not incorporate diplomacy as a core component of his theoretical framework, de-emphasizing 
the importance of diplomacy in international politics and underestimating the role and 
function of diplomacy in the international system.  
 International Relations theorists have written little about diplomacy. Mearsheimer 
and Morgenthau’s theory of realism argues that states compete for power in an anarchical 
                                                 
16 Keohane, After Hegemony, 6. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 13. 
 For more information concerning international regimes, see Robert Keohane, “Cooperation and International 
Regimes” in After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984).  
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international society. While they may disagree on why states compete for power, their 
scholarship provides an understanding of what power is and how states measure the level of 
power. The works of Morgenthau and Mearsheimer demonstrate that international relation 
theorists of Political Realism have given less attention to diplomacy. Although Morgenthau 
frames diplomacy as a reflection of the national power, Mearsheimer does not mention the 
role of diplomacy in his theoretical framework. Liberalism also does not give much attention 
to diplomacy. While Keohane argues that cooperation between states can be achieved 
through international institutions with certain characteristics, he does not mention how the 
practice of diplomacy can support international cooperation. Diplomacy is a valuable 
instrument of foreign policy, yet International Relations scholars rarely discuss the role of 
diplomacy in their theories, and give even less attention to the role of Track II diplomacy in 
their scholarship. There is, therefore, a disconnection between the study of International 
Relations theory and the study of diplomacy.  
  
Literature on US diplomacy is atheoretical 
 The dominant approach to the study of American diplomacy is empirical and not 
shaped by a clear theoretical framework. I do this by comparing the works of George Kennan 
and William Appleman Williams, and the scholarship that they have developed.20 Kennan 
and Williams’ respective scholarship on American diplomacy is a critique of US foreign 
policy that had taken place before and was taking place during the Cold War.21 Kennan 
argues that the legalistic-moralistic principles that defined US foreign policy from 1900s to 
                                                 
20 George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); 
William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
1972). 
21 Both Kennan and Williams’ works were published and taught during the Cold War. Kennan’s American 
Diplomacy, 1900-1950 was first published in 1950. Williams’ The Tragedy of American Diplomacy was first 
published in 1959. 
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1950s are at odds with the assumptions and practices of traditional power politics, where the 
nation’s concept of interests is defined by power.22 His work, therefore, includes concepts 
that are identified to Political Realism. Williams’ The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
argues that US foreign policy was interconnected with imperialism, and is, therefore, also 
considered as an important piece of scholarship within the study of American imperial 
history.23 Michael Hunt considers Kennan and Williams’ work on US foreign policy as the 
two dominate interpretations concerning America’s relationship with the rest of the world.24  
 Kennan’s American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 analyzes past events of American 
diplomacy to make the case that because the national interest is defined in terms of power, 
great states care about power. He argues that moralism and legalism, which he argues defined 
America’s approach to international affairs, obstructed a clear definition and effective pursuit 
of the national interest.25 Kennan defines the legalistic-moralistic approach to international 
problems as the “belief that it would be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous 
aspirations of government in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal 
rules and restraints.”26 The main principle of the legalistic-moralistic approach is that it is in 
the international community’s best interest if formal criteria of a juridical nature, by which 
acceptable behaviour of states could be defined, were developed.27  
 Kennan finds faults in the legalistic-moralistic approach and argues that this approach 
contains several weaknesses. The first is that the legalistic-moralistic approach ignores the 
international significance of political problems and the deeper sources of international 
stability. 28  The legalistic-moralistic approach also does not take into consideration the 
                                                 
22 Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, 107. 
23 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 24.  
24 Michael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009), 5. 
25 Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, 107. 
26 Ibid., 102. 
27 Ibid., 102. 
28 Ibid. 
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conflicts of national interest. Kennan critiques the moralistic-legalistic aspect of US foreign 
policy arguing that this framework had led to a decline of US security.29 Mearsheimer’s The 
Tragedy of Great Powers argues that while Kennan presents the argument that power is the 
basic concept that explains the conduct of a state’s external relations, he does not explain 
why states pursue or compete for power, or what level of power states deem satisfactory.30 
Kennan’s approach makes use of conceptual insights of what is now understood as the 
international theory of realism. He, however, does not use these to build a comprehensive 
and persuasive theoretical framework for understanding international diplomacy. 
 Also relying on past events in the field of American diplomacy, Williams’ The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy describes US’ overseas commercial expansion, and 
explains the expansionist ambitions of US diplomacy. Williams, therefore, connects US 
economic activities to the study of US foreign policy, to emphasize that American foreign 
policy can be identified as an interest-oriented approach, and that it was centred on 
expansionism. Another theme that Williams introduces in The Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy is that almost all Americans held the belief that domestic well-being depends 
upon sustained, increasing overseas economic expansion.31 Williams argues that Americans 
believed that expansion was essential to American prosperity and security not only because 
it was economically necessary, but also because of their belief that it would bring peace and 
wealth to the rest of the world.32 Williams explains why America saw expansionism as 
essential, but he does not explain why expansionism increases the effects of American power. 
Moreover, while Williams explains the relationship between United States expansionism and 
the pursuit of power by US policymakers, his work remains focused on empirical 
                                                 
29 Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, vii. 
30 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 18. 
31 Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 24. 
32 Ibid., 30. 
 9 
 
investigation. His work, therefore, also does not provide a developed theory of American 
diplomacy. 
 As demonstrated, the works that discuss diplomacy between the US and other states 
are more empirical than theoretical.33 Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman’s edited volume, 
American Diplomacy, recognizes the issue of scholars and policymakers giving more 
attention to American grand strategy and foreign policy than to American diplomacy. 34 
While the essays in the volume contribute to the general study of American diplomacy, this 
section specifically analyzes the first chapter, written by Wiseman, as he underlines that 
International Relations theorists underestimate diplomacy. In his chapter, “Distinctive 
Characteristics of American Diplomacy,” Wiseman argues that the US has a distinctive form 
of “anti-diplomacy,” accepting in practice many diplomatic norms and practices while 
remaining reluctant to acknowledge the fact.35 To demonstrate this claim, Wiseman argues 
that the US practices diplomacy in a distinctive manner, and that the distinctiveness steams 
from seven characteristics of American diplomacy.36  
 Through his analysis of the characteristics of American diplomacy, Wiseman 
examines the relationship between international relation theorists and the study of diplomacy. 
Wiseman argues that realism “overlook a great deal that distinguishes national diplomatic 
culture and styles that affect international affairs.”37 Realists perceive diplomacy as static 
and universal rather than evolving and particular.38 Moreover, realists believe that diplomacy 
                                                 
33 Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1969); 
John Greenville and George Young, Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy 
1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); Robert Schulzinger, US Diplomacy since 1900 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
34 Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, eds., American Diplomacy (Leiden: Martinus Njihoff Publishers, 
2012). 
35 Geoffrey Wiseman, “Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy,” in American Diplomacy, ed. by 
Paul Sharp et al. (Leiden: Martinus Njihoff Publishers, 2012), 4. 
36 Wiseman, “Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy,” 4. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid., 22. 
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fails to achieve the objective of advancing the country’s national interests, which is why they 
do not give much importance to diplomacy within their theory of International Relations.39 
Similarly, liberals doubt that diplomacy promotes international cooperation as much as they 
think it should, and, therefore, the practice of diplomacy is also overlooked.40 Wiseman’s 
work, therefore, further supports the argument that the literature on US diplomacy lacks an 
appropriate framework that is drawn from the concepts of International Relations theory.  
 
Dominant themes of literature on US foreign policy towards East Asia 
 In this section, I analyse the literature on US foreign policy towards East Asia to 
demonstrate that the dominant themes of the literature are the question of stability in the East 
Asian region and security. Little attention is given to the subject of diplomatic interaction 
between the United States and East Asia. The literature on US foreign policy towards East 
Asia refers to numerous theories of International Relations, as scholars explain their 
perspectives concerning stability and security in East Asia. There is, however, a lack of 
literature on the subject of diplomacy between the two regions, specifically Track II 
diplomacy between the US and DPRK. Scholars have, therefore, given little attention to 
diplomacy, focusing predominantly on the theme of security and the question of stability. 
 The main understanding concerning the situation of post-Cold War East Asia has 
conventionally been underpinned by Realist assumptions, and focuses on prospects for 
regional tension and heightened great power conflict.41 Richard Betts’ “Wealth, Power and 
                                                 
39 Wiseman, “Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy, 22. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War,” 
International Security 18, no. 3 (1994): 34-77; Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a 
Multipolar Asia,” International Security 18, no. 3 (1994): 5-33; Michael Mastanduno, “Incomplete 
Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia,” in Asian Security Order, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, 
(Redwood City: Standford University Press, 2003), 141-170; Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East 
Asia in the Twenty-first Century,” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 81-118. 
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Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War,” and Aaron Freidberg’s 
“Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” argue that Asia could see a 
return of power politics, return of arms racing, and possibility of major conflict among Asian 
countries.42 Robert Ross writes in his article, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the 
Twenty-first Century,” that liberalist scholars argue that the tension in post-Cold War East 
Asia will “increase because of the relative absence of the three liberal/Kantian sources of 
peace: liberal democracies, economic interdependence, and multilateral institutions.”43  
Other perspectives concerning security and stability of East Asia that are not 
underpinned by Realist or Liberal assumptions are, however, appearing in the academic 
literature. David Kang points out that the pessimistic predictions from realists that “Asia 
would experience a period of increased arms racing and power politics has largely failed to 
materialize” and argues that East Asia should be examined through the theory of 
constructivism—the perspective of East Asia’s own history and culture.44 Kang critiques 
widely-used Realist approaches by arguing that it is problematic for scholars to project 
concepts, theories and experiences derived from the European experience onto East Asia.45 
On a similar note, Peter Katzenstein argues that regional commonalities differentiate Asian 
from European politics in terms of institutional form, type of identity, internal structure, and 
characteristic political practice.46 John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno also voice their 
concern that European-centred theories may not apply or be useful towards the East Asian 
region.47 These scholars, therefore, question whether the International Relations theories that 
are deeply rooted in Western philosophical traditions and debates are applicable to US 
                                                 
42 Betts, “Wealth, Power and Instability,” 36-37; Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” 7.  
43 Ross, “The Geography of the Peace,” 81. 
44 David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, 
no. 4 (2003): 58. 
45 Ibid., 57. 
46 Peter Katzenstein, “Regionalism Reconsidered,” Journal of East Asian Studies 7, no. 3 (2007): 395.  
47 Ikenberry and Mastanduna, International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, 2.  
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relations with East Asia. Amita Acharya notes that the theory of constructivism is becoming 
central to literature on East Asian international relations because “its focus on issues of 
culture and identity, resonate well” with Asian scholars.48 
Muthiah Alagappa’s Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features 
also questions the claim made by Friedberg and other Realist scholars of how East Asia 
would become a dangerous region where rivalry, power balancing and conflict would 
prevail.49 He instead argues that the international political, economic and social interaction 
of most East Asian states, “occurs in the context of a stable and predictable environment and 
generally is in accord with internationally accepted principles and norms.”50 Alagappa’s 
Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features examines the security order of 
East Asia.51 Algappa argues that six pathways sustain the security order; these are hegemony, 
balance of power, regional multilateral institutions, United Nation system, nongovernmental 
institutions, and economic cooperation and interdependence. 52  This edited volume is 
structured around the study of security order in Asia, and includes a chapter that investigates 
the impact of Track II process, or nongovernmental institutions, on the form and function of 
the Asian security order. 
Brian Job’s “Track 2 Diplomacy: Ideational Contribution to the Evolving Asia 
Security Order,” questions to what extent Track II processes have had an impact on 
determining the characteristics of the post-Cold War security structure in the Asian region 
and whether past Track II processes are capable of sustaining forward momentum on 
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enhancing norms and modalities of sub-regional and regional security cooperation.53 Job 
adopts the analytical eclectic mode of inquiry that includes multiple theoretical 
perspectives—realism, liberalism and constructivism—to analyse the influence of 
nongovernmental institutions and unofficial processes on Asian security.54 His analysis of 
the Track II diplomacy is, however, based on the broader spectrum of Track II processes, 
such as unofficial public diplomacy, informal diplomatic process, and regional and sub-
regional multilateral security dialogues throughout Asia. 55  The focus is, therefore, on 
multilateral institutions, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its 
corresponding nongovernmental (Track II) multilateral institutions, and the effect that these 
multilateral institutions have on cooperative security. His analysis consequently does not 
include the narrower Track II processes that include a particular form of dialogue activity 
which involves the meeting of academics, journalist, and government officials attending in 
their unofficial or private capacities.  
Another approach that challenges the dominant Realist perspective concerning 
security in East Asia is the “critical theoretical approach” and the “human-centered policy 
approach” introduced by Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald.56 In their edited volume, 
Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific, Burke and McDonald question the understanding of 
traditional or Realist security studies. They and other contributors address some of the 
problems, people, and vulnerabilities of the East Asian region that they believe have been 
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neglected in the dominant literature. The critical theoretical approach “interrogates the 
deeper assumptions underpinning security discourses and policies.”57 The human-centred 
policy approach “avoids the state and elite bias of traditional security analysis and instead 
focuses on the security, welfare and emancipation of human beings and communities.”58 The 
edited volume, therefore, approaches East Asia not through theories concerning deterrence, 
alliance systems strategy and counter-insurgency, but through emancipation, human security, 
security politics, language and threat-constructions. While the focus of the articles written 
about the Korean peninsula or China is on traditional conflicts and security concerns, issues 
are perceived through the critical theoretical approach.59 The main purpose of this book is to 
underline forms of insecurity and suffering that have been misunderstood or neglected by 
traditional security studies.60 It, therefore, aims to re-define security in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The edited volume, however, pays little attention to diplomacy, both official and 
unofficial, nor does it mention whether diplomacy plays or does not play a role in the re-
defined security order of this region. The theme of the literature concerning US foreign policy 
towards East Asia is about the question of security and stability within the East Asian region, 
and pays little attention to the diplomatic relation between the US and East Asia.  
 
Lack of literature on Track II diplomacy between US and DPRK 
There is little research on Track II diplomacy between US and the DPRK. Instead the 
English-language literature on North Korea is predominantly policy driven. Furthermore, as 
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argued by Charles Armstrong, most of the literature is written by security experts who are 
more concerned with influencing US policy than understanding North Korea itself.61 I first 
analyse the authoritative literature that has influenced US policymakers’ and media’s 
perspective of North Korea, and the US foreign policies towards the DPRK to demonstrate 
that the primary focus of US policy is the nuclear issue more than any other issue concerning 
North Korea. I then analyse the authoritative literature concerning nuclear negotiations 
between the US and the DPRK to demonstrate that the literature focuses on Track I 
diplomatic procedures, and is primarily descriptive. I lastly analyse the literature concerning 
Track II diplomacy with US and DPRK to show that the literature is also descriptive, and 
does not provide an analytical framework that can be used as a theoretical framework for this 
dissertation. 
 
Dominate focus of US foreign policy towards North Korea 
The authoritative literature pertaining to US foreign policy towards North Korea 
focuses on North Korea’s nuclear program and analyzes this issue predominantly through a 
security perspective where the significant factor of analysis is military power and military 
instruments.62 As will be later demonstrated, these scholar’s interpretation of the North 
Korean government’s behaviour and their perception of North Korea’s strategic intentions 
about its nuclear program are reflected in US government policies. United States foreign 
policy towards North Korea is, therefore, predominantly focused on the nuclear issue more 
than any other issue. Nicholas Eberstadt’s “Hastening Korean Reunification” (1997) and 
Marcus Noland’s “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through” (1997) are two such articles 
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that have led the scholarship that has shaped US foreign policy towards North Korea.63 Other 
influential scholarship includes Victor Cha’s “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on 
the Korean Peninsula” and David Kang’s “International Relations Theory and the Second 
Korean War.”64 Cha’s and Kang’s arguments can also be found in their jointly-authored book 
Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies.65  
Eberstadt argues that the “North Korean regime is the North Korean nuclear 
program” and because the North Korean program is what supports the existence of the North 
Korea regime, the only strategy that will bring peace to the Korean peninsula and resolve the 
North Korean issue is unification under South Korean rule.66 Eberstadt, therefore, argues that 
US policy towards North Korea should focus on Korean unification. Eberstadt argues that 
gradual unification is not possible since the North Korean government will not accept a 
program of economic liberalization. Instead, “the weight of evidence indicates that the 
leadership believes that economic liberalization would be lethal for the regime.”67 Eberstadt 
also argues against diplomacy by underlining that any diplomatic act with the North Korean 
government will turn into “tribute-seeking diplomacy.”68 In other words, if the US- DPRK 
relation was normalized and the two nations were to enter into an economic relationship, the 
North Korean government would only extort foreign aid from the US, using its nuclear 
program as leverage. Under these conditions, the acceptable policy is one that prepares for 
and attempts to expedite unification.69  
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Noland’s article examines the economic status of North Korea, and offers three 
options that the North Korean leadership faces, which are: economic reform, collapse of the 
North Korean regime and unification with South Korea, or muddling through, making 
adjustments when circumstances dictate.70 Noland also briefly discusses which option China, 
Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States would prefer. 71 Noland proposes that 
“long-run US interests” are better served by the option of unification by South Korea, 
compared to the other two options.72 He argues that the US would not only bear little of the 
direct costs of unification, but also unification has the prospect of ending North Korean 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 73  Noland, therefore, supports Eberstadt’s 
argument that unification by South Korea is a promising solution for the US concerning 
North Korea and its nuclear program. 
While Eberstadt and Noland argue that the policy of unification, even if it is coerced, 
best serves the interests of the US, Cha and Kang argue that engagement with the DPRK 
must be part of the US policy.74 Cha and Kang argue that North Korea is neither irrational 
nor undeterrable; they, however, adopt different assessments concerning North Korea’s 
nuclear ambitions. Relying on the theories of preventive war and power transitions, as well 
as the desperation theory, which argues that a country might rationally decide on war if 
alternatives are even worse, Cha envisages that North Korea will instigate another conflict 
and is, therefore, a threat to the United States.75 Kang, however, disputes Cha’s argument. 
Relying on the theory of deterrence, Kang argues that North Korea will not instigate another 
conflict because deterrence works—the US has made it clear that a North Korean attack 
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would fail.76 Kang also argues that North Korea’s “nuclear weapons, missile programs, and 
massive conventional military deployments are aimed at deference and defense.”77 North 
Korea’s nuclear program is, therefore, a product of DPRK’s legitimate security concerns, 
and the purpose of the program is to protect the DPRK from existential threats. Although 
both Cha and Kang argue that the most desirable option concerning North Korea’s nuclear 
program is engagement, they differ in their assessment of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. 
Cha argues that the program is for offensive capabilities, while Kang argues that it is for 
defensive purposes.  
There is a number of English language scholarly books on North Korea that aim to 
explain various aspects of the state, such as the everyday life of North Korea citizens, human 
rights, and its economy.78 A large bulk of the literature concerning North Korea, however, is 
focused and written in the context of what the US’ response to North Korea’s nuclear 
program should be. The authors’ arguments can be seen in US government policies 
concerning North Korea, as their scholarship has influenced one of the primary issues that 
have stood out in the policy debate: containment and/or regime change vs. engagement.79 
Policymakers in the US government have been divided between the two contrasting policies 
concerning the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. One group of policy-
makers, known as hardliners, believes that the North Korean government is increasing its 
nuclear capacity to deter attacks, intimidate its neighbours and/or sell its products to other 
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nations.80 They proclaim that the North Korean government’s violation of a series of non-
proliferation agreements result from the government’s intention of regime survival. 81 
Hardliners, therefore, believe North Korea is a threat to the interests of the United States and 
believe that the only strategy worth pursuing is isolation and containment to ensure the 
dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program.82  
A component of the hardliner’s preferred policy is complete verifiable irreversible 
dismantlement (CVID) and the use of economic sanctions. The literature concerning CVID 
states that the primary goal of the US government must be complete dismantlement of all 
North Korean nuclear weapons in a complete verifiable manner.83 The literature argues that 
any policy that does not strive for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization, 
demilitarization, and termination of hostilities and illicit activities is rewarding North Korea 
for “escalating belligerent provocations.” 84  The literature on financial and economic 
sanctions argues that sanctions force the North Korean regime to make better decisions 
concerning its wealth and present the leadership with a choice between reform and collapse.85 
Financial sanctions are, therefore, perceived by hardliners as being successful in restraining 
the North Korean government and pressuring it to modify its behaviour. Some hardliners, 
however, take a step further, seeking regime change, which would lead to the collapse of the 
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current North Korean government and unification under South Korean rule.86 Like Eberstadt, 
they believe that the eradication of North Korea is the solution for a denuclearized and 
peaceful Korean peninsula. Hardliners favour isolation, containment, and transformation of 
North Korea rather than attempting engagement and diplomacy.  
The other group of policy-makers is known as soft-liners, or moderates. Contrast to 
hardliners, they believe that the North Korean government’s fear of United States pre-
emptions led it to develop a nuclear program. 87  The United States government should, 
therefore, resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations.88 This 
policy is against economic sanctions and acts of military deterrence, arguing that they have 
not worked to end the North Korean crisis, but instead have led to more tension on the Korean 
Peninsula.89 The body of literature produced by moderates reasons that the US government 
should take steps to persuade rather than force North Korea to cooperate.90 Moderates argue 
that the primary purpose of the North Korean nuclear program is to leverage the US and other 
countries into providing North Korea with political, economic and security benefits.91 The 
components of US policy towards North Korea should, therefore, entail economic and 
political incentives. 92  Mike Mochizuki and Michael O’Hanlon’s Crisis on the Korean 
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Peninsula introduce such a policy, which they label as a “grand bargain.”93 The authors argue 
that in return for the North Korean government limiting its conventional forces and 
completely dismantling its nuclear capability, the United States should provide economic aid 
and guarantees of military security. 94  The policy literature from moderates focuses on 
components and points that US diplomats should bring to the negotiating table, but it does 
not adequately explain why these components will lead to a successful negotiation, nor does 
it take role of Track II diplomacy into consideration.  
The literature concerning United States foreign policy towards North Korea focuses 
predominantly on the denuclearization of North Korea. Scholars and government officials 
introduce and argue for what they believe is the most efficient route to dismantling North 
Korea’s nuclear program, with the debate being framed within the security perspective. 
 
Nuclear negotiations literature 
There is a body of literature that discusses United States diplomatic negotiations with 
the DPRK.95 The literature, however, focuses primarily on Track I diplomatic processes, and 
is more empirical than theoretical. I demonstrate this argument through the analysis of the 
authoritative English-language literature concerning the nuclear negotiations that occurred 
during the first and second North Korean nuclear crisis.  
In Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Joel Wit, Daniel Poneman 
and Robert Gallucci present an inside account of the first North Korea nuclear crisis and trace 
the efforts of the Clinton administration that led North Korea to freeze its nuclear program 
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starting from March 1993 to July 1995. Using international government documents, 
memoranda, cables, and notes, the three authors discuss the concerns that the Clinton 
administration had towards North Korea’s nuclear program and the diplomatic efforts that 
lead to the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.96 The authors establish the obstacles 
that negotiators faced as the negotiators sought to intertwine military, economic, and 
diplomatic instruments to create a multi-part strategy that would persuade North Korea to 
accept significant constraints on its nuclear activities, while deterring rather than provoking 
a violent North Korean response.97 While the authors discuss President Carter’s visit to North 
Korea, they do not provide an in-depth analysis of the Track II diplomatic efforts, as the 
book’s main focus is to provide the US government’s perspective of the first North Korean 
nuclear crisis.  
Leon Sigal also provides a comprehensive account of the first North Korean nuclear 
crisis in Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Using extensive 
interviews and daily newspaper coverage, Sigal presents the details to how the Korean 
nuclear crisis originated, how it escalated to point that the United States almost went to war, 
and how the crisis was defused and resolved. Referring to game theory and strategy of 
reciprocity, Sigal argues that the North Korean government was willing to negotiate its 
nuclear program in exchange for light-water reactors and a normalized relationship with 
United States. He establishes that the United States government at first refused to engage in 
negotiations, and was only able to recognize the option of a peaceful conflict resolution after 
the failure of coercive diplomacy, and after the personal intervention by former president 
Jimmy Carter. Sigal, therefore, argues that the US government carries a preference towards 
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coercion than cooperation when dealing with aggressive nations.98 Sigal’s work is important 
as it presents a different account of the first North Korean nuclear crisis, as he incorporates 
the argument that the US prefers coercion than cooperation when interacting with aggressive 
nations. He also argues that North Korea was willing to cooperate and negotiate, disputing 
prior beliefs and scholarship about North Korea. He, however, does not focus on the Track 
II diplomatic efforts that occurred during this time period and its role within the Track I 
diplomatic efforts, as he gives more attention to the actions and decisions of the US 
government.  
While Wit, Poneman, Gallucci and Sigal focus on the first North Korean nuclear 
crisis, Funabashi provides a comprehensive and multiple-perspective account of the second 
North Korean nuclear crisis in The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean 
Nuclear Crisis. Drawing upon interviews with key government officials, Funabashi goes 
beyond the bilateral context of the United States and North Korea, and depicts how the efforts 
of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States attempted to lay the framework 
for multilateral negotiations, first as trilateral meetings that included the US, China and North 
Korea, and then as the Six Party Talks. Funabashi discusses the historical, geopolitical and 
security concerns of the participating states, and also illustrates the failures of these states 
that led to the deepening of the second nuclear crisis. Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi made efforts to create a normalized relationship with North Korea only for the 
attempts to become hampered by the abduction issue.99 The US government attempted to 
search for a quick and permanent solution to the nuclear issue, but the “two governments in 
one” and the inner-struggle within the Bush administration concerning the nuclear solution 
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resulted in the prolongation of the negotiations.100 Russia offered to play the role of “honest 
broker” and proposed of a “package solutions” that the Russian government believed would 
be accepted by other nations.101 The North Korean government, however, did not trust Russia 
and the weakest point of the proposed solution was that it failed to lure China into the 
arrangement. The role of the Chinese government shuffled between its traditional 
relationship with North Korea, and leading the multilateral diplomacy to defuse the nuclear 
crisis.102 Despite China’s efforts, North Korea carried out a nuclear test in October 2005. The 
South Korean government played a self-appointed role as “balancer” in the East Asian 
region, but it started to lose trust and support from other countries for South Korea to play a 
central role in a post-unification Korean peninsula.103 Funabashi examines the actions of the 
states that participated in the Six Party Talks, and concludes that these actions may have 
deepened the crisis than resolve it. He, however, does not provide an analysis of the nuclear 
negotiations, but rather provides a detailed account of the security interests and perspective 
of the participating nations.  
 
United States Track II Diplomacy with North Korea 
Few have analysed or sought to explain United States Track II diplomacy to North 
Korea.104 The available literature on US-DPRK Track II diplomacy is primarily descriptive. 
Marion Creekmore’s A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and 
North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions describes former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to North 
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Korea and his Track II diplomatic efforts to mediate the first nuclear crisis that occurred 
between the United States and North Korea. Unlike Wit, Poneman, and Galluci’s book that 
uses governmental documents, Creekmore’s book relies on the personal papers and notes of 
President Carter. Creekmore accompanied President Carter on his trip to North Korea, which 
gave him access to primary sources that were not available to other analysts. The book 
describes the process of how President Carter, as a private citizen, was able to travel to North 
Korea, meet with North Korea’s President Kim Il-Sung, and leave with an understanding that 
contributed to a peaceful suspension of the nuclear crisis. 105 Creekmore’s book aims to 
establish that the former president was concerned that the US government was misjudging 
the actions of North Korea, and that President Carter’s initiative to go and visit North Korea 
was because he believed that Kim Il-Sung wished to resolve the nuclear issue through a 
peaceful resolution.106 The book, however, does not attempt to provide analysis of this Track 
II diplomatic effort, but instead provides a detailed empirical account of President Carter’s 
visit to North Korea.  
Accounts of United States initiated Track II diplomacy to the DPRK are mainly 
available in reporting from non-governmental agencies and media reporting, and are mainly 
descriptive than scholarly. The well-connected National Committee of American Foreign 
Policy (NCAFP) hosted Track II conferences in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2009 that 
complemented the official, or Track I, Six Party Talks, and allowed the participating six 
states to explain their perspective of the North Korean nuclear crisis in an unofficial 
setting.107 Several DPRK participants and US officials said that they found the meetings 
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helpful.108 The NCAFP published information about the Track II diplomatic efforts that the 
NCAFP hosted in its journal, American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National 
Committee of American Foreign Policy and in the related NCAFP yearly reports.109 The 
reports and articles include observations of the conferences, perspectives of the different 
participating nations, and the goals of the NCAFP. The publications, however, cannot be 
considered as scholarly since the literature is primarily descriptive. In June 2017, the National 
Committee on North Korea (NCNK) released a report about Track II diplomacy with North 
Korea.110 Similar to the publications of the NCAFP, the NCNK report is more descriptive 
than analytical, in that it offers no analytical framework which explains why the 
organizations initiated US Track II diplomatic activities with the DPRK. There is, therefore, 
an absence of research on United States diplomacy towards North Korea, particularly in 
terms of Track II diplomacy.  
 
Research question 
During the administrations of George W. Bush, the dominant view, as expressed by 
the National Security Council, the president’s office, and the vice president’s office, was that 
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Policy 28, no. 3 (2006): 269-70; Donald Zagoria, "East Asian Security Challenges," American Foreign Policy 
Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 29, no. 1 (2007): 11-22.  
110 Daniel Wertz, Track II Diplomacy with Iran and North Korea: Lessons Learned from Unofficial Talks 
with Nuclear Outliers, Washington D.C.: The National Committee on North Korea, 2017, accessed July 27, 
2017, http://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/NCNK_Track_II_Conference_Report_0.pdf. 
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the United States should not engage in Track I diplomacy with North Korea.111 Even when 
both states were engaged with each other through the multilateral diplomacy of the Six Party 
Talks between 2002 and 2008, the Bush administration continued to express a reluctance to 
engage in Track I diplomacy with North Korea. The Bush administration, for example, 
instructed the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly 
not to engage in bilateral talks with the North Korean government delegation. 112 
Nevertheless, unofficial or Track II diplomacy, initiated by representatives of United States 
non-governmental organizations closely connected to Track I officials, took place throughout 
the period of the Bush administrations. The well-connected National Committee of American 
Foreign Policy (NCAFP) hosted Track II conferences on Northeast Asian security; the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra visited Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea to play a public 
concert; and academics from Stanford University visited the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific 
Research Center, North Korea’s main nuclear facility. Track II diplomacy, therefore, had the 
consequence of managing diplomatic channels between the United States and the DPRK 
when official channels were closed.113  
As demonstrated in the first section of this chapter, there is a lack of research on 
Track II diplomacy between the US and the DPRK, and so the question that arises from the 
research gap is why did influential United States non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
initiate and pursue Track II diplomacy with the government of the DPRK during the United 
States administrations of George W. Bush that began on January 20, 2001 and ended on 
January 20, 2009? 
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112 Ibid., 338. 
113 Kruth, Erin. “US Alternative Diplomacy towards North Korea: Food Aid, Musical Diplomacy, and Track 
II Exchanges,” in SAIS US-Korea Yearbook 2008 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 2008). 
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Thesis 
 Even though the United States and the DPRK were diplomatically engaged with each 
other, the Bush administration continued to express a reluctance to engage in Track I 
diplomacy with North Korea. This placed constraints on Track I diplomats. The argument 
that I aim to demonstrate is that non-state actors pursued Track II diplomacy because they 
believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of US Track I 
diplomacy that took place between the Bush administration and the North Korean 
government. My dissertation’s understanding of Track II diplomacy is a type of diplomatic 
practice where non-state actors help compensate for the limitations that state actors face 
during Track I diplomacy through processes, such as problem-solving workshops, 
influencing public opinion, and cooperative economic development.114 This understanding 
of Track II diplomacy is significant as it emphasizes an important function of Track II 
diplomacy, which is its ability to become an effective support to the official negotiation 
process. Track II diplomacy can play an important complementary role at all stages of the 
negotiation process. 
 Although United States non-state actors recognized the divergent national interests 
of the United States and the DPRK, they hoped that the Bush administration would continue 
to resolve the North Korean nuclear conflict through diplomacy. They perceived United 
States policy as being over-reliant on military solutions while ignoring and underestimating 
the value of diplomacy in conflict resolution. Track II diplomacy was, therefore, designed to 
assist official Track I diplomats and the diplomatic process by compensating for the 
constraints that were imposed upon these state actors by the Bush administration.  
 
                                                 
114 Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch,” 161. 
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Methodology 
This dissertation evaluates secondary material that includes books and scholarly 
articles about Track I and Track II diplomacy between United States and the DPRK, and 
books and articles about US foreign policy goals towards North Korea and the instruments 
the US government used to achieve those goals. This dissertation also uses primary data that 
includes government and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports, reports from the 
National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) and the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra, and interviews.  
Secondary data is obtained from libraries and electronic sources. Primary data is 
obtained through news services, such as The New York Times, and The Los Angeles Times. 
Primary data is also obtained through databases, such as LexisNexis, which is used to gain a 
broader access to relevant articles. Material on Track II diplomacy is obtained from the 
American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee of American 
Foreign Policy, which is the journal that is published by the NCAFP and the NCAFP yearly 
reports.115 The journal of the NCAP and the yearly reports include information about the 
Track II diplomatic efforts that the NCAFP hosted with DPRK and other participating Six 
Party Talk states. The journal can be found using the database, Taylor & Francis.116 The 
yearly reports are published on the NCAFP website.117 My thesis is from the perspective of 
                                                 
115 "For the Record," (2004): 73-76; "News and Views," (2005): 459-61; "News and Views,” (2006): 276-79; 
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US non-governmental organizations and the Bush administration, which have produced 
material written in English. I will, therefore, be mainly using English-language material. 
 This dissertation also makes use of interviews with organizers of Track II diplomacy 
between the US and the DPRK in order to supplement the gaps that appeared after the 
secondary and primary literature was reviewed and analysed. I specifically interviewed those 
who played a key role within the Track II diplomatic endeavours, as a main unit of analysis 
of this dissertation are those who have initiated and/or pursued Track II diplomacy with the 
DPRK. I have gone through the appropriate ethical procedures, as established by the 
University of Central Lancashire, and have obtained ethical approval to address the issue of 
gaining informed consent. In order to obtain consent from participants, I created a consent 
form which the participant signed before the interview began. Interviews raise some 
understandable methodological and theoretical concerns, such as the problems of 
distinguishing truth from authenticity, potential bias, and the informant’s memory.118 For a 
variety of reasons, the informant may omit important details, or they may view the situation 
through “distorted lenses” and provide an account that is misleading and unable to be 
checked or verified.119 Original interviews are, however, necessary in order to gain a better 
understanding of why non-governmental organizations pursued Track II diplomacy. This 
study is moreover based on the perceptions and beliefs of the organizers of Track II 
diplomacy. Interviews were, therefore, chosen as the primary method because they allow me 
to examine the subject’s attitudes and beliefs in depth, and because interviews provide insight 
into “experiences, processes, and behaviors.” 120  Semi-structured interviews is the most 
                                                 
118 George Gaskell, “Individual and Group Interviewing,” in Qualitative Researching: With Text, Image and 
Sound. A practical handbook, ed. Martin W. Bauer and G. Gaskell (London: SAGE Publications, 2000), 38-
56; Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Karl Nunkoosing, 
“Problems with Interviews,” Qualitative Health Research 15, no. 5 (2005): 698-706. 
119 Gaskell, “Individual and Group Interviewing,” 44. 
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appropriate form of interviewing since it not only provides some organization and structure, 
but also allows for flexibility and subject feedback.121 The organization and structure allows 
for specific topics to be addressed, while the flexibility and subject feedback gives rise to 
unconsidered questions or topics.  
 
Chapter outline 
My dissertation consists of a total of eight chapters, including introductory Chapter 
1. The analytical framework of my research, including its understanding of Track II 
diplomacy, is established in Chapter 2. The analytical framework draws from the following 
concepts of diplomacy. The first is that diplomacy is conducted by the state and state-
sanctioned actors through the process of negotiation. The second is that diplomacy is also 
conducted by non-state actors. The third is that the relationship between the state and the 
non-state actor within the realm of diplomacy can be demonstrated in a specific form of 
diplomacy, known as Track II diplomacy.  
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 specifies the constrictions of US Track I diplomacy during 
the Bush administration, which Track II diplomacy aimed to compensated for. The aim of 
Chapter 3 is to demonstrate that although articulated and manifested in different forms by 
different presidencies, American exceptionalism in the theory and practice of United States 
diplomacy, is very profoundly embedded in the historical and conceptual framing of United 
States foreign policy. The idea of American exceptionalism as moral superiority is helpful in 
the effort to understand United States reluctance to engage diplomatically with non-
democratic states. Chapter 4 demonstrates that the United States delegation to the Six Party 
Talks was unable to fulfil the normal functions of diplomacy because of the underlying 
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philosophy of the ideology of American moral exceptionalism that impeded active 
diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government.  
Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7 discuss three cases of US Track II diplomacy 
towards North Korea that occurred during the Bush administration. Chapter 5 analyses the 
Track II diplomatic efforts initiated by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 
(NCAFP). I argue that the National Committee on American Foreign Policy pursued and 
initiated a series of Track II meetings from 2003 to 2005 to compensate for the US delegation 
to the Six Party Talks’ inability to facilitate the communication of US policy objectives to 
the DPRK. To explain the NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic approach, I make use of Herbert 
Kelman and Stephen Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop. Their model reflects 
my analytical framework, as I establish in my analytical framework that problem-solving 
workshops have the potential to compensate for limitations of official diplomacy.  
Chapter 6 examines the US scientific activities pursued by the academics of Stanford 
University and the Nautilus Institute of Security and Sustainability in the DPRK. In lieu of 
the unsuccessful efforts by the Bush administration to obtain information about the DPRK’s 
nuclear program, these activities can be explained by diplomatic theories that have been 
established in my analytical framework, specifically the concept that non-state actors are 
partaking in functions of diplomacy. Chapter 6 argues that the scientific activities can be 
understood as fulfilling the Track I diplomatic function of gathering information about 
another state. By gathering information and transferring their findings back into the United 
States Track I policymaking processes, the Stanford University academics and the Nautilus 
Institute compensated for the Bush administration Track I diplomatic limitations. 
Chapter 7 shows that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang can 
be understood as a partial compensation for the US delegation’s inability to fulfil the normal 
diplomatic function of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the 
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DPRK. While it can be debated whether this visit can be categorised as a form of Track II 
diplomacy, the New York Philharmonic’s visit to the DPRK played a complementary role to 
the Six Party Talks, as the visit helped the United States delegation to the Six Party Talks 
fulfil certain functions of diplomacy. By doing such, the visit can be considered a form of 
Track II diplomacy. The analytical framework of this dissertation argues that Track II 
diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors compensate for the 
constraints that state actors face in official diplomacy. The orchestra aimed to present a 
positive image of the United States to the North Korean government and the North Korean 
public. In so doing, the activities of the New York Philharmonic can be understood as a 
partial compensation for the United States delegation’s inability to ease the diplomatic 
friction between the US and the DPRK. 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of and summarizes the research. There are 
numerous other forms of nongovernmental activity that have been carried out by United 
States intermediaries in regards to North Korea, such as the global, nongovernmental, 
humanitarian aid organization Mercy Corps program to alleviate hunger in North Korea by 
expanding agricultural production, or Syracuse University educational initiatives. 122 The 
three case studies that my dissertation analyses, however, best demonstrate my dissertation’s 
understanding of Track II diplomacy. These cases partially compensated for the United States 
delegation to the Six Party Talks’ inability to fulfil a normal function of diplomacy. 
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Chapter 2 Analytical Framework 
 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I develop the analytical framework to explain why influential United 
States non-state actors initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the government of the 
DPRK during the George W. Bush administration. I argue that Track II diplomacy was 
pursued by non-state actors because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate 
for the shortcomings of US official diplomacy that took place between the Bush 
administration and the North Korean government. I develop an analytical framework that 
takes into account the role of the state and non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy 
through the analysis of the literature on diplomacy, since Track II diplomatic activities 
involves state and non-state actors.  
 I first introduce my analytical framework, which draws on concepts of diplomacy. In 
the following section, I further analyse these concepts within the context of the International 
Relations theories of political realism and neoliberal institutionalism. I then analyse the 
classical literature on diplomacy to argue that two conceptual underpinnings of diplomacy 
are that diplomacy is conducted by the state and that negotiation is central to diplomacy.1 
The classical literature on diplomacy does not take into consideration the role of the non-
state actor in diplomacy or the nature of Track II diplomacy. In the third section, I address 
these limitations. Through the analysis of literature on post-Cold War diplomacy, I argue that 
diplomacy is also conducted by non-state actors, since non-state actors are engaging in 
practices that have been conventionally known as core diplomatic tasks.2 The emergence of 
                                                 
1 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: The Macmillan Press, 
Ltd., 1977); Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
Knopf, 1993); Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
2 John Robert Kelley, “The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 21, no. 2 
(2010): 286-305; Richard Langhorne, “Current developments in diplomacy: Who are the diplomats now?” 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 8, no. 2 (1997): 1-15; Richard Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 
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non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy does not mean that non-state actors are replacing 
the state-sanctioned actors as the diplomatic representative, as argued by Langhorne.3 In the 
last section, I argue that the relationship between the state and non-state actor can be 
demonstrated in a specific practice of diplomacy known as Track II diplomacy, through the 
analysis of the literature on Track II diplomacy.4  
 
Analytical framework 
 In order to explain why non-governmental organizations pursued Track II diplomacy 
with the government of the DPRK during the Bush administration, the analytical framework 
draws from the following concepts of diplomacy. The first assumption is that diplomacy is 
conducted by the state and state-sanctioned actors through the process of negotiation, as 
argued by the classical literature on diplomacy.5 The second assumption is that diplomacy is 
also conducted by non-state actors, as the literature on post-Cold War diplomacy such as 
Richard Langhorne’s “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors” and John Robert Kelley’s “The 
New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution” argue that non-state actors are engaging in core 
diplomatic tasks.6 Diplomacy, therefore, involves a wide range of actors that go beyond the 
                                                 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 16, no. 2 (2005): 331-339; Michael Lisowski, “How NGOs Use Their Facilitative 
Negotiating Power and Bargaining Assets To Affect International Environmental Negotiations,” Diplomacy 
& Statecraft 16, no. 2 (2005): 361-383; Geoffrey Allen Pigman, “Making Room at the Negotiating Table: The 
Growth of Diplomacy between Nation-State Governments and Non-State Economic Entities,” Diplomacy & 
Statecraft 16, no.2 (2005): 385-401; Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, 
“Introduction,” in Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics, ed. Old Jacob Sending et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 5. 
3 Langhorne, “Current developments in diplomacy,” 3, 4; Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 
332. 
4 Ronald J. Fisher, “Coordination Between Track Two and Track One Diplomacy in Successful Cases of 
Prenegotiation,” International Negotiation 11 (2006): 65-89; Ronald J. Fisher, “Prenegotiation Problem-
Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful Negotiation,” International Journal 44, no. 2 
(1989): 442-474; Joseph Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,” in 
The Psychodynamics of International Relationships Vol II ed. V.D. Volkan, J. Montville & D.A. Julius 
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), 161-175. 
5 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 170; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 108, 530-531; Nicolson, 
Diplomacy, 3, 39, 52. 
6 Kelley, “The New Diplomacy,” 286; Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 334; Sending, 
Pouliot, and Neumann, “Introduction,” 5. 
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state, which include intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. 
The emergence of non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy, however, does not indicate 
that the role of the state and state-sanctioned actors is irrelevant or has become obsolete.7 
The third assumption is, therefore, that the relationship between the state and non-state actors 
in diplomacy can be demonstrated in a specific form of diplomacy, known as Track II 
diplomacy. 8  Track II diplomacy is a practice of diplomacy where non-state actors help 
compensate for limitations that state actors face during official diplomacy.  
 The analytical framework of this dissertation makes use of the concepts of the 
International Relations theories of realism and neoliberalism. It, however, makes less use of 
constructivist theory. According to the constructivist framework,  identities and interests of 
actors of the international system are endogenous and socially constructed, rather than 
exogenous and fixed, making identities and interests significant features of international 
relations.9 Constructivists are, therefore, interested in how constituent actors are able to 
acquire their current identity and the interests that are assumed to go along with it, and how 
specific identities of specific states shape their interests, and thereby, patterns of international 
outcomes.10 Wendt and Ruggie, who are considered core constructivist scholars within the 
                                                 
7 Juergen Kleiner, “The Inertia of Diplomacy,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 19, no. 2 (2008): 321-349; Sending, 
Pouliot, and Neumann, “Introduction,” 5. 
8 Tobias Böhmelt, “The effectiveness of tracks of diplomacy strategies in third-party interventions,” Journal 
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Discussions,” 442-474; Jeffrey Mapendere, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of 
Tracks,” Culture of Peace Online Journal 2, no. 1 (2005): 66-81; John W. McDonld, “Further Exploration of 
Track Two Diplomacy,” in Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts ed. Louis Kriesberg and 
Stuart J Thorson (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 201-220; Montville, “The Arrow 
and the Olive Branch,” 162; James Notter and John McDonald. “Track Two Diplomacy: Nongovernmental 
Strategies for Peace,” Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, accessed on April 19, 2016, 
http://www.davidmlast.org/POE410-
2016W/7_Management_files/Notter%26McDonald(1996)Track2diplomacy.pdf. 
9 John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social 
Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization, vol 52 no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 856; Alexander Wendt, 
“Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 
vol. 46 no. 2 (Spring 1992) 397, 403. 
10 Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?,” 863.  
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field of International Relations as determined by the February 2007 TRIP survey of 
International Relations faculty in the United States and Canada , argue that the identities and 
interests of actors are generated by international interactions—by what other actors do.11 The 
identities and interests of actors, such as foreign policy identities and national interests, are, 
thereby, constructed socially. The aim of my dissertation, however, is not to explain the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy or American diplomacy, per se. Rather, it is more interested 
in showing how the United States government regards diplomacy, particularly within the 
context of its foreign policy towards the DPRK, in order to better demonstrate that Track II 
diplomacy is a complement to official Track I diplomacy. It is, therefore, not necessary to 
use the fundamental principles of constructivism as a framing device.  
 
Core elements of classical literature on diplomacy 
 In this section, I demonstrate two core components in terms of understanding 
diplomacy as established by the classical literature on diplomacy. The first component is that 
the classical literature on diplomacy understands diplomacy as being conducted by the state. 
The conceptualization of the state that informs this perspective can be understood through 
the paradigm of Political Realism theories, which assumes the state as sovereign, 
independent, and equal to other states in the international system.12 The second component 
that I demonstrate is that the classical literature on diplomacy understands negotiation as the 
core component of diplomacy. Diplomacy, therefore, does not involve the usage of force, as 
the negotiation process is conducted through peaceful means. The classical literature on 
                                                 
11 Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney, “The View From the Ivory Tower: 
TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada,” College of William & 
Mary, February 2007, https://www.wm.edu/offices/itpir/_documents/trip/ivory_tower_view_2007.pdf; 
Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?,” 879; Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it,” 403. 
12 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 318-319. 
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diplomacy does not conceptualize negotiation, but the concepts of the negotiation process 
can be understood through I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman’s framework on 
negotiation, as set out in The Practical Negotiator. 13  This framework argues that the 
negotiation process can be analysed through specific stages, sequences, behaviours, and 
tactics. These two core elements of diplomacy are in works that have become authoritative 
and influential in understanding the nature and function of diplomacy, including Harold 
Nicolson’s Diplomacy, Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, and Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 
 
Diplomacy is conducted by the state 
 In this section, I argue that diplomacy is conducted by the state, and those who 
represent and are, thereby, authorized to act in the name of the state, as argued by the classical 
literature on diplomacy.14 The conceptualization of the state that informs this perspective can 
be understood through the paradigm of Political Realism theories.15 Given the paradigm of 
Political Realism thought, which gives states more importance than non-state actors, the 
classical literature on diplomacy understands the state, rather than non-state actors, as the 
key actor in diplomatic interaction. 
 In his work Diplomacy (1939), Nicolson argues that diplomacy is conducted by the 
professional diplomat, who is the representative of the state.16 Nicolson was part of the 
diplomatic service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for twenty 
years, from 1909 to 1929.17 Diplomacy was written due to Nicolson’s concern that the public 
                                                 
13 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982). 
14 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 163; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 531; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 4.  
15 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 13. 
16 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 39, 52. 
17 T.G. Otte, “Nicolson,” in Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, ed. G.R. Berridge et al. (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 152-153. 
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was misunderstanding and misusing the term diplomacy, and so his purpose for this work 
was to explain what he believed diplomacy is and what it is not.18 Although Nicolson’s 
Diplomacy does not provide a theoretical framework for understanding diplomacy, his work 
makes use of conceptual insights of what is now known as the International Relations theory 
of Political Realism, represented by Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace (1948).19  
 To represent and specify his understanding of diplomacy, Nicolson uses the definition 
of diplomacy as given by the Oxford English Dictionary, namely, “diplomacy is the 
management of international relations by negotiations; the method by which these relations 
are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the 
diplomatist.”20 This definition of diplomacy provides various understandings of diplomacy, 
but it implies that diplomacy is conducted by specific official agents who are authorized to 
act in the name of the state. Nicolson argues that diplomacy is a definite profession, which 
is why he dedicates an entire chapter of his scholarship to what he believes to be the qualities 
of an ideal diplomatist. 21  Nicolson also specifies which official agents should conduct 
diplomacy, as he states that he believes that diplomacy should be practiced specifically by 
professionals who have been trained in the art of negotiation and have discretion and 
experience in negotiation.22 Nicolson then argues that this “professional diplomat is the 
servant of the sovereign authority,” and that in democratic countries, the sovereign authority 
is represented by the government.23 The professional diplomat is, therefore, the servant of 
the state, as Nicolson assumes the sovereign authority as the state. 
                                                 
18 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 4. 
19 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 13. 
20 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 4-5. 
21 Ibid., 14, 55-67. 
22 Ibid., 39, 52. 
23 Ibid., 41. 
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 Nicolson describes the state as being independent, which indicates that Nicolson 
assumes the state as having no authority above it, or as sovereign.24 Nicolson’s scholarship 
can be understood through the paradigm of Political Realism thought, represented by Hans 
Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Morgenthau 
argues that the independence of a state signifies that there is no authority above the state, 
which he then argues is a particular aspect of the supreme authority of the state, or a state’s 
sovereignty. 25  The state is, therefore, free to manage its internal and external affairs 
according to its discretion and without the interference of another state, as long as the 
decisions of the state do not violate existing treaty or international law. Nicolson understands 
the state as the sovereign authority, and so the sovereign authority that the professional 
diplomat serves is the state. Nicolson’s work demonstrates that diplomacy is state-directed 
as he argues that diplomacy is conducted through the professional diplomat who represents 
the state.  
 Similar to Nicolson, Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace argues that diplomacy is conducted by the state through the agents that speak for 
and represent the state.26 Morgenthau’s scholarship is one of the few theories of International 
Relations that gives attention to the subject of diplomacy. Morgenthau argues that 
international peace can be achieved through diplomatic processes, because diplomacy can be 
used by the state to minimize and mitigate international conflicts.27 Morgenthau understands 
diplomacy as the formulation and execution of foreign policy.28 In order to successfully 
formulate and execute a state’s foreign policy, and thereby resolve international conflicts, 
                                                 
24 Nicolson, Diplomacy, 41. 
25 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 318. 
26 Ibid., 108. 
27 Ibid., 529. 
28 Ibid., 146. 
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Morgenthau argues that there are four tasks that diplomacy must manage.29 Diplomacy must 
first determine its objectives taking into account the power that is actually and potentially 
available for the pursuit of these objectives.30 Diplomacy must then access the objectives of 
other states and determine whether the other states have the power to pursue their 
objectives.31 The third task is to determine the compatibility of these different objectives.32 
If the objectives are not compatible, then through diplomatic bargaining, the give and take of 
compromise, a way must be found to which the interests of the different nations can be 
reconciled.33 Diplomacy must lastly establish the correct means for achieving its policy 
objectives.34  
 Morgenthau argues that the instruments of diplomacy, or those who are responsible 
for performing these tasks of diplomacy, are two. The first instrument is the foreign offices 
in the capitals of the respective state, which is the agency where foreign policy is 
formulated.35 These foreign offices are better known as the ministries of foreign affairs, 
which are responsible for the formulation and execution of foreign policy; although in most 
states, the foreign ministry formally shares control over the making of foreign policy with 
other ministries and executive activities.36 The second is the diplomatic representative sent 
by the foreign offices to the capitals of foreign nations, or the diplomat.37 According to 
Morgenthau, the ones who conduct diplomacy are, therefore, the ministry of foreign affairs 
and the diplomat. He, moreover, argues that these instruments of diplomacy act as the 
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representative of the state, which indicates that Morgenthau believes that diplomacy is 
conducted by the state, or those sanctioned by the state.38  
 The main unit of Morgenthau’s scholarship is the statesmen.39 When Morgenthau 
inquiries into why states seek power, he does so from the perspective of the statesman; he 
assumes that the statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.40 Morgenthau 
argues that statesmen are those who speak for and represent the state in international affairs.41 
These agents speak for the state, negotiate treaties in the name of the state, define the 
objectives of the state, choose the means for achieving these objectives, and try to maintain, 
increase and demonstrate the power of the state.42 As demonstrated earlier, according to 
Morgenthau, the ones who are responsible the actions of defining the objectives of the state, 
and choosing the means for achieving these objectives are the foreign offices and the 
diplomat. The diplomat is, therefore, a statesman, and consequently, an agent of the state 
who representatives the state and acts on behalf of the state.  
 The classical literature on diplomacy understands diplomacy as being conducted by 
the state through official agents who are authorized to act in the name of the state.  
 
Negotiation is a core element of diplomacy 
 While the study of diplomacy consists of a varied set of conceptual frameworks, 
making diplomacy a rich theoretical field of research, a common theme of the literature on 
diplomacy is the centrality of the negotiation process to diplomacy.43 In this section, I first 
demonstrate that negotiation is a core concept of diplomacy, as argued by the classical 
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literature. The classical literature on diplomacy does not discuss in detail the concepts of the 
negotiation process, nor does it fully elaborate the procedures of the negotiation process. The 
classical literature, however, does argue that processes of diplomacy do not involve the usage 
of force, which I demonstrate in the second section. In the following section, I demonstrate 
the concepts of the negotiation process as understood through I. William Zartman and 
Maureen Berman’s framework on negotiation, as set out in The Practical Negotiator. 
Zartman and Berman’s framework of negotiation incorporates the understanding of 
negotiation that has been established by the classical literature on diplomacy.  
 
The significance of negotiation to diplomacy 
 Negotiation is a central component of diplomacy, as understood by the classical 
literature on diplomacy. In Diplomacy, Nicolson’s understanding of diplomacy is intertwined 
with negotiation, making negotiation a core component of diplomacy. Nicolson understands 
diplomacy as being the execution of foreign policy, which he also describes as negotiation.44 
In his scholarship, Nicolson attempts to correct the public’s misunderstanding of diplomacy, 
which was that diplomacy implied both the formation of foreign policy and the execution of 
that policy.45 Nicolson argues that diplomacy involves only the execution of foreign policy 
and that it does not imply the formation of foreign policy. 46  According to Nicolson, 
diplomacy is carried out by negotiation, as he argues that foreign policy is executed through 
negotiation.47 Negotiation is, therefore, a central component of diplomacy. 
 Nicolson’s understanding of the relationship between diplomacy and negotiation can 
again be seen when he discusses diplomatic theory. Nicolson argues that diplomatic theory 
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is the principles and methods of negotiation and international conduct that are common to all 
international intercourse and have been generally accepted by the international community.48 
The main unit of Nicolson’s diplomatic theory is the negotiation process, which implies that 
Nicolson perceives negotiation as a core element of diplomacy. Nicolson elaborates and 
discusses what he calls “two main currents of diplomatic theory,” which are two different 
methods of negotiation.49 The first theory, or method of negotiation, is what Nicolson calls 
“the warrior or heroic” theory, and regards diplomacy as war by other means.50 The methods 
are similar to military tactics rather than the intercourse of give and take, and are managed 
by the military.51 The purpose of negotiation according to the warrior theory of diplomacy is 
total victory, and, therefore, any concession made or treaty concluded is regarded as a 
weakness.52 The second theory, or negotiation method, is called the “mercantile or shop-
keeper theory” and regards diplomacy as an aid to peaceful commerce.53 The mercantile 
theory is based on the assumption that a compromise between rivalries is generally more 
profitable than the complete destruction of the rival.54 Negotiation is, therefore, an attempt 
by mutual concession to reach some understanding, thereby reconciling their conflicting 
interests.55 Nicolson discusses these methods of negotiation to demonstrate that negotiations 
is a core concept of diplomatic theory, implying that negotiation is the core of diplomacy.  
 Morgenthau understands negotiation as a core component of diplomacy, as he argues 
in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace that it is through negotiation 
that the third task of diplomacy can be fulfilled. 56  The third task that diplomacy must 
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accomplish is determining the compatibility of the different objectives of each state. 57 
Morgenthau elaborates that if the objectives are not compatible, then through diplomatic 
bargaining, the give and take of compromise, the states must find a way to reconcile the 
different interests.58 Morgenthau describes the give and take process as follows. State A must 
first determine whether its objectives are so important that they must be pursued despite the 
incompatibility with the objectives of state B. If state A finds that its objectives are essential 
towards its national interests, then state A must determine whether state B’s objectives are 
essential for state B’s national interests. If state A concludes that state B’s objectives are not 
essential for state B’s national interest, then state A must persuade state B to abandon its 
objectives by offering state B equivalents that are not important to state A.59 Morgenthau 
argues that the incompatible objectives and interests of each state can be reconciled through 
compromise. Morgenthau does not use the term negotiation in his scholarship. The process 
that he demonstrates, however, reflects Nicolson’s second negotiation method, the 
mercantile or shop-keeper theory, where conflicting interests are reconciled through 
compromise and the discovery of a middle point.60 Morgenthau understands negotiation, or 
what he calls diplomatic bargaining, as a core component of diplomacy.  
 In The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Bull also demonstrates 
the centrality of negotiation to diplomacy through his argument that diplomacy can only fulfil 
one of its function if negotiation is possible.61 Bull’s scholarship inquires into the nature of 
order in international politics, and questions how order is maintained within the present 
system of sovereign states, despite the anarchical characteristics of the international arena.62 
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Bull argues that diplomacy is one of the five institutions of international relations that 
contribute to international order, which he defines as “the pattern of activity that sustains the 
elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society.”63 The other 
institutions are: balance of power, international law, managerial system of great powers, and 
war.64 Through the five institutions of international relations, states collaborate with one 
another to carry out the political functions of the international society, such as the function 
of making the rules or legislation, and thereby maintain order.65  
  In his section on diplomacy, Bull argues that an important function of diplomacy is 
the negotiation of agreements to ensure that relations between states do not consist of only 
brief, hostile encounters.66 Bull demonstrates the centrality of negotiation to diplomacy when 
he argues that the extent to whether diplomacy can occur is connected to whether negotiations 
can be carried out. Bull understands negotiation as the process of determining the areas of 
common interests between states, and bringing the states to an awareness of the overlapping 
interests.67 According to Bull, if the state views its foreign policy as the rational pursuit of 
common interests, diplomacy is able to serve its function in the international system.68 Bull 
elaborates and emphasizes that diplomacy “can play no role where foreign policy is 
conceived as the enforcement of a claim to universal authority, the promotion of the true faith 
against heretics, or as the pursuit of self-regarding interests that take no account of the 
interests of others.”69 In these situations, states are unable to find or determine areas of 
common interests since states refuse to take into consideration any other objectives or 
interests other than their own. Diplomacy is, therefore, not possible because negotiation 
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cannot take place. According to Bull, diplomacy is linked to whether negotiation, or the 
pursuit of common interests, is plausible, making negotiation a core part of diplomacy.  
  The classical literature on diplomacy understands negotiation as a central aspect of 
diplomacy, as the literature argues that diplomacy is implemented by the process of 
negotiation.  
 
Diplomacy does not involve the use of force 
  While diplomacy may involve the threat of force, diplomacy does not involve the use 
of force. Once diplomacy involves the usage of force, it ceases to be diplomacy and becomes 
its opposite, namely war.70 This concept of diplomacy can be seen in the classical literature’s 
understanding of war and diplomacy. The classical literature argues that war and diplomacy 
are both instruments of the state through which a state’s objectives can be attained.71 The two 
differ in the means that they employ. Unlike war, which is conducted through violent means, 
diplomacy is conducted through peaceful means.72 
 In Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Morgenthau is more 
explicit in his understanding concerning the different methods and means of war and 
diplomacy. Morgenthau argues that the objective of war is to break the will of the other state 
by bringing the greatest amount of violence upon the other state’s most vulnerable areas.73 
The objective of diplomacy is, however, not to break the will of the other state, but to bend 
the other state’s will through compromise.74 Diplomacy does not involve hurting the interests 
of the other state, and, therefore, does not involve the use of force. Morgenthau mentions in 
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his scholarship that military force is a necessary means of diplomacy, but he is discussing 
the threat of force not the actual use of force.75 Morgenthau argues that the threat of force, 
along with persuasion and compromise, are the three means which diplomacy employs to 
pursue its objectives.76 Military strength can, therefore, be used by the state to impress the 
other state, and to convey the message that disaster will be inescapable if negotiations are 
not conducted.77 While diplomacy may involve the threat of force, it does not involve the 
usage of force. Once diplomacy does so, it can no longer be called diplomacy, but war.  
 
The characteristics of the negotiation process 
 In this section, I demonstrate the concepts of the negotiation process as understood 
by I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman’s The Practical Negotiator. Zartman and 
Berman incorporates the classical literature on diplomacy’s understanding of negotiation, as 
both understand negotiation as a process where the differing interests of the states are 
reconciled.78 The classical literature on diplomacy, however, does not discuss the traits or 
procedures of the negotiation process. Although Zartman and Berman’s The Practical 
Negotiator may not relay new information concerning negotiation, as argued by Robert 
Purnell, this scholarship is considered innovative by James R. Silkenat and Roger Fisher due 
to its usage of data gathered from extensive interviews and questionnaires addressed to senior 
diplomats, United Nations ambassadors, and other high-ranking negotiators from a number 
of different nations.79 
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 Zartman and Berman’s The Practical Negotiator discusses the concepts of the 
negotiation process, and develops a model of the negotiation process that is composed of 
three stages. Each stage is based on what Zartman understands as being the turning points of 
the negotiation process, and the stages are focused on concepts that form the negotiation 
process.80 The first stage is the pre-negotiation stage, where both states recognize that it is in 
their mutual interest to negotiate and agree on the need to negotiate.81 The second stage is 
the formula stage. The aim of this stage is to identify and agree on the basic principles of an 
agreement, also known as the guidelines or framework of the agreement, and ensure that this 
formula serves the interest of both states so that the agreement can be concluded and 
observed.82 Once the formula is established, negotiators can start focusing on more precise 
points of conflict and begin their search for agreement on details to implement the established 
framework. 83  This stage is known as the details stage. Zartman and Berman present a 
sequential view of negotiation, and argue that this framework of negotiation can be used to 
improve the conduct of negotiations, and better the chances of success.84  
 Zartman develops this framework of negotiation based on his belief that the 
negotiation process can be properly analysed, and that no satisfactory theory on negotiation 
has been developed because there are aspects of the negotiation process that have not been 
taken into full consideration.85 In his article “Negotiations: Theory and Reality,” Zartman 
argues that theoretical and experimental portrayals of negotiations have interpreted 
negotiation as an incremental process of concessions and counter-concessions.86 Zartman, 
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however, argues that the negotiation process is not simply an incremental process where 
negotiators propose offers in an effort to narrow the gap between themselves and the other 
party until a single point of convergence is reached.87  
 The negotiation process, according to Zartman, is a search for a formula, or 
framework, that contains and justifies outcomes acceptable to both parties.88 The context in 
which the concessions or the details are determined must be taken into consideration. The 
main subject of negotiations is, therefore, not the details, but what Zartman calls referent 
principles. Zartman defines referents as the principles of justice on which both parties can 
agree, and they can be philosophical principles such as equality, split-the-difference, 
compensation, or special rights.89 Once the referent principles are established and agreed 
upon by both parties, a formula for the agreement can be recognized. The negotiation process 
is more than an incremental process where concessions and counter-concessions are 
exchanged. The negotiation process revolves around a search for referents, which become 
the formula of the negotiation, so that the details can be properly implemented. Zartman 
perceives negotiation in terms of referents, formulas, and details. The different phases of his 
framework of negotiation, which is set out in The Practical Negotiator, is, therefore, focused 
around those concepts, becoming important components of the negotiation process.  
 
Limitations of the classical literature on diplomacy 
 In this section, I demonstrate the limitations of the classical literature on diplomacy. 
The classical literature on diplomacy does not take into consideration the role and function 
of non-state actors in diplomacy. In addition, this bulk of literature pays little attention to the 
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nature of unofficial, or Track II diplomacy. As argued by the post-Cold War literature on 
diplomacy, I establish that diplomacy is conducted not only by the state, but also by non-
state actors, which according to the International Relations theory of neoliberal 
institutionalism are also important actors of the international system.90 The emergence of 
non-state actors in the domain of diplomacy, however, does not indicate that the role of the 
state is obsolete.91 Through the analysis of literature on Track II diplomacy, I argue that the 
relationship between the state and non-state actors within the domain of diplomacy can be 
demonstrated by a specific form of diplomacy known as Track II diplomacy. Track II 
diplomacy is a practice of diplomacy where non-state actors help compensate the limitations 
that state actors face during Track I diplomacy through its processes, such as problem-solving 
workshops, influencing public opinion, and cooperative economic development.92 
 
Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy 
 In this section, I argue that diplomacy involves a wide range of actors that includes 
not only the state, but also non-state actors. The post-Cold War scholarship on diplomacy 
argues that non-state actors are engaging in practices that have conventionally been defined 
as core diplomatic tasks, and have, therefore, emerged as a key actor in the domain of 
diplomacy.93 The conceptualization of non-state actors that informs this perspective can be 
understood through the paradigm of the International Relations theory of neoliberal 
institutionalism, which regards non-state actors as essential actors in the international 
                                                 
90 Kelley, “The New Diplomacy,” 286; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-
State Actors,” 334; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, “Introduction,” 5. 
91 Langhorne, “Current developments in diplomacy,” 3, 4; Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 
332. 
92 Montville, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch,” 161. 
93 Kelley, “The New Diplomacy,” 286; Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 334; Sending, 
Pouliot, and Neumann, “Introduction,” 5. 
 52 
 
system. 94  These non-state actors appear in the form of nongovernmental organizations, 
corporations, and intergovernmental organizations.95 The emergence of non-state actors in 
the domain of diplomacy, however, does not indicate that the role of the state and state-
sanctioned representatives in diplomacy is insignificant or irrelevant.96 
 
Rise of non-state actors in diplomacy 
 Non-state actors engage in diplomacy by practicing core diplomatic tasks. The 
functions, or tasks, of diplomacy include facilitating communication between the political 
leaders of state and other entities in world politics, negotiating agreements, gathering 
intelligence or information about foreign countries, minimizing the effects of friction in 
international relations, and symbolizing the existence of rules to which states and other 
entities in the international system pay some allegiance.97 The primary functions non-state 
actors are engaging in are information gathering and communication functions, as 
demonstrated by international environmental negotiations and diplomacy between states and 
non-state economic entities.98  
 Bull’s The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics understands that 
the state is not the only important actor of world politics, as he argues that non-state actors 
are engaged in diplomacy with other states and other non-state actors.99 Aspects of Bull’s 
work have commonalities of what would later be known as the theory of neoliberal 
institutionalism, represented by Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
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Discord in the World Political Economy. Keohane’s scholarship, like that of Bull’s, is 
concerned with the ways in which institutions allow states to cooperate on the basis of 
complimentary interests, and thereby views norms and institutions as solutions to different 
kinds of conflicts in the international system.100 In the case of Bull’s scholarship, the issue is 
how world order is maintained in an anarchical system.  
 Within his framework on understanding world order, Bull does not believe that non-
state actors explain the basic causes of how order is maintained in contemporary world 
politics.101 Bull, therefore, does not focus on international organizations such as the League 
of Nations or the United Nations as the cause of order. He instead chooses to analyse the 
institutions of international society, which he argues arose before the establishment of the 
international organizations and would continue to operate even if these international 
organizations did not exist.102 Although Bull argues that non-state actors do not contribute to 
world order, he argues that non-state actors help contribute to the workings of the institutions 
of international society. Diplomacy is, therefore, conducted by the state and also by political 
entities that are not recognized as a state, but have standing in world politics, such as the 
United Nations.103 Bull’s scholarship ascribes a role of greater importance to non-state actors 
than Political Realist assumptions, but because Bull views the international system as being 
anarchical, Bull still considers the state as being an important actor of the international 
system. Bull, therefore, does not disregard the importance of the state and state-sanctioned 
representatives in the domain of diplomacy, as the main unit of his scholarship is the state.  
 The post-Cold War literature on diplomacy also argue that non-state actors are 
engaging in diplomacy. In “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” Richard Langhorne argues 
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that diplomacy involves many more participants who are experts in matters other than 
diplomacy and hold positions outside foreign ministries.104 Langhorne’s understanding of 
diplomacy is the management of international transactions passed between states and entities 
created by states.105 He, however, argues that this practice is being managed increasingly 
more by non-state actors because global crises are becoming beyond the control of the 
government and relevant intergovernmental organizations.106 This creates space for non-state 
actors to come play a significant role.107 Similarly to Langhorne, Kelley argues that the key 
actors of diplomacy are no longer the state and state-sanctioned representatives, but non-state 
actors that include NGOs, public intellectuals, and religious leaders.108 
 Langhorne and Kelly argue that one factor that induced the rise of the non-state 
actor’s influence over diplomacy is the widespread adoption of information communication 
technologies (ICT), such as the Internet.109 The information power gained through ICTs 
elevated the influence of the public domain to behave in ways that are not necessarily 
coextensive with the system of the states. This “communications revolution,” therefore, led 
to the emergence of a wide range of human activities that has no connection or ties to 
government permission or regulation.110 According to Langhorne, much of these human 
activities are able to weaken governmental authority, diminish its role, and loosen the bonds 
of loyalty between the population and its government.111 The weakening of state structures 
leads to state collapses and domestic political violence.112  
                                                 
104 Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 331. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., 332. 
108 Kelley, “The New Diplomacy,” 286. 
109 Kelley, “The New Diplomacy,” 289; Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 332. 
110 Langhorne, “The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,” 332. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
 55 
 
 Langhorne argues that these types of situations have proven to be very difficult for 
the traditional international and diplomatic processes to resolve.113 The result is that non-
state actors adopt higher profile roles as they fill in this gap because they promise levels of 
efficiency and responsiveness that the state cannot.114 When there are conflicts that seem to 
lie beyond the control of the state and state-sanctioned actors, non-state actors emerge to play 
significant roles.115 Non-state actors are, therefore, compensating for government inaction. 
Langhorne and Kelley are, however, not solely arguing that states are sharing the role of 
diplomacy with non-state actors, or that the state is coordinating with non-state actors to 
better manage international affairs. They are arguing that in the near future, non-state actors 
will be producing the more innovative and novel forms of representation in the diplomatic 
domain.116 The change in the practice of representation is, therefore, not that the state will be 
sharing the role of managing of international transactions with non-state actors, but that non-
state actors will soon replace the role of the foreign ministry, which is the agent of the state 
that is traditionally responsible for diplomacy.117  
 
Sole focus on non-state actor in diplomacy is not adequate 
 As if to compensate for the lack of importance that the literature on classical 
diplomacy gave to non-state actors, Kelley and Langhorne place too much importance on 
non-state actors, while marginalizing the state. Non-state actors are engaging in practices that 
have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks.118 The emergence of non-state 
actors in the domain of diplomacy, however, does not mean that the role of the state and 
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state-sanctioned representatives in diplomacy is insignificant or irrelevant, particularly since 
it is the state that carries law-making and law-enforcement powers.119 Langhorne and Kelley 
furthermore do not adequately demonstrate their argument that diplomacy will be practiced 
not by the diplomat and foreign ministries, but by non-state actors. 
 Langhorne acknowledges that the state is equipped with a highly developed method 
of representing itself to other states, which can be found in the services and structure of 
foreign ministries.120 He, however, argues that governments and tax-paying constituents are 
no longer certain that they need the services of foreign ministries, although he fails to specify 
which government of which state. 121  Constituents, therefore, believe that the foreign 
ministries can no longer carry out the job the governments want done, while non-state actors 
can. According to Langhorne, the rise of non-state actors will bring about the end of the 
diplomatic primacy of states, and diplomacy will, therefore, be practiced not by the diplomat 
and foreign ministries, but by non-state actors. Langhorne, however, does not provide 
sufficient cases to support his argument. Although Langhorne argues that a change is 
occurring in the practice of representation, he does not demonstrate how his argument is 
consistent with reality. He fails to provide concrete facts to his interpretation of the changes 
occurring in diplomacy.  
 Kelley argues that his argument of how non-state actors are becoming more 
influential in the domain of diplomacy is based on his belief that diplomacy is no longer an 
institution, but a behaviour.122 He, however, fails to elaborate upon his understanding of 
diplomacy, leaving his argument of diplomacy as a non-state behaviour unsubstantiated.123 
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Kelley states in his article that he will examine diplomacy as a non-state behaviour in relation 
to power, yet he does not.124 He rather argues that non-state actors have gained authority in 
the realm of diplomacy, contextualizes the idea of “newness,” and then introduces and 
discusses five features that he argues will permanently change the way diplomacy is practiced 
for the longer-term.125 Kelley, therefore, does not clearly demonstrate his understanding of 
diplomacy. This lack of explanation makes it difficult to comprehend in what way non-state 
actors are the new diplomats of the international system.  
 Kelley’s article is also limited by an illogicality. Kelley argues in his article that 
“diplomacy is now well beyond the point of opening itself to the public—it is becoming 
enmeshed within the public domain.”126 Nicolson, however, argues in his work, Diplomacy 
(1939), that the public interest is, and should be, rightly focused upon the stage where policy 
is being framed and decided.127 For democratic countries, the public domain has been playing 
a role in the shaping of foreign policy long before Kelley’s article was published, indicating 
that Kelley’s argument is not new. At the end of his article, Kelley argues that diplomats are 
now being defined by a unique skill set rather than membership to an established class.128 
Kelley’s understanding of diplomacy as a behaviour could, therefore, mean that diplomacy 
is no longer a practice performed by the state, but a specific set of actions and skills that are 
being adopted by the non-state actors. Yet, Kelley then questions whether the activities done 
by the non-state actor, or the new diplomat defined by a unique skill, can still be called 
diplomacy.129 His questions concerning what diplomacy is makes it difficult for the reader 
to comprehend his exact understanding of diplomacy.  
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 Langhorne and Kelley’s argument places too much emphasis on the non-state actor 
while marginalizing the state. Although there is a rise of non-state actors in diplomacy, this 
does not mean that the role of the state has become irrelevant. As argued by Juergen Kleiner 
in his article, “The Inertia of Diplomacy,” only the state carries law-making and law-
enforcement powers.130 Only states are in the position of deciding whether or not to sign 
international agreements and treaties.131 Non-state actors, therefore, do not have the power 
to sign international treaties. There is, therefore, a certain limit to what non-state actors can 
do. The relationship between the state and the non-state actor in the domain of diplomacy is 
not an inverse relationship, where if the non-state actor gains more power the state has less 
power. Rather, the state and non-state actors coexist in what Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent 
Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann’s Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics call a “mutually 
constitutive relationship.”132 The tasks that the non-state actors perform add to and change 
ways of doing things for the state actors, and the non-state actors model their operations on 
the institution of diplomacy. This relationship can be seen in a specific form of diplomacy 
known as Track II diplomacy.  
 
Track II diplomacy 
 Scholars of “Track II diplomacy” use the term to distinguish this practice of 
diplomacy from official, state-to-state diplomacy, which they call Track I diplomacy.133 In 
this section, through the analysis of the literature on Track II diplomacy, I argue that Track 
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II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors assist state-sanctioned 
actors by compensating for the limitations that the officials of Track I diplomacy face. This 
can be done through processes, such as problem-solving workshops, influencing public 
opinion, and cooperative economic development.134 In this section, I first discuss the role 
and function of Track II diplomacy as well as the tasks of the processes of Track II 
diplomacy. I then demonstrate how the Track II diplomatic process of problem-solving 
workshops is able to help overcome the limitations of official diplomacy.  
 
Role and function of Track II diplomacy 
 According to US State Department Foreign Service Officer Joseph Montville, Track 
II diplomacy is a process involving unofficial, informal interactions between members of 
adversary groups with the aim of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and 
organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict.135 
Montville was the first to coin the term “track II diplomacy” in his co-authored article 
“Foreign Policy According to Freud” (1981). 136  Since Montville’s article on Track II 
diplomacy, various articles and books have been published on this subject, many who use 
and cite Montville’s understanding of Track II diplomacy.137 The main focus of the bulk of 
literature on Track II diplomacy is on establishing the specific processes of Track II 
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diplomacy, or the question of coordination and cooperation between Track I and Track II 
diplomacy.138  
 Montville’s scholarship addresses why Track II diplomacy occurs, as he argues that 
Track II diplomacy is designed to assist the officials of Track I diplomacy and to compensate 
for the constraints imposed upon these officials.139 Montville’s scholarship assumes that they 
face limitations, such as the need to be seen as strong, wary, and indomitable in the face of 
the enemy by their constituents, and that the resources and procedures of Track I diplomacy 
may not be enough to resolve the conflict.140 Track II diplomacy, therefore, occurs in order 
to compensate for the shortcomings of official diplomacy, and assist officials of Track I 
diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is not a substitute for Track I diplomacy, but an 
interdependent process of Track I diplomacy. The processes of Track II diplomacy 
consequently do not replace those of Track I diplomacy.   
 Since the coinage of Track II diplomacy, a variety of types of diplomacy have been 
identified, such as Track One and a Half diplomacy. Jeffrey Mapendere introduces this type 
of diplomatic practice in his article, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the 
Complementarity of Tracks.”141 Mapendere understands Track One and a Half diplomacy as 
“public or private interaction between official representatives of conflicting governments or 
political entities…which is facilitated or mediated by a third party not representing a political 
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organization or institution.”142 According to Mapendere, the main feature that distinguishes 
Track One and a Half diplomacy from Track II diplomacy is the participant. He argues that 
the participants of Track II diplomacy are not official representatives of the conflicting states, 
while in Track One and a Half diplomacy, the participants involved are official 
representatives of the conflicting groups.143 The main distinguishing feature of Track 1.5 
diplomacy is that in Track 1.5 diplomacy, there implies an element of a formal transfer of 
information back into the government. In Track II diplomacy, while the participants may be 
a current or former government official, these officials are participating within an informal 
context and do not represent the state formally. They, however, may still have privileged 
access to policymakers by virtue of their official government position.  
 Within the realm of the study of Track II diplomacy, there are cases of envoy 
diplomacy, such as the key role that Professor Kei Wakaizumi with regard to the revision of 
Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Wakaizumi was sent to the United States as a special envoy of 
Japan’s Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, and witnessed the Prime Minister and United States 
President Richard Nixon sign a secret document that granted the US the right to bring nuclear 
weapons in an emergency into Okinawa after its reversion to Japan.144 Wakaizumi was an 
envoy of the Japanese government, and thereby a state official. Wakaizumi’s role in regards 
to the US-Japan Okinawa reversion talks was a state directed venture. There is also the role 
of interest groups and nongovernmental organizations at the Versailles Peace Conference in 
1919, who aimed to represent emerging national minorities. Their aim, however, differs from 
the organisations that pursued this dissertation’s understanding of Track II diplomacy. The 
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private organisations were present at the Versailles Peace Conference to represent the 
importance of their own special interest claims.145 They were not trying to achieve American 
foreign policy objectives nor were they trying to substitute or compensate for a failure in 
American diplomacy. These cases provides a further example to the study of 
nongovernmental negotiating approaches, they, however, do not incorporate my 
dissertation’s understanding of Track II diplomacy. These cases are state-directed ventures, 
while my dissertation’s understanding of Track II diplomacy is non-state directed venture. 
 
Three interdependent processes of Track II diplomacy 
 In his article, “The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for Track Two Diplomacy,” 
Montville argues that Track II diplomacy involves at least three interdependent processes, 
which are problem-solving workshops, influencing public opinion, and cooperative 
economic development.146 Problem-solving workshops are small, facilitated workshops or 
seminars that that bring together leaders, or other representatives, of conflicting groups or 
states. 147  Most problem-solving workshops are conducted and organized by non-state 
actors.148 Non-state actors are not highly dependent on the position and interests of the state, 
and are, therefore, not tied to the agenda of the state. This status allows for increased trust 
between the participants and organizers of problem solving workshops. 149  In these 
workshops, participants develop workable personal relationships, and understand the conflict 
from the perspective of the adversary.150 At some point, they also develop joint strategies for 
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dealing with the conflict as a shared problem, a solution that requires reciprocal and 
cooperative efforts.151 The workshops are designed to promote relationships and build trust 
between the conflicted parties, develop lines and improve the quality of communication, and 
explore options that could meet both sides’ interests and needs.152 Montville, therefore, 
argues that in problem-solving workshops, it is possible for participants to “develop a vastly 
expanded understanding of a conflict” and “to undergo a personal transformation in which 
their sense of and approach to the enemy becomes humanized.” 153  In his article, 
“Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful 
Negotiation,” Fisher emphasizes that in order for the results of the problem-solving 
workshops to be effectively used to resolve the conflict, participants should be influential, 
yet informal representatives of the adversarial states.154 Participants should, therefore, have 
the potential to influence policy, but are not directly accountable for policy decisions, such 
as academics, advisers, or retired politicians. During problem-solving workshops, the 
representatives of the adversary states are brought together so that they can gain a better 
understanding of the conflict and develop joint strategies directed towards a mutually 
acceptable solution.155  
 The second process of Track II diplomacy is influencing public opinion.156 Montville 
assumes that it is not only the government of the adversary states that are in conflict with 
each other, but their constituents as well. Influencing public opinion programs are, therefore, 
considered by Montville as the most principal role for nongovernmental action, so that 
political leaders will gain public support in taking positive steps towards resolving the 
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conflict.157 These positive steps could be those that were worked out in the problem-solving 
workshops.158 The goal of the public-opinion programs is to develop respectful and “re-
humanized” relationships among adversary groups, where the major tasks involve reducing 
the sense of victimhood of the parties, and breaking down negative stereotypes and 
generalizations of the adversary.159 If this process is successful, it will create an environment 
that makes it safe for leaders to take positive steps towards resolving the conflict. 160 
Montville argues that it is important to ensure that the overall political environment reflects, 
to some extent, the understanding that participants have gained in the problem-solving 
workshops because if not, the political leaders are likely to confront strong resistance when 
they try to take actions based on their new insights.161  
 The third process of Track II diplomacy is cooperative economic development, and 
involves organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the 
conflict. Cooperative economic development may not be essential to resolving conflict, but 
Montville argues that it provides incentives, institutional support, and continuity to the first 
two processes.162 Montville elaborates that cooperative economic development stems from 
the idea that tangible economic incentives for conflicted parties can be helpful towards 
resolving conflict because it offers conflicted parties the prospect of growth, the enhancement 
of individual well-being, and a measure of stability for families and communities who have 
suffered significant personal loss and endured chronic instability.163 Cooperative economic 
development is dependent on and a result of the success of the prior processes. 
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Problem-solving workshops can help compensate for limitations of official diplomacy 
 Of the three interdependent processes, problem-solving workshops are considered by 
Montville and Fisher to be the leading form of Track II diplomacy. 164 Problem-solving 
workshops contribute to Track I diplomacy in two ways. The unofficial setting of the 
problem-solving workshops helps overcome the risks of the pre-negotiation stage. Problem-
solving workshops also compensate for the limitations of official diplomacy by facilitating 
movement towards successful negotiation. The procedures of problem-solving workshops 
create movement towards formal negotiation by opening up communication, improving 
attitudes, developing framework, and creating options directed towards resolution.165  
 The pre-negotiation stage is the phase where both states recognize that it is in their 
mutual interest to negotiate and decide to explore the possibility of negotiating.166 Zartman 
and Berman argue that the most positive way for one state to convince another state to 
acknowledge that a negotiated settlement may be in its best interest is by showing the other 
state the possibilities of creative solutions.167 New solutions, new alternatives, new ways of 
defining the issue, and new possibilities for flexibility are suggested to show that the 
conflicted states are not locked in their stalemate.168 The initiating state can also reframe the 
situation to show the other state that it is looking for exchanges rather than expecting the 
other state to give in. The possibility of exchanges, side-payments, compensation, and other 
contingent benefits are, therefore, suggested as an incentive for negotiation.169 Another way 
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of persuading the other side to negotiate is for the initiating state to suggest the idea of a 
jointly created gain, which could never exist by unilateral decision, and to show how the 
other state will gain from the new creation.170  
 Zartman and Berman argue that the risk of this method is that the attempts to show 
the beneficial outcomes of negotiations may raise the expectations of the other state to the 
point that the suggested outcomes become part of the formal negotiation agenda.171 The other 
state may, therefore, misunderstand the suggested solutions as concrete, official propositions. 
Zartman and Berman, however, do not establish how these risks can be overcome. In his 
article, “Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for 
Successful Negotiation,” Fisher argues that the unofficial setting of problem-solving 
workshops provide conflicted states a safe opportunity to explore the possibility of more 
formal negotiations and to determine the basis for future activity. 172  Problem-solving 
workshops, therefore, help compensate the risks of the pre-negotiation stage since the 
unofficial, informal setting of the workshops allows participants to explore possible solutions 
without the requirement of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage.173 Participants 
can freely discuss outcomes and strategies without the danger that the other side may 
misinterpret the ideas as a specific promise or a part of the formal negotiation agenda.  
 Problem-solving workshops also contribute to official diplomacy by facilitating 
movement in the pre-negotiation stage. The procedures of the problem-solving workshops, 
which focus on the perceptions and attitudes of participants, induce the start of the perceptual 
shift required for conflicted states to move from stalemate to negotiation.174 Fisher argues in 
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“Prenegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for Successful 
Negotiation,” that problem-solving workshops can influence the perceptions, attitudes, and 
orientations of the participants in ways that will improve both the probability of negotiation 
occurring and the likelihood of its success.175 Problem-solving workshops provide a space 
where participants can share perspectives and concerns about the conflict and the other party. 
Fisher argues that this allows for not only greater understanding of the sources and nature of 
the conflict, as participants understand the conflict from the perspective of the adversary, but 
also increased trust among participants and improvements in the relationships.176 This then 
leads to a re-perception of the adversary as a party that is reasonable and trustworthy to some 
degree. Consequently, the conflict is reassessed, such that the potential benefits of 
negotiation outweigh the risks and costs as solutions are also generated during these 
workshops.177 By shifting the participant’s perceptions and attitudes of the conflict and the 
adversary, Fisher argues that problem-solving workshops help conflicted states come to the 
realization that negotiation is a viable option.178 Problem-solving workshops, therefore, can 
be used a pre-negotiation methodology, leading conflicted states into the decision to move 
into more formal negotiation.  
 Montville and Fisher’s argument concerning Track II diplomacy and the processes of 
Track II diplomacy is case specific. To support their argument, Montville and Fisher’s 
respective scholarship analyzes cases of international conflict that did not directly involve 
the United States. Their scholarship, moreover, assumes that conflict between states is 
dominated by subjective, psychological, and social processes. Conflicts can, however, be 
assessed on a variety of indicators, including the specific degree of subjectivity. Due to the 
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lack of case studies that have adopted problem-solving workshops during the pre-negotiation 
stage, it is yet to be determined whether Fisher’s argument may be generally applicable to 
different kinds of conflicts, which is a question that Fisher himself acknowledges.179 Fisher’s 
scholarship, however, provides a model that demonstrates the contributions of problem-
solving workshops towards the pre-negotiation stage of official diplomacy that is hindered 
by subjective factors. His argument can consequently be used to explain the usage of Track 
II diplomacy during the second North Korean nuclear crisis since movement towards 
negotiation was impeded by a high degree of mistrust between the US and the DPRK, and a 
lack of meaningful and direct communication.180  
 In the remaining chapters of this dissertation, I demonstrate that US non-state actors 
pursued Track II diplomacy because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate 
for the shortcomings of United States Track I diplomacy that took place between the Bush 
administration and the North Korean government. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I demonstrate 
the ways in which the US government’s practice of diplomacy, and, therefore, Track I 
diplomacy between the Bush administration and the DPRK, was restricted. These constraints 
provided an opening for a specific role pertaining to Track II diplomacy. In Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6, and Chapter 7, I demonstrate these roles and functions, and how the processes of 
Track II diplomacy helped compensate for United States Track I diplomacy that occurred 
during the second North Korean nuclear crisis. 
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I developed the analytical framework to explain why influential 
United States non-state actors initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the government 
of the DPRK during the United States administrations of George W. Bush. In the first section, 
I introduced the analytical framework, which draws on concepts of diplomacy established by 
the classical literature on diplomacy. In the second section, I argued that diplomacy is 
conducted by the state and that negotiation is a core component of diplomacy, as argued by 
the classical literature on diplomacy. In the third section, I addressed the limitations of the 
classical literature on diplomacy. I argued that non-state actors are also engaging in 
diplomacy, as demonstrated by the post-Cold War literature on diplomacy. Non-state actors 
are, however, not replacing the state actor as the diplomatic representative. I, therefore, 
argued that the relationship between the state and non-state actor in diplomacy can be seen 
in Track II diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-
state actors help compensate the limitations that state actors face during Track I diplomacy. 
This relationship can be seen especially during the pre-negotiation stage, through the 
processes of problem-solving workshops. The analytical framework of my dissertation is 
based on the concepts that have been demonstrated in this chapter.
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Chapter 3 American Moral Exceptionalism as a Constraint on US diplomacy 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter has a rather narrow aim; to demonstrate that although articulated and 
manifested in different forms by different presidencies, American exceptionalism in the 
theory and practice of United States diplomacy, is very profoundly embedded in the 
historical and conceptual framing of United States foreign policy. The specific 
understanding of American exceptionalism that has animated American foreign policy is 
the idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous compared to other states because the 
United States’ conduct of foreign affairs is guided by ethical principles. I also show that 
ideas of moral exceptionalism have resulted in a reluctance to engage in diplomacy with 
non-democratic states.1  
Ideas about the normative or ideological functions of American exceptionalism as 
providing constraints to diplomacy do not of course provide the only explanation of all 
American foreign policy or even of all foreign policy that is directed towards non-
democratic states. Many have argued, for example, for the explanatory power of, among 
other things, strategic actors, bureaucracies, and domestic politics. 2 The claim of this 
chapter is not, however, that American foreign policy is in all instances best explained by 
notions of American exceptionalism or that other theoretical prisms are not useful. The 
claim is simply that the idea of American exceptionalism as moral superiority remains 
helpful, especially in the effort to understand United States reluctance to engage 
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diplomatically with non-democratic states. This chapter shows that this policy has some 
longevity. It is not only about what Geoffrey Wiseman demonstrates is the United States 
disinclination to establish formal diplomatic relations for many years with states that it 
deems adversarial.3 The chapter shows that since World War II, based on an explicit self-
understanding of the United States as morally superior to non-democratic states, the 
Truman administration further developed policies of isolationism towards adversarial 
states, in the form of the containment doctrine, which Litwak argues is applied to what are 
sometimes characterised as “rogue states.”4 
The aim of this chapter is, therefore, not to explain American diplomacy per se, 
given the vast literature that has explored this subject, nor is it to explain the concept of 
American exceptionalism for its own sake, especially as this topic has also had a vast 
literature devoted to its analysis. It is to establish the power of the notion of American 
exceptionalism for understanding American foreign policy underpinnings that, I argue in 
the next chapter, helps explain the trajectory of the Bush administration’s official or Track I 
diplomacy towards the DPRK.  
 This chapter proceeds by first acknowledging that there are multiple factors that 
shape United States foreign policy, and thereby competing explanations that seek to explain 
US foreign policy decisions. I then examine the various understandings of the concept of 
American exceptionalism; which have at their core a common idea that the United States is 
necessarily more virtuous and altruistic than that of other states.5 I use the framing device 
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developed by Ceaser who argues that Americans conceive exceptionalism in two ways.6 
The first is historiographical, as articulated, for example, by Michael Kammen in “The 
Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration.”7 The second is as ideology, as 
demonstrated by Davis and Sean Lynn-Jones in “Citty Upon a Hill.”8 Finally, I chart how 
United States governments have drawn on the ideology of American exceptionalism as a 
consistent framing device for a policy stance of diplomatic isolation towards states it 
considers as adversarial.  
 
The Debates: Exceptional or Not? 
This chapter evaluates continuing debates about the existence and potency of the 
theory and ideology of the American exceptionalism paradigm. Kammen, for example, 
shows that there has been a rise in debates about American exceptionalism, particularly 
since the 1990s. The chapter does not argue that theories of American exceptionalism 
determined United States foreign policy or even that such theories provide explanatory 
power for all of American diplomatic history. Arguably, for example, as I show in the next 
chapter, although the first years of the Bush administration policy towards the DPRK can 
be best explained by the power of the exceptionalism paradigm, the 2006 DPRK nuclear 
test forced a more realist or strategic response to the DPRK, as evidenced in the new 
                                                 
(May 1993): 40-54; Walt, Friedman, and Mandelbaum, “An FP Debate: Just how Special is America 
Anyway?” 71-78. 
6 James W. Ceaser, “The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism,” American Political Thought: A 
Journal of Ideas, Institutions, and Culture 1 (Spring 2012): 6. 
7 Daniel Bell, “American Exceptionalism Revisited: the Role of Civil Society,” Public Interest 95 (Spring 
1989): 38-56; Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,” American 
Quarterly 45, no. 1 (March 1993): 1-43; Seymour Martin Lipset, “American Exceptionalism Reaffirmed,” 
International Review of Sociology 2, no. 3 (1988): 25-69. 
8 Davis and Lynn-Jones, “Citty Upon a Hill,” 20-38; Stephen M Walt, Thomas L. Friedman, and Michael 
Mandelbaum, “An FP Debate: Just how Special is America Anyway?” Foreign Policy 189 (November 2011): 
71-78. 
 73 
 
mandate given to Ambassador Christopher Hill to enter into substantive security 
negotiations with the DPRK.   
The idea of American exceptionalism has been played out differently in different 
historical periods.9 This foundational impulse to understand America as different and 
morally superior to adversarial states does not automatically result in any specific foreign 
policy practice in terms of either ‘engagement’ or ‘disengagement’ with the rest of the 
world. The neoconservative movement in American foreign policy, for example, whose 
influence on Bush administration policy to the DPRK in which I detail in the next chapter, 
promoted vigorous campaigns abroad to foster regime change against what were sometimes 
understood as rogue states. Historically, conversely, ideas of American exceptionalism 
have been used to justify isolationism, as when the Republican Senate rejected the Treaty 
of Versailles after World War I.10 
I do not argue that America never in practice deals with foreign policy adversaries 
whose values they do not share. The United States regularly makes foreign policy choices 
to deal with these unpalatable actors for example in the decision by Nixon to enter into 
relations with Communist China in the 1970s. The United States government also 
intentionally set aside its moral beliefs to engage directly with non-democratic states, such 
as South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, China under Mao Zedong and 
his successors, and Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh and his successors. These decisions are 
taken in spite of the overall paradigmatic perspective of moralistic distaste, but evidentially 
there have always remained tensions between pragmatic relationship and underlying 
unease. The underlying moralistic perspective has in practice also underpinned foreign 
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policy outcomes that have been criticised as unethical for example in terms of the 
indiscriminate American bombing campaigns in Indo China during the Vietnam War. In 
one sense, this empirical observation only serves to validate my thesis; that the moralistic 
perspective in the sense of seeing America as superior and different to the ‘other’ can serve 
to justify any foreign policy practice whose aim is to isolate and challenge those that hold 
antithetical values to the American polity. 
These debates and tensions reflect the great debates in international relations theory. 
Hans Morgenthau’ for example in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace argued that states use ideology as a justification for policy, which is based upon the 
pursuit of power.11 Morgenthau’s assumes that international politics is a struggle for power, 
and so the concept of a state’s national interest is defined in terms of power.12 According to 
Morgenthau, statesmen, think and act in terms of interest defined in power, but they define, 
or disguise, their goals in terms of ethical or legal principles in order to obtain the support 
of their own constituents and to ensure that other states will not unite together in resistance 
against their goals.13 The Idealist tradition, as evidenced in some of Henry Kissinger’s 
work, takes issue with Morgenthau’s argument that ethical principles are mainly used as a 
justification or cover for rational actors acting in self-interest. Kissinger argues, for 
example, that the Truman administration believed that the goal of United States political 
action in international affairs was the pursuit of ethical principles based on American 
normative superiority.14 
                                                 
11 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace First Edition (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 61-63. 
12 Ibid., 5. 
13 Ibid., 62. 
14 Kissinger, Diplomacy, 599. 
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The works of Robert Kagan, Walter Russel Mead, Robert Osgood, Robert Tucker, 
and David Reynolds show that there are various competing factors that influence the 
making of United States foreign policy. Kagan draws upon the concepts of Morgenthau’s 
classical realism, as his writings demonstrate that he believes international relations is 
governed by considerations of power. His articles, such as “Not Fade Away: Against the 
Myth of American Decline,” and “Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places,” focus 
on the question of American power.15 Kagan argues against the decline of American power, 
as he demonstrates that the United States has global influence, but he warns that the United 
States it not omnipotent.16 Kagan cautions that there never was a time within US history 
where the United States was able to shape the international community to suit its desires 
and get other nations to do what the United States wanted them to do.17 Kagan’s main focus 
is power, and warns that due to a disparity of power between the United States and other 
states, the United States needs to earn legitimation for its actions, through promotion of not 
only its own national interest, but also the common interests of the liberal democratic 
world.18  
Mead shows the impact of Jacksonian nationalism in shaping United States foreign 
policy. In “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order,” Mead 
argues that with the rise of the Jacksonian school of thought, the United States will play a 
smaller role in liberal order building and the policy of global engagement.19 This is due to 
the American constituents’ lack of trust in the people that shaped such US foreign policy. 
                                                 
15 Robert Kagan, “Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places,” Foreign Policy, no. 137 (Jul. - Aug., 
2003): 70-72; Robert Kagan, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline,” Brookings, January 
17, 2012, accessed July 30, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/not-fade-away-against-the-myth-of-
american-decline/ 
16 Ibid., 71; Ibid., 15. 
17 Kagan, “Not Fade Away,” 7. 
18 Kagan, “Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places,” 70, 71. 
19 Walter Russel Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt: American Populism and the Liberal Order” Foreign Affairs 
(March- April 2017): 1. 
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According to Mead, Jacksonians believe that the role of the United States government is to 
look after the physical security and economic wellbeing of the American people in their 
national home, and to do so while interfering as little as possible with the individual 
freedom of the American people.20  
In “America’s Sticky Power,” Mead also argues there that are factors, other than 
Jacksonian nationalism, which help shape US foreign policy. Mead draws upon Nye’s 
international relations theory on soft and hard power.21 While he acknowledges the that soft 
power will continue to have an important role within US foreign policy, the aim of his 
article is to underline the equal importance of military and economic power.22 He argues 
that together with US soft power, which includes American values, habits, and politics, 
United States military and economic power can sustain an American hegemony, making 
the US-led global system desirable, inevitable, and permanent.23  
Other views, however, reiterate the overwhelming importance of understanding 
American power and the direction of US foreign policy as being largely shaped by military 
capabilities. Osgood, for example, shows that it was the acquisition of sophisticated 
military technology, particularly nuclear capability, that largely shaped American foreign 
policy towards adversarial states. Osgood focuses on the impact that military capabilities 
have upon the development of US foreign policy. He argues that military technology, 
particularly nuclear capabilities, can influence the United States’ relations with not only 
states that the US government deems adversarial, such as the Soviet Union, but also with 
allies.24 In “NATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration,” Osgood argues that 
                                                 
20 Mead, “The Jacksonian Revolt,” 4.  
21 Walter Russel Mead, “America’s Sticky Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 141 (March - April 2004): 48. 
22 Mead, “America’s Sticky Power,” 48. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Robert E. Osgood, “NATO: Problems of Security and Collaboration,” The American Political Science 
Review, vol. 54 no. 1 (March 1960): 106-129; Robert E. Osgood, “Stabilizing the Military Environment,” The 
American Political Science Review, vol. 55 no. 1 (March 1961): 24-39. 
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independent nuclear capabilities, particularly those of European allies, influences the basic 
foundations of the NATO alliance.25 In “Stabilizing the Military Environment,” Osgood 
focuses more upon United States’ policy of deterrence against the Soviet Union’s nuclear 
capacity. Due to the novel characteristics of the military technology that were being created 
during this time of publication, Osgood calls for a reappraisal of assumptions that underpin 
the United States’ foreign policy towards the NATO alliance and the Soviet Union, 
respectively.  
Tucker’s “Morality and Deterrence” shows that certain United States foreign 
policies have been influenced by moral understandings, particularly from Catholicism, 
while his “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” demonstrates that US foreign policy is 
influenced by the nature and behaviour of men, or more specifically, the public profession 
of the United States’ leaders.26 In “Morality and Deterrence,” Tucker discusses the 
principal moral issue of nuclear deterrence—the peace of deterrence ultimately rests upon 
the threat and the intent to do evil.27 His article shows that there are American constituents, 
and in this specific case Catholic moralists, who expect US foreign policy to contain a 
moral aspect.  
In “The Sources of American Legitimacy,” Tucker echoed Kagan’s argument in 
“Looking for Legitimacy in All the Wrong Places,” as both argued that America is losing 
its international legitimacy, especially after its actions in Iraq. Tucker argues that United 
States legitimacy was based upon four factors—United States’ leaders commitment to 
international law, their acceptance of consensual decision making, their reputation for 
                                                 
25 Osgood, “NATO,” 106.  
26 Robert W. Tucker, “Morality and Deterrence,” Ethics, vol. 95 no. 3 (April 1985): 461-478; Robert W. 
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moderation and their identification with preservation of peace.28 These factors were, 
however, called into question due to the decisions of the high- level government officials of 
the George W. Bush administration.  
Reynolds in America, Empire of Liberty, supports this chapter’s argument that 
American foreign policy has been driven by concepts of American moral exceptionalism.29 
In his exploration of the theme of American faith, Reynolds argues that faith, stemming 
primarily from evangelical Protestantism, shaped US policy towards adversarial states. He 
argues that a “religious sense of mission” spurred America in its Cold War struggle 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and promoted Bush’s war on terror.30 
Reynolds, then elaborates, that a “self-belief in America’s mission” to spread its core 
values, influenced Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt to offer the war-torn world the 
American model of  freedom and democracy.31 
This chapter acknowledges competing traditions and schools of thought, different 
interpretations and explanations of United States foreign policy, for instance in the work of 
Kagan, Mead, Osgood, Tucker, and Reynolds, as cited above. This chapter, however, 
demonstrates that ideas of moral exceptionalism have provided an important foundation to 
United States’ foreign policy arguments of non-engagement in diplomacy with non-
democratic states. 
 
                                                 
28 Tucker and Hendrickson, “The Sources of American Legitimacy.” 
29 David Reynolds, America, Empire of Liberty (Basic Books: New York, 2009). 
30 Ibid., xvii, 310-311. 
31 Ibid., 246, 292. 
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American exceptionalism: historical phenomena versus normative prospectus  
Ceasar argues that a common understanding among scholars who study American 
exceptionalism is that American exceptionalism is a claim to uniqueness.32 According to 
Ceaser, the literature on American exceptionalism argues for the claim to uniqueness from 
two different perspectives.33 The first is that the United States is different to other states and 
the difference is demonstrated by empirical studies. The second is that the United States is 
special, and Ceaser shows that this is based on normative ambition.  
The major debates can thus be characterised as between a scholarship that argues that 
American exceptionalism is based on the idea that America is empirically different from 
other states (even as some of the same scholarship argues that in practice the United States 
was never any different from other industrialised states); and one that understands America 
as a superior ethical entity and, consequently American foreign policy as morally superior to 
that of other states. 34  From the first perspective American exceptionalism is an actual 
historical phenomenon. From the second perspective, American exceptionalism is an 
ideology that consists of a number of normative claims. One normative assumption is a sense 
of moral superiority.35 Another is that United States behaviour in foreign affairs is better than 
that of other states.36 I will show that it is this second perspective that underpins notions of 
American exceptionalism and US foreign policy.37 Again, I do not argue that there are no 
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other influences on American foreign policy, but that these ideas of moral superiority have 
provided a powerful and rather consistent strand in ideas about America’s role in the world. 
 
American exceptionalism as a historical phenomena 
Michael Kammen, Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset argue, from differing 
perspectives, that within the study of history and social science, the meaning of American 
exceptionalism is that the United States is different in some important way from other 
states.38 Ceaser argues that these two academic fields of study have understood the subject 
of American exceptionalism as a difference, rather than superiority.39 Their research 
programmes are based on the view of American exceptionalism as a distinct historical 
phenomena and their research problem is based around analysing what factor makes the 
United States a statistical outlier. This scholarship is based on empirical studies rather than 
normative claims and not all of the historiography accepts the existence of a specific 
empirical phenomena of American exceptionalism. Ian Tyrell, for example, while 
analysing the empirical claims of American exceptionalism as a historical phenomenon, 
refutes and expresses profound scepticism towards the idea of the historical existence of 
American exceptionalism.40   
Kammen surveys the literature on American exceptionalism to conclude that that the 
term “different” is more acceptable and accurate when explaining United States history and 
culture, and warns against using any other term, such as unique or exceptional.41 Kammen 
found little evidence that the US deviated from norms underpinning the behaviour of all 
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industrialized nations; if that had been the case, according to Kammen, that might have 
indicated the moral superiority of the United States.42  
Kammen’s understanding of American exceptionalism derives from a tradition of 
empirical social science that understands the United States as somehow being different from 
other countries, but does not argue that the US is special or superior. Kammen argues that 
this scholarship is persuasive since it is based on empirical case studies and historical 
scholarship. The historiographical work does not argue that the United States is unique  or 
special or that it possesses a unique quality, such as the promotion of liberty, or carries a 
sense of mission.43  Kammen argues that any understanding of American exceptionalism that 
is based upon the idea that the United States is special or superior compared to other states, 
is historically inaccurate.44  He acknowledges that ideas about American exceptionalism may 
have an ideological content, but argues that that there has been a lack of scholarly literature 
that empirically evaluates the ideological force of American exceptionalism.45  
Daniel Bell’s views on American exceptionalism evolved over time. In 1975 Bell 
wrote “The End of American Exceptionalism” – expressing scepticism about the notion. Bell 
argued that the United States faced the same issues that affected other societies in history, 
and is, therefore, like all other nations. 46  Fourteen years later, Bell’s second article, 
“American Exceptionalism Revisited: the role of civil society” (1989), presents a very 
different argument; it does not specify what events led Bell to revisit the subject of American 
exceptionalism.47 Both articles argue, however, for a similar meaning to the concept of the 
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American exceptionalism. The 1975 article seeks to empirically refute its existence; the 1989 
article does the opposite.  
Bell’s understanding of American exceptionalism derives from the Founding Fathers 
of America’s conviction that the United States is the providential nation whose dedication to 
liberty and to the dignity of the individual lays the foundation for a new and better world.48 
Bell elaborates that the Founding Fathers believed that the United States and its constituents 
would avoid the decadence and degeneration of previous republics, since morality grounded 
its political order. Bell argues that the Founding Fathers believed that America would avoid 
the issues that led to the collapse of previous republics. America is historically different 
because the United States has avoided the social instability that troubled Europe as America 
was founded on the  creation of a vibrant civil society. Bell argues that American 
exceptionalism, therefore, arises historically and is due to the fact that the United States 
achieved social stability due to the establishment of an institutional foundation that protected 
individual liberties and provided a degree of continuity and consensus.49  
Bell argues that the United States has created the only complete civil society, perhaps 
the only one in political history, due to the United States’ emphasis on individual self-interest 
and the utilitarian mode of thought. 50 Bell argues that due to the United States being a 
complete civil society, the United States avoided social instability. Bell’s work can be 
critiqued in a number of ways; for example although he refers to the ideas of Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel as the source of his understanding of civil society, he does not elaborate on 
Hegel’s understanding of a complete civil society, nor does he explain clearly why Hegel 
provides explanatory power for Bell’s evaluation of American exceptionalism. Bell does not 
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either provide any detailed empirical and/or comparative studies to support the claim the US 
is the only complete civil society. 
For the purpose of this study, the legitimacy of Bell’s argument is less important than 
Bell’s understanding of American exceptionalism as a distinctive historical attribute of 
America. Bell does not argue or make claims to how the US has a special mission or that the 
US is on a higher moral plane than other states as the Founding Fathers did. Rather, Bell aims 
to demonstrate that America’s civil society is what makes the United States different from 
European states, and hence exceptional. Bell’s understanding of American exceptionalism 
therefore can be understood as part of a trend in the historical scholarship and social science 
that regards the United States as a statistical outlier, rather than the United States as a 
normatively special entity. 
Bell shares with Kammen the understanding of American exceptionalism as a specific 
historical phenomenon that can be empirically observed, especially from the late twentieth 
century onwards. Bell, particularly in his later work, argues that the US is different in the 
sense that the US has been more somewhat immune from the social ills and decadence that 
affected all other industrialized states.51 Kammen argues that the United States has much in 
common with other industrialised states but he shares with Bell that in some meaningful 
sense America is ‘different’. Bell’s understanding of American exceptionalism, therefore, 
differs from that of Kammen since Bell argues that the United States has deviated from a 
norm that describes most or all industrialized nations through its more developed civil 
society..  
 Lipset also argues that American exceptionalism is based upon the understanding that 
the United States is different from other countries in some important manner. 52  Lipset 
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provides a list of factors that he argues makes the United States different from other 
industrialized states, such as Canada or England, thereby making the United States a 
statistical outlier. His article is, however, more of an assertion of American exceptionality as 
he does not substantiate many of these claims through detailed empirical study and analysis. 
This long listing of traits also makes it difficult to determine which of these variables have 
explanatory power.   
Among other things, Lipset argues that a major explanatory issue in the study of 
American exceptionalism is deciphering why the United States lacks a significant socialist 
movement or Labor Party.53 He argues that the variables that weakened the potential for 
socialism and class-consciousness are America’s unique class structure and religious 
system. 54  Yet Lipset does not go on to on establish American exceptionality by 
demonstrating why the United States does not have a socialist movement like other 
industrialized states. Instead, Lipset next discusses how the United States is exceptional 
because the United States was created from a revolutionary event.55 Lipset, therefore, pauses 
his discussion on the lack of a socialist class in the United States, and seeks to demonstrate 
the exceptionality of America through the US’s founding principles. What is of relevance for 
this thesis, however, is Lipset’s core understanding of American exceptionalism. Similarly 
to Kammen and Bell and through his numerous examples, Lipset seeks to demonstrate 
America’s distinctiveness from other states. He does not, however, base his analysis on how 
the United States might be supposedly superior to other industrialized states due to these 
differences. Rather, Lipset focuses on demonstrating that the United States is a statistical 
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outlier compared to other industrialized states, as he seeks to specify what trait of America 
makes America different from other industrialized states. 
  
American exceptionalism as moral superiority 
There is both an analytical and an empirical strand to the literature on American 
exceptionalism as moral superiority. Analytically, the literature looks at the philosophy of 
the idea. Historically, the literature traces the empirical record; often with the intention of 
refuting the idea that America has superior moral foundations to its foreign policy compared 
to other states. Davis and Lynn-Jones argue that American exceptionalism is founded in a 
sense of moral superiority, that this understanding of American exceptionalism underpins 
American foreign policy and that American exceptionalism should be understood as a 
normative claim in the sense that American exceptionalism is based on what Americans 
believe the US should be, rather than an empirical attribute of the United States. For Davis 
and Lynn-Jones, American exceptionalism is not primarily a historical phenomenon, but an 
ideology that has been constructed upon the beliefs of prominent Americans.56  
According to Davis and Lynn-Jones, the belief that the United States is morally 
superior to other states originates from the belief of early colonial settlers and the Founding 
Fathers, who believed that the US would occupy a separate, and higher, moral category from 
the rest of the world, as they declared their independence from Great Britain.57 Davis and 
Lynn-Jones, therefore, demonstrate that the belief in the moral superiority of the United 
States is as old as the nation itself. Davis and Lynn-Jones also show that the rhetoric of US 
presidents and policymakers at least from the twentieth century onwards, particularly those 
of the Reagan administration, has relied heavily on the tropes of moral superiority. Davis and 
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Lynn-Jones argue that the rhetoric of these US presidents and policymakers reflect and stem 
from the belief of the Founding Fathers that the United States was morally superior, and 
thereby, exceptional.  
Henry Kissinger, influential as both a theorist and practitioner of United States 
foreign policy, shares some of these understandings. Kissinger argues that the United States 
conduct of foreign policy is different from other Western states because the US is the only 
state that asserts that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the 
same way that they do to the individual.58 Kissinger’s argument can be critiqued, in that it 
can be argued that other states have understood their foreign policy as founded on moral 
notions similar to those held by the individual. The British empire’s “civilising mission” 
fifteenth to the twentieth century provides one example, as does the Japanese empire’s 
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” of the early twentieth century.59 Nevertheless, 
Kissinger argues that all twentieth-century presidents have made claims to an ethical mission 
abroad, in one way or another.60 Kissinger argues that European foreign policy is based on 
an understanding and usage of concepts of international order and balance of power; whereas, 
the United States, according to Kissinger, bases foreign policy on ethical conduct and this is 
what makes the United States different from other states. The American claim is that the 
foreign policy of states should reflect the same moral standards as personal ethics; the state 
has no right to claim a separate morality for itself.61  
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Kissinger’s understanding of American exceptionalism can be found in his 
description of the core components of Wilsonianism.62 These include that the United States 
has a special mission that obliges it to serve as a beacon of liberty for the rest of mankind, 
that the foreign policies of democracies are morally superior because the people are 
inherently peace loving, and that foreign policy should reflect the same moral standards as 
personal ethics. 63  Kissinger calls these components assertions of American moral 
exceptionalism.64  Kissinger, therefore, understands American exceptionalism as constructed 
upon a United States sense of mission and moral superiority. Kissinger acknowledges that 
these ideals have existed since Thomas Jefferson but argues that it was the Wilson 
administration that gave the ideas of the Founding Fathers international influence and 
strength. Kissinger credits Wilson for transforming these ideals into a crusading ideology, 
which thereby enabled the United States to emerge as a key player in the world affairs and 
rest its claim to international leadership on altruism.65  
Stephen M. Walt and Edward A. Tiryakian argue that the core of the sense of 
American exceptionalism as moral superiority is based upon a normative claim that the 
United States behaves better than other states since United States foreign policy is guided by 
ethical principles.66 These principles embrace moral causes, such as the eradication of evil. 
Although Walt seeks to repudiate the claims about American exceptionality by arguing that 
the normative claim does not stand against the empirical test of American history, in so doing 
he acknowledges the strength and longevity of ideas that cast American foreign policy as 
morally superior.  
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Walt provides a concrete understanding of what it means for the United States to be 
morally superior to other states. He argues that declarations by prominent Americans about 
American exceptionalism are based on the belief that the United States is a uniquely virtuous 
nation, a nation that loves peace, nurtures liberty, respects human rights, and embraces the 
rule of law.67 Walt’s understanding of American moral exceptionalism is, therefore, rooted 
in what Americans believe about the United States.68 Walt can be understood, therefore, as 
elaborating the core conceptions provided by Davis and Lynn-Jones and Kissinger who 
demonstrate that American exceptionalism within the framework of US foreign policy is 
based upon the United States sense of moral superiority. Their work, however, does not 
provide much of an explanation of what it means for the United States to be morally superior.  
 According to Walt, the idea that the United States is morally superior to other states 
means that the US behaves much better than other states and other great powers because 
United States foreign policy decisions are based on virtuous or ethical principles, such as 
respecting human rights or nurturing liberty. 69  Walt shows that the sense of American 
exceptionalism as moral superiority is founded in the American belief that the United States 
conduct in international affairs are guided by what Kissinger calls principles of ethical 
conduct, rather than calculations of national interest or gaining power.70 Americans believe 
that the US is on a higher moral plane than other states because the US behaves in a better 
manner than other states and it does not always act only in its own self-interest. 
 Tiryakian also supports a view of American exceptionalism in foreign policy as being 
founded in an American sense of virtue and moral superiority. He argues that Americans 
believe they are morally superior to other states because the United States conduct in foreign 
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affairs is guided by a moral cause, which is the eradication of evil from institutions, practices, 
and other empirical conditions. Tiryakian asserts that a central factor of American moralism 
is the religious impulse to find and eradicate evil, or a fall from grace, in empirical 
conditions.71 He argues that this distinction between good and evil, and the impulse to 
eradicate evil are components of the moral principles that guide US foreign policies. 72 
Tiryakian calls these components specifically American as he asserts that this religious 
element has diffused to other US social contexts to the degree that the impulse to find and 
eradicate evil has become a near permanent feature of modern American society.73  
In his volume on the history of United States foreign relations, Herring argues that 
American exceptionalism is the understanding that American foreign policy is guided by 
ethical principles rather than principles of power. Herring states that a set of assumed ideas 
and shared values have determined the way Americans viewed themselves and others, and 
how they dealt with other peoples and responded to and sought to shape events abroad.74 The 
set of assumed ideas and shared values is underpinned by the United States’ sense of special 
virtue and unique destiny; Herring elaborates that Americans perceive themselves as a 
chosen people with a providential mission.75 According to his book, Americans believe that 
the United States is a peace-loving and righteous state, guided by ideas and values. Herring 
also understands American exceptionalism as being based upon a sense of mission that was 
given to America by Providence, Himself.76 At core, Herring’s understanding of American 
exceptionalism is that of a sense of moral superiority. 
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A number of these investigations of American exceptionalism refute the idea that 
American foreign policy is in practice more moral than that of other states. Fields observes 
that the rhetoric of United States government officials does not always match the actual 
practice of US foreign policy.77 Walt shows that historically United States foreign policy 
actions were not peaceful, did not respect human rights, or failed to nurture liberty. The 
United States does not always, as he shows, behave as well as Americans believe it does or 
ought to.78 Herring also shows that the conventional narrative of American exceptionalism, 
where the United States is more virtuous than other states, is empirically debatable to the 
extent of in many cases being incorrect.  
There are also ambiguities and tensions in the scholarship on American 
exceptionalism. Kissinger’s views are controversial, for example, given that foreign policy 
practice when Kissinger was a foreign policy advisor during the Vietnam War was brutal, 
involving indiscriminate bombing and napalming of civilians. Tensions exist as the contested 
nature of what constitutes the morality of American exceptionalism. Tiryakian does not 
specify how Americans arrive to their conclusion of what they perceive as evil. Herring’s 
work is very much a synthetic text and does not base itself on primary sources, although, 
according to Josef Joffe, editor of the German weekly newspaper, Die Zeit, the text is 
innovative in that it provides a single-volume history of United States foreign policy from 
the foreign policy from George Washington to George W. Bush.79 Payne’s work has been 
critiqued by Campbell, Cumiford, and Ninkovich, among others, on the basis that it is 
empirically questionable.80 
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Nevertheless, the view of American exceptionalism as moral superiority still provides 
a powerful prism for studying United States foreign policy. Kissinger explicitly argues that 
during the twentieth century the conduct of United States foreign policy was guided by 
American moral exceptionalism.81 Davis and Lynn-Jones show there has been a continuous 
reiteration of the singular and superior ethical status of the United States  and claims about 
America’s moral leadership have played a substantive part in the rhetoric of US presidents 
and policymakers from the twentieth century onwards. 82  Spanos demonstrates that the 
concepts of American exceptionalism was particularly prominent within the 
neoconservatives during the post 9/11 era.83 
 
The diplomatic isolation of non-democratic states 
Scholarship from a range of intellectual traditions converge around a finding that 
American exceptionalism as moral superiority provides a powerful explanation of American 
foreign policy to isolate states deemed adversarial to the United States. Payne and Fields, 
who investigate domestic values as a source of America foreign policy, can perhaps be 
understood as operating within a Liberal tradition.84 Robert Litwak can be understood as 
emerging from a  more state-centric scholarship, perhaps best thought of as operating within 
a Political Realist position.85  Litwak and Kissinger share the view that American foreign 
policy has tended towards isolating non-democratic states, albeit from differing reasoning 
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processes, as have scholars operating in the critical tradition of international relations theory. 
Herring’s historiographical work that, among other things, charts the ideological or 
normative notion of American exceptionalism and the US foreign policy stance of diplomatic 
isolation towards adversarial states, can perhaps be understood as deriving from a more 
critical analysis than that of Kissinger, whose prime aim is to better understand American 
foreign policy in order to improve its efficacy.86  
Payne argues that the ideology of American exceptionalism induces US policymakers 
to not support compromise with countries that these policymakers believe are inherently less 
virtuous than the United States, which he asserts is a characteristic of the states that the 
United States considers as adversaries.87 The ideology of American moral exceptionalism 
favours diplomatic isolation with states that the US deems adversarial because Americans 
perceive compromise with states that are inherently less virtuous than the US as a violation 
of American principles and a national humiliation. 88  Payne argues that this is the case 
because Americans tend to view international conflicts in religious and moralistic terms. 
Fields argues, similarly to Payne, that an understanding of American values as natural, 
universal in application, and superior to those of other nations, is deep-seated in American 
thinking about foreign policy.89  
Payne argued that the International Relations theories that draw from Political 
Realism cannot explain the international relations of the post-Cold War, since Political 
Realism downplays the significance of internal factors and ideational considerations in the 
formulation and implementation of a country’s foreign policies. 90  He argues that it is 
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necessary to understand culture as an important explanatory variable in foreign policy 
analysis because, he asserts, after the end of the Cold War, culture has become one of the 
most decisive determinants of international behaviour.91 Payne draws upon from the work of 
Clifford Geertz the idea of culture as a set of shared learned values, beliefs, perceptions, 
attitudes, modes of living, customs, and symbols. 92  He argues that the United States 
possesses a consensual political culture and that this specific political culture underpins 
American foreign policy.93 For Payne, the ideology of American exceptionalism, as the belief 
that the United States is unique and morally superior to other nations, emerges from domestic 
culture and he argues that American exceptionalism inevitably shapes US foreign policy.94  
Fields argues that this sense of American moral exceptionalism impedes diplomacy 
because it provides a justification for American political leaders and policymakers who do 
not wish to diplomatically engage with adversarial states.95 Fields aim is to show that these 
rationales are baseless and inconsistent since they are articulated for some states while 
overlooked for others, but in so doing he demonstrates the strength of the view that 
compromise with countries that are understood as less virtuous than the United States is seen 
as a violation of American principles and, in some instances, a national humiliation.96 Within 
this perspective, Fields argues that a compromise with states that are less virtuous than the 
United States is a violation of American principles.97  
Litwak, whose work on American foreign policy is widely respected, explains 
United States’ post-Cold War international relations, specifically the United States policy 
                                                 
91 Payne, The Clash with Distant Cultures, xiv. 
92 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 36. 
93 Payne, The Clash with Distant Cultures, 5. 
94 Ibid., 13, 22. 
95 Fields, “Engaging Adversaries,” 307-308. 
96 Fields, “Engaging Adversaries,” 307-308; Payne, The Clash with Distant Cultures, 85. 
97 Fields, “Engaging Adversaries,” 303. 
 94 
 
of containment or isolation of adversarial states.98 The coincidence of research 
investigation between Litwak’s work with scholarship that explicitly focuses on American 
exceptionalism arises because of his interest in containment as the dominant US policy 
towards rogue states, or the states that the US government considers adversarial, during the 
post-Cold War era.99 Although primarily focused on the security dilemmas provided by 
proliferating states, Litwak argues that the idea of rogue state reflects a view of 
international affairs as a struggle between good and evil. 
Litwak draws from Robert Bellah’s “Civil Religion in America,” to argue that the 
view of international affairs as a struggle between good and evil, is at the core of an 
American civil religion.100 Litwak argues that the rogue state concept and US policy 
towards rogue state is a product of the United States’ unique political culture.101 Litwak’s 
understanding of the rogue state discourse in post-Cold war American foreign policy, 
therefore, has a number of conceptual commonalities with the conceptual foundations of 
the analysis of American moral exceptionalism argued by Davis and Lynn-Jones and 
Tiryakian, who argue that the sharp distinction between good and evil is a core component 
of the American exceptionalism that is based upon the United States’ sense of moral 
superiority.102 Litvak describes the  political culture of the United States as deeply-rooted 
and unique. As argued by Ceaser, a claim to uniqueness is the common denominator of the 
scholarship on American exceptionalism.103 
Henry Kissinger argues for an empirical correlation between the ideology of 
American moral exceptionalism and the US foreign policy stance of diplomatic isolation 
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towards states that the United States government deems adversarial.104 Based on analysis of 
reports written by presidential advisers, the rhetoric of government officials and 
policymakers, and official US government documents and US policies, Kissinger argues that 
American foreign policy has been shaped by the belief that the United States’ behaviour in 
international affairs is guided by ethical principles, such as the spread of democracy, rather 
than the pursuit of the  national interest defined in terms of power.105 He further argued that 
the United States government espoused the ideology of American moral exceptionalism not 
as a justification that disguises a United States goal to achieve power, but as an actual guide 
that influences US foreign policy. For Kissinger, the corollary of the ideological 
understanding of American exceptionalism is a rejection of the  idea of diplomacy with 
adversarial states.  
From different normative perspectives, ranging from Kissinger’s which is essentially 
supportive of American foreign policy abroad to those from a more critical perspective agree, 
the scholarship converges on an understanding that the empirical record links notions of 
American exceptionalism and the US foreign policy stance of diplomatic isolation towards 
states that the United States government deems adversarial. The authoritative work of George 
C. Herring that surveys the history of United States foreign policy from the sixteenth century 
to the twenty-first century, and Kissinger’s Diplomacy that focuses specifically on US 
foreign policy during the twentieth century, illustrate the empirical correlations with both 
scholars identifying the Truman administration (1945-1953), as providing a formative 
moment for an explicit policy of isolating adversarial states, especially in the evolution of 
post-World War II relations with the Soviet Union, the former wartime ally of the United 
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States.106 Herring’s work does not necessarily prove a causal relationship between the moral 
exceptionalism and US diplomatic isolation policy to adversaries, which is why his work is 
analysed alongside that of Kissinger, Litwak, Payne, and Fields. Their work further supports 
Herring’s argument that concepts of moral exceptionalism have impacted United States’ 
foreign policy to not engage in diplomacy with non-democratic states. Furthermore, I do not 
draw upon his work as a whole, but rather his section concerning the Truman administration.  
Kissinger refers to President Truman’s statement that the United States was not 
interested in territory or military bases, but instead that United States foreign policy was to 
be a reflection of American moral values that were based firmly on principles of 
righteousness and justice, and on refusing to compromise with evil.107  Kissinger quotes 
Truman in order to demonstrate that Truman disdained justifying American actions in terms 
of security, and that Truman believed that peace should be based on American principles. 
The goal of the Truman administration’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was, 
therefore, the spread of liberty and democracy, which is one of the constitutive components 
of American moral exceptionalism as understood by Kissinger.108  
Kissinger analyses presidential adviser Clark Clifford’s report to President Truman 
on US relations with the Soviet Union, foreign service officer George Kennan’s telegram to 
the United States government concerning the behaviour and ideology of the Soviet Union 
government, and the National Security Council document (NSC-68). Drawing upon his 
analysis of such documents, Kissinger argues that the Truman administration believed that 
the Soviet-American conflict was caused by the moral shortcomings of the Soviet leadership, 
rather than conflicting geopolitical interests. The aim of the Truman administration was then 
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not to negotiate an end to the Soviet-American conflict, but to aim at the internal 
transformation of the Soviet Union to a democracy.109 The Truman administration decided 
that it would diplomatically isolate the Soviet Union until the government of the Soviet 
Union had met the precondition of behaviour change. Similar to Kissinger’s analysis of the 
Truman administration, Herring argues that Truman officials were appalled by Marxist 
dogma and Soviet totalitarianism. 110  Herring, furthermore, argues that Truman 
administration officials believed in American moral exceptionalism and held a passionate 
belief in an American destiny to reshape the post-World War II world order.  
Truman administration officials assumed that the American ways of doing things 
were the correct way and that any peace should be based on American principles. 111 
American statesman, therefore, perceived negotiations with the government of the Soviet 
Union as pointless until the Soviet Union changed its behaviour.112 Litwak also argues that 
the Truman administration policy of containment towards the Soviet Union was a reflection 
of a reluctance to resolve the post-war Soviet-American conflict through negotiations.113 The 
philosophy of diplomatic isolation provided the foundation for what became the policy of  
containment towards what the United States government perceived as rogue states.114 
 
American moral exceptionalism and Track II diplomacy  
The central thesis of this dissertation is that American Track II diplomacy towards 
the DPRK during the George W. Bush administrations can be largely explained as an 
attempt made to fill perceived gaps and/or failures of official American diplomacy or Track 
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I diplomacy. In this chapter, I have shown  a moralistic ideology of American 
exceptionalism, which is based upon the normative claim that America is morally superior 
to other states has provided a powerful and consistent underpinning of United States 
foreign policy. I have also shown that fundamental to the moralistic notion of foreign 
policy is the policy stance of diplomatic isolation towards states the United States considers 
as adversarial. In the next chapter I show that underpinning the failure of Bush 
administration diplomacy towards the DPRK is this very long-standing strand of American 
diplomacy based in an ideological approach to the idea of American exceptionalism. I will 
show how in the George W. Bush administration,  ideas of American exceptionalism and 
the ancillary notion of non-negotiation with and isolation of adversarial states were 
manifested through the  ideology and practice of ‘neo-conservatism’ that was espoused by 
powerful actors within the administration such as Vice-President Dick Cheney.  
The downplaying of official or Track 1 diplomacy as a way to deal with adversarial 
states consequently created a role for Track II diplomacy, since Track II diplomacy was able 
to compensate for the lack of dialogue by providing a space or channel for communication 
between adversarial states through processes that were discussed in prior chapters. I next 
show in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7, how the distaste for diplomacy with the DPRK 
provided the context and motivation for American Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK. 
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Chapter 4 Bush administration diplomacy towards the DPRK: Constraints and limitations 
 
Introduction 
This chapter shows the extent of the impact of ideas of moral exceptionalism on the 
thinking of senior, influential foreign policy makers in the Bush administration, particularly 
in relationship to North Korea. By analysing the memoirs and speeches of influential 
decision-makers, as well as scholarly and policy literature, I show that the ideas underpinning 
an antagonism to diplomacy with North Korea were embedded in policy throughout the 
duration of the eight year Bush administration, although they were more forcefully applied 
in the period 2002-2005.1 The lack of interest in achieving a negotiated settlement was 
underpinned by the preference for regime change, itself shaped by the idea that it was 
America’s destiny to promote the transformation of the DPRK into a democratic state. If 
successful, regime change would have obviated the need for negotiation. This chapter shows 
how these understandings became embedded in legislation and policy. It then presents a 
detailed study of some of the most controversial events in Bush administration diplomatic 
relations with the DPRK, demonstrating the constraints placed upon negotiators by senior 
foreign policy officials in Washington DC. It shows how United States diplomats were 
unable to fulfil the normal functions of diplomacy, including meaningful negotiations, 
gathering of information, and clear and effective communication of government objectives. 
The chapter considers other inhibiting factors on Bush administration diplomacy to 
North Korea including the lack of a consistent and coherent foreign policy, a lack of trust 
between the United States and the DPRK, the Bush administration’s overreliance on the 
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Chinese government as a means of communication between the United States and the DPRK, 
and the DPRK’s own approach to negotiating with the United States. 2  Not all these 
arguments carry equal weight but equally, none of them obviate my analysis of the 
importance and consequences of ideological framing of American foreign policy towards the 
DPRK during the Bush administration. As demonstrated in the following chapters, the 
constraints and limitations of American diplomacy provided subsequent impetus to non-state 
actors, to try to fill the gaps that they identified in the official diplomacy between the United 
States and the DPRK. 
 
The underlying philosophy 
As demonstrated in the prior chapter, American exceptionalism is a normative claim 
that is based upon the United States’ sense of moral superiority. The belief is that the United 
States is morally superior to other states because the United States behaves better than other 
states, and its foreign policy is guided by ethical principles, such as the spread of democracy 
and the eradication of evil. During the Bush administration these ideas were most 
prominently held by a group of senior foreign policy advisers to President Bush, who became 
known collectively, as “neo-conservatives.” 
James Mann in The Rise of the Vulcans: the History of Bush’s War Cabinet chronicles 
the thirty-five year history of a group of the most influential of President Bush’s foreign 
policy advisors, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Richard Armitage, Paul 
Wolfowitz, and Condoleeza Rice. 3  Mann argues that there were important differences 
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between them, with Condoleeza Rice for example, less aligned with an ideological 
conservativism and more influenced by concepts of Political Realism, which assumes that 
relationships among countries are governed by considerations of power, not morality.4 By 
contrast Mann shows how Paul Wolfowitz emphasised the value of political freedom and 
believed strongly in democratic ideals.5 Nevertheless, Mann argues that, collectively, these 
senior foreign policy advisers to President Bush advocated pre-emptive action to support 
American interests where necessary, supported the notion of an unchallengeable American 
superpower and an ever-greater American military power, and believed that America is 
ultimately a force for good despite negative consequences that may arise from American 
aggression.6 Mann shows that these were not beliefs that were adopted after the tragedy of 
9/11 and a reaction to that event. Instead these were long held beliefs and convictions. Mann 
argues that the 9/11 terrorist attacks did not precipitate these beliefs but instead provided an 
opportunity for the application of these long held ideological beliefs about America’s role in 
the world to be put into practice.  
Mann’s work documents the importance of the American belief that United States 
role and policies in international relations should support democratic ideals and be based on 
moral values. Funabashi also reports that senior officials of the Bush administration, most 
particularly Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz “believe that there is a 
dichotomy between Good and Evil in international politics…they believe in containment 
and conversion of what they regard as evil states.”7 These very strong understandings of the 
notion of American exceptionalism, therefore, were shared by very senior Bush 
administration officials. Even when shifts in administration policy and personnel from 
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confrontation to attempts at some form of accommodation with the DPRK took place, with 
the appointments of Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State, and Christopher Hill as the 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, neo-conservative 
understandings of how to deal with the DPRK remained influential. 8 Despite the departure 
of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense in 2006, which visibly indicated a change in 
administration policy in broader foreign policy, advocates of non-engagement with the 
DPRK, as Chris Hill reports, were motivated and active in trying to undermine Hill’s turn 
to conventional diplomacy.9 
 
The self-understanding of Bush administration foreign policy  
The writings and speeches of President George W. Bush, his vice-president Dick 
Cheney, and other senior figures in the administration, explicitly refer to ideas about 
American exceptionalism as fundamental drivers of American foreign policy.  
Every State of the Union Address made by President Bush to Congress explicitly 
drew on ideas about American exceptionalism as a rationale for foreign policy. The annual 
State of the Union address to Congress is important as it provides a platform where American 
presidents rally support for their agenda, and a forum where the president can speak directly 
to the American people.10 Policies that President Bush discussed in his State of the Union 
Addresses were policies he hoped to implement. In every State of the Union Address, 
President Bush stated that the foreign policy of the United States should be the spread of 
democracy abroad in order to end the tyrannies of the world. President Bush appealed to the 
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ethics of the American people in his explanation to why the US government’s foreign policy 
should be the spread of democracy abroad. Bush drew on tropes from the American 
exceptionalism repertoire that argued for United States moral superiority to other states as a 
state whose foreign policies are inherently ethical. These foundational assumptions of 
American exceptionalism justified the preferred foreign policy of spreading democracy 
abroad as a fundamentally moral policy.  
 In his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush states that “America will lead by 
defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people 
everywhere.”11 The spread of democracy abroad was, therefore, the moral foreign policy 
option. This is further reinforced by the phrase, “because they are right,” which Bush uses to 
describe the policy of spreading democracy abroad.12 This type of logical structure is again 
seen in his 2004 State of the Union Address, when President Bush stated that “the cause we 
serve is right, because it is the cause of all mankind.”13 Bush underlines that this policy is 
moral since it benefits the international community.  
In his 2003 State of the Union Address and his 2008 State of the Union Address, 
President Bush stated that the United States had a unique moral position in world affairs since 
its creation as a state.14 America’s Founding Fathers dedicated the American state “to the 
cause of human dignity, the rights of every person, and the possibilities of every life.”15 Bush 
again draws on concepts familiar from the ideology of American exceptionalism in the 
normative claim that the United States is uniquely virtuous and morally righteous. Bush was 
invoking a sense of American uniqueness within his audience, as he reminded the American 
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people that the Founding Fathers committed the United States to a separate and higher moral 
category from other states by ensuring that its foreign policy would be virtuous and altruistic. 
By referring to the intentions of America’s Founding Fathers, Bush asserted a framework for 
thinking about America’s foreign policies as having been based upon ethical principles since 
the creation of the American state. Within this context, Bush argued that his preferred foreign 
policy of spreading democracy abroad is a policy based upon ethical principles and, thereby, 
aligned with the intentions of the Founding Fathers.  
Similarly to President Bush, Vice-President Richard “Dick” Cheney also believed in 
American moral exceptionalism, as demonstrated by his book Exceptional: Why the World 
Needs a Powerful America, co-authored with his daughter Liz Cheney. Cheney drew from a 
belief in American moral exceptionalism to critique the Obama administration’s foreign 
policies. Cheney criticises Obama administration’s foreign policies for emitting the idea that 
the United States is to blame for certain world events and that United States’ power must, 
therefore, be restrained. 16  Cheney calls this idea a “fundamental counterfactual,” as he 
believes that the United States has not done any wrong, and there is, therefore, no need for 
the United States to apologize to other states.17 Rather, according to Cheney, what the United 
States has done in and for the world is guarantee freedom, security, and peace for a larger 
share of humanity.18 Cheney states that the United States is the greatest force for good that 
the world has ever known.19 Cheney perceives US foreign policies as being almost entirely 
benevolent; his belief is that United States foreign policies are based upon ethical principles; 
and his understanding of American exceptionalism is based upon United States’ moral 
superiority.  
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UN Ambassador John Bolton is another prominent United States government official 
who explicitly drew on notions of American moral exceptionalism in his rationale to why the 
United States government should not negotiate with the DPRK. Before he was appointed as 
United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Bolton was the Under Secretary of State 
for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. Bolton was, therefore, senior advisor to 
President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell on matters pertaining to arms control, 
non-proliferation, and disarmament, which included North Korea’s nuclear program. In his 
book review of Vice-President Cheney’s Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful 
America, Bolton writes that Cheney’s understanding of the United States’ proper place in the 
world is something “we always know to be true.” 20  Bolton’s positive review indicates 
agreement with Cheney’s description of the United States as the greatest force for good that 
the world has ever known because its policies seeks to guarantee the freedom, security, and 
peace for a larger share of humanity. 21 Furthermore, Bolton believes that this understanding 
of the United States is an empirical fact, rather than a normative claim. 
 
The embeddedness of moral exceptionalism in policies towards North Korea 
At the same time as the administration argued that it had not entirely ruled out a 
diplomatic strategy towards the DPRK, it sought an alternative strategy to direct talks, 
including economic isolation. Diplomatic engagement with the DPRK was not the preferred 
foreign policy approach; regime change rather than a negotiated settlement was the logical 
corollary of stances taken by the most senior leaders in the United States. Below, I show how 
                                                 
20 John Bolton, “BOOK REVIEW: ‘Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful America’,” review of 
Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful America, by Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, The Washington 
Times, September 14, 2015, Analysis/Opinion, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/14/book-
review-exceptional-why-the-world-needs-a-powe/; Bolton, Surrender is Not an Option, 104. 
21 Cheney and Cheney, Exceptional, 1. 
 106 
President Bush, Vice-President Cheney and John Bolton’s approach to North Korea policy 
was infused with the tropes of American exceptionalism. Similarly to members of the United 
States Congress, President Bush did not trust the DPRK as a negotiating partner; he stated 
that he was “not certain as to whether” the DPRK was “keeping all the terms” of the October 
1994 Agreed Framework, and that Kim Jong-il “simply cannot be trusted.”22  
I then show that Congress worked off common assumptions to President Bush 
through a consideration of the 2003 North Korea Democracy Act and the 2006 North Korean 
Nonproliferation Act. Both portrayed North Korea as an irrational, unreliable negotiating 
partner. I also analyse the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007. Members of the United States Congress agreed that North could not be relied upon, 
trusted or negotiated with. The 2003 and the 2006 legislation both called for the 
dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program to be executed through economic isolation 
of North Korea, rather than diplomacy between the two states. The Bush administration and 
the US Congress understood economic sanctions as an alternative to negotiations not 
primarily as a tool to providing leverage over the DPRK during negotiations. The foreign 
policy aim was to pressure the North Korean government into accepting United States terms. 
The objective and aims of Bush administration’s foreign policy towards North Korea’s 
nuclear issue are drawn from United States government documents, including United States 
legislation and United States Congressional Records.23 
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North Korea must be free 
The ideas outlined in the State of the Union Addresses underpin President Bush’s 
approach to North Korea. In his autobiography, Decision Points, President Bush records that 
he was “convinced that the only path to meaningful change is for the North Korean people 
to be free.” 24  North Korea is discussed within the chapter entitled “Freedom Agenda,” 
perhaps a further indication that President Bush’s preferred foreign policy towards the DPRK 
was regime change rather than a negotiated settlement. The Freedom Agenda was part of 
what is now known as the Bush Doctrine, and it concerns the “advancement of hope and 
liberty as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear.”25 The Freedom 
Agenda, therefore, had the same objectives as the foreign policy that Bush explains in his 
State of the Union Addresses, in that both seek and support the growth of democracy abroad, 
with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny abroad.26  
Vice-President Cheney directly conceptualized foreign policy towards North Korea 
within this moralistic paradigm as demonstrated in a statement that he made during a White 
House meeting on North Korea in December 2003. Vice-President Cheney stated that “I have 
been charged by the president with making sure that none of the tyrannies in the world are 
negotiated with. We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.”27 United States foreign policy 
towards the DPRK is understood as one of good versus evil. Given that Cheney believes in 
the inherent benevolence of American foreign policy and that the actions of the United States 
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are for the betterment of the international community and by characterising the North Korean 
regime as evil, Cheney could argue that a United States foreign policy towards the DPRK 
where the natural outcome is a United States victory over North Korea. Cheney directly used 
these ideas to argue that the United States should not negotiate with North Korea under any 
circumstance.28 The ideology of American moral exceptionalism provided a rationale for the 
preferred foreign policy of isolation and a refusal to engage in bilateral diplomacy with North 
Korea.  
Bolton’s writings concerning the North Korean regime demonstrate that Bolton’s 
partiality towards regime change in North Korea as the solution to North Korea’s nuclear 
program, rather than negotiation. It is this very strong interpretation of American moral 
exceptionalism, as further outlined in his book, Surrender is Not an Option: Defending 
America at the United Nations and Abroad that explicitly underpins his reluctance to enter 
into any negotiations with the North Korean government.29 For Bolton, the North Korean 
government is an inherently unreliable negotiation partner. Bolton’s discussion of the Agreed 
Framework, which he sought to terminate, blamed all failure on the North Korean 
government, and did not analyse actions of the United States, even when respected United 
States sources reported that the United States government did not always fulfil or honour the 
its core commitments to North Korea.30 In a hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asia 
and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on 14 July 
1998, the Chairman, former Senator Craig Thomas, reported that the United States 
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government was late in fulfilling obligations in respect of heavy oil deliveries to the DPRK.31 
Sigal goes so far as to argue that the North Korean government did not fulfil its commitments 
to the Agreed Framework as a response to prior United States failures to fulfil its obligations. 
Irrespective of the balance of blame, Bolton’s prior commitment to the ideas of American 
moral superiority seems to underpin his lack of acknowledgement of any fault on the side of 
the United States or indeed mention of such a possibility. For Bolton, the DPRK violated the 
Agreed Framework, “before the ink was dry.”32 Bolton insists that the collapse of the Agreed 
Framework was due to the North Korean government’s violation of the terms of the 
agreement.33  
 
The 2003 North Korea Democracy Act  
Former Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona explained during the first session of the 108th 
Congress that the purpose of the 2003 North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 was to “move 
North Korea toward a more democratic regime and forego the development of these weapons 
of mass destruction and the proliferation of them as well as missiles throughout the world.”34 
The North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 aimed to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program 
by changing the North Korean regime into a democratic one. The purpose of this legislation 
was, therefore, not to defend or push for direct engagement with North Korea. The legislation 
proposed economic isolation through the imposition of sanctions, with the aim of pressuring 
the DPRK into becoming a democratic state. 35  The authors of the Act believe that the 
democratization of North Korea would resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. They did not 
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believe that a negotiated settlement would be possible because of their belief that that the 
North Korean government violated the terms of the 1994 October Agreed Framework and 
was, therefore, an unreliable negotiation partner.36  
The legislation was underpinned by the belief that the North Korean government 
cheated on past negotiations. This perspective of the North Korean government aligned with 
that of prominent government officials, including Vice-President Richard “Dick” Cheney 
and UN Ambassador John Bolton, that direct talks with the North Korean government could 
not provide a dependable solution, since an unreliable partner implies that the state will not 
comply with any negotiated agreement. The North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 was highly 
sceptical about negotiations with the DPRK, but it did not entirely rule out a diplomatic 
solution. Point four of section four of the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 discusses 
what diplomacy with the DPRK must achieve, although the sub-section begins with a 
warning that North Korea is not a trustworthy negotiating partner. 37  Due to authors’ 
perception of North Korea as an unreliable negotiation partner, the recommended diplomatic 
solution is rigid and comes with a specific set of demands. The Act states that if diplomacy 
with the DPRK should occur, it must achieve the total dismantlement of North Korea’s 
nuclear program and include highly intrusive verification requirements. 38  The only 
diplomatic solution permitted is prompt and verifiable dismantlement of North Korea’s 
nuclear program, which must be complete, verifiable, and irreversibly dismantled.  
The content of the 2003 North Korea Democracy Act shows that the main objective 
of United States foreign policy towards North Korea was to dictate United States terms onto 
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North Korea, rather than reconcile the different interests of the two states.39 The North Korea 
Democracy Act of 2003 is also significant in that recommended strategies, other than 
diplomacy, were proposed and these proposals were almost all adopted by the Bush 
administration. As with senior Bush foreign policy officials, Congress shared the view that 
the DPRK was inherently a state with which the United States could not engage with 
diplomatically, to reconcile interest and seek a compromise solution. 
The 2006 Congressional Research Service Report on “North Korea’s Nuclear 
Weapons Program,” points out that that the majority of the conditions that were 
recommended by the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003 were executed by the Bush 
administration.40 These included the termination of the 1994 October Agreed Framework, 
imposition of financial sanctions onto North Korea, and denial of reciprocal measures that 
include any nuclear cooperation agreement or type of nuclear interaction until North Korea 
takes steps to dismantle its nuclear program.41 Although the 2006 Congressional Research 
Service report demonstrates that the Bush administration did not entirely dismiss a 
diplomatic strategy, it also demonstrates that the Bush administration preferred alternative 
strategies to negotiations.42 
 
The 2006 North Korea Nonproliferation Act 
The 2006 North Korean Nonproliferation Act, passed by the 109th session of 
Congress, and signed by President Bush on 13 October 2006 provides strong language 
indicating that the Bush administration believed that negotiations could not obtain the 
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dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program in an enforceable and verifiable way. 
Former Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee describes North Korea as an unreliable negotiating 
partner when explaining why the Senate should pass the 2006 North Korean Nonproliferation 
Act.43 
The North Korea Nonproliferation Act became Public Law No: 109-353. The law 
argues, “it should be the policy of the United States to impose sanctions on persons who 
transfer such weapons, goods and technology related to such weapons, to and from North 
Korea.”44 The policy introduced in the North Korean Nonproliferation Act of 2006 shares 
the same objective as section 7 of the North Korea Democracy Act of 2003, which argues 
for the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea in order to deny the North 
Korean government currency it needed to build up its nuclear capability and to prevent them 
from exporting these weapons to other countries. 45  The main focus of the sanctions 
introduced in the 2003 North Korea Democracy Act was upon the North Korean government, 
while the 2006 North Korea Nonproliferation Act focused on imposing sanctions upon 
outside actors. Senator Bill Frist emphasised the unreliability of North Korea in his reference 
to North Korea’s boycott of the Six-Party Talks and his argument was that the DPRK showed 
scant willingness to allow diplomatic efforts to succeed.46  
 
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 
The Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2007, also known as the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, was signed by President Bush on 
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17 October 2006 and became Public Law 109-364. It further demonstrates the Bush 
administration’s disinterest in negotiations with the DPRK.47 Section 1211 of this law states 
that the President was required to appoint a senior presidential coordinator of United States 
policy on North Korea, no later than sixty days after the date of the enactment of the Act.48 
This direction to President Bush was a response to the Bush administration termination of 
the North Korea senior policy coordinator position, that had been active during the Clinton 
administration, the preceding presidential administration.49 President Clinton had appointed 
William Perry as the North Korea Policy Coordinator in 1998.50 One of the duties of the 
North Korea Policy Coordinator was to engage in direct negotiations with the DPRK. The 
call by Congress in 2007 indicates a change in mood of Congress towards diplomacy, but 
also confirms that in the view of Congress, the Bush administration had still not fully 
accepted that the North Korea nuclear issue could be resolved through negotiations.51 It is a 
reminder that even by 2007, the Bush administration did not prioritise diplomacy as a means 
of ending conflict with the DPRK. 
  
Bush administration foreign policy towards the DPRK 
The main objective of the Bush administration’s foreign policy towards the DPRK 
was to secure the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program in a complete, verifiable, 
and irreversible manner.52 United States officials entered into diplomacy with North Korea 
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with these stated aim of achieving these policies but were unable to perform conventional 
diplomatic functions because the underlying philosophy of the ideology of American moral 
exceptionalism impeded active diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government. 
Bush administration diplomatic activities towards the DPRK took place primarily through 
the multilateral vehicle of the Six-Party Talks, that included the United States, the DPRK, 
the Republic of Korea, China, Russia and Japan. The first round of the Six-Party Talks was 
held from 27-29 August 2003. The second round of the Six-Party Talks was held from 25-
28 February 2004. The third round was held from 23-26 June 2004. The fourth round took 
place in 2005; the fifth in 2006-2007; the final set of talks started in 2007 and was formally 
discontinued in 2009.  
The commitment to multilateralism and to avoiding bilateral communication with the 
DPRK was such that it pushed the Bush administration, by contrast with the Clinton 
administration, into a policy based upon cooperation with China. While the Bush 
administration made the argument that its reliance upon China as an intermediary during the 
Six-Party Talks was to maintain solidarity and cohesion of the negotiation process, Funabashi 
convincingly argues that it pursued a multilateral approach because it did not want to engage 
in bilateral negotiations with North Korea.53 The United States was also very focused on the 
issue of Iraq and the war against terrorism in the early 2000s, in the aftermath of the 9.11 
attack on New York, and Funabashi also shows that due to its focus on Middle East, the Bush 
administration temporarily outsourced the North Korea nuclear issue to China. 54 
Nevertheless, whatever the rationale, as far as North Korea was concerned, the Bush 
administration’s reliance on China and the lack of direct communication between the United 
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States and the DPRK indicated to the North Korean government that the Bush administration 
was not serious about pursuing a negotiated settlement.55  
The US delegation to the first three rounds of the Six-Party Talks was headed by 
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly. Kelly’s successor was Ambassador Christopher R. 
Hill (2005-2009). The United States delegation to the Six-Party Talks were given strict 
instructions by the sector of Bush administration that was reluctant to enter into diplomatic 
engagement with the North Korean government.56 The constraints imposed on United States 
negotiators from Washington DC were extremely rigorous in the first three rounds of talks.
 Ambassador Hill was given more autonomy by the Bush administration than 
Assistant Secretary of State Kelly, for instance, he was permitted to conduct direct talks with 
his North Korean counterparts, but surveillance from Washington DC continued. The Bush 
administration became more open to the idea of a negotiated settlement but at the same time 
neoconservative voices, although less dominant than earlier in the administration, were 
powerful enough to obstruct any development that seemed to offer legitimacy to the DPRK 
and remained intent on doing so.57 Yoichi Funabashi reports that National Security Council 
staffers Professor Victor Cha and William Tobey were included in the US delegation to the 
Six-Party Talks to ensure that Ambassador Hill did not go beyond his instructions from the 
Bush administration.58 Both Kelly and Hill’s interactions with North Korean counterparts 
were monitored by the Bush administration. 
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Diplomacy with the DPRK 
There is a plethora of descriptive and policy-focused literature on the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy towards North Korea and its nuclear program; a common 
contemporaneous theme was the question of whether the Six-Party Talks remained an 
effective solution to the North Korea nuclear issue.59 There is research that examines the Six-
Party Talks within the larger context of the Bush administration’s foreign policy. In this bulk 
of literature, scholars seek to demonstrate why the Bush administration changed its policy 
from confrontation to accommodation, or to determine whether the Bush administration’s 
response to the second North Korean nuclear crisis was effective.60 This body of work does 
not allow questions to be asked and answered about diplomatic processes. In order to 
examine the actual practices of United States diplomacy, I draw on the theories of diplomacy 
introduced earlier in the dissertation. These include the conventional understanding of the 
functions of diplomacy as facilitating communication between states, and allowing states to 
gather intelligence, or information, about other states. 61  These functions allow states to 
determine whether there is compatibility between the interests of the states. As established 
within the earlier chapters, when states recognize that their respective interests can be 
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reconciled, they are able to enter into the negotiation process to negotiate an agreement.62 
The negotiation process is, therefore, a core component of diplomacy, as argued by the 
classical literature on diplomacy.63  
In this section, I first of all show how the United States developed an approach to 
dealing with the DPRK that comes close to the antitheses of diplomacy; whereby negotiation 
was discouraged and strict instructions from Washington DC forbade United States officials 
from participating in conventional diplomatic interaction. I show the genesis of this approach 
in the October 2002 Pyongyang meeting between United States officials and DPRK officials. 
I trace the progress of United States participation in the Six-Party Talks to show how the 
normal functions of diplomacy could not be carried out effectively by United States officials. 
In particular, I show that the US delegation to the Six-Party Talks could not gather adequate 
information concerning its adversary’s position on the nuclear issue because of the 
constraints placed upon it from foreign policy directions from the White House. I show that 
these constraints also severely hampered the possibility of the United States delegation to the 
Six-Party Talks being able to perform the conventional diplomatic function of facilitating 
clear communication between negotiating adversaries.64 I draw on United States government 
policy and legislations, United States Congressional Records, as well as the journalist and 
scholarly, and governmental community’s analysis of the policy towards North Korea.65 I 
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reconstruct the rounds of the Six-Party Talks, by using secondary sources, as well as the 
statements released by the foreign ministries of relevant states.66  
 
The 2002 Pyongyang meeting 
The unwillingness and disinterest of the Bush administration to enter into direct talks 
with the North Korean government and the aversion to any process that could be seen as 
negotiating a compromise, one of the core functions of diplomacy, inevitably downgraded 
all other diplomatic functions. Arguably, this absence of focus on the conventional functions 
and potential contribution of diplomacy was a significant factor in the now notorious meeting 
that Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly held in Pyongyang in 2002, which resulted in, 
among other things, ambiguities about the important question of whether the North Korean 
government had pursued a highly enriched uranium program.  
In early summer of 2002, the American intelligence community had made an 
assessment that suggested the need for a reinterpretation of North Korea’s enrichment 
program.67 According to Robert Carlin, former CIA analyst responsible for North Korea, the 
analysis was not based upon direct knowledge of how far the program had actually 
developed, but rather was based upon a synthesis of information about material and 
machinery the DPRK had procured, or sought to procure, over the past several years.68 The 
Central Intelligence Agency provides President’s Daily Brief, which is a summary of high-
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intelligence and analysis about the developments on the Korean Peninsula.69 It is written for 
the president and his top advisers. The procurement efforts suggested that the DPRK was 
making a major effort to move beyond small-scale experimentation and launch a production-
scale program.70 According to Carlin, the intelligence community made great efforts to make 
clear that it was impossible to conclude whether the DPRK had assembled and was actually 
operating a highly enriched uranium program.71 Senior officials of the Bush administration 
nonetheless began to perceive the North Korean government through the lens of having 
violated the 1994 Agreed Framework, and instructed Kelly to address North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons development efforts within that context.  
High-level government officials argued, and believed, that the North Korean 
government violated the terms of the 1994 October Agreed Framework.72 They argued that 
the 2002 United States intelligence agency report concluded that the North Korean 
government had been secretly developing its uranium enrichment program beyond the 
experimental level.73 The creation of such a program was a serious violation of international 
agreements, such as the 1994 October Agreed Framework and the 1992 Joint Declaration of 
South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The purpose of 
Kelly’s visit to the DPRK in October 2002 to meet with Vice Minister of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of DPRK Kim Gye-Gwan was to inform the North Korean government that 
the United States believed that the DPRK had violated the October 1994 Agreed Framework, 
and that until the issue was corrected, there would be no further diplomatic discussions 
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between the United States and the DPRK.74 On 4 October 2002, the United States diplomatic 
delegation led by Kelly met with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK in 
Pyongyang. Vice Minister Kim denied the allegation about having developing a highly 
enriched uranium program.75 The following day, the United States delegation met with First 
Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK Kang Sok Ju.76  
The public outcome reported by the Bush administration was that Kang had admitted 
to the illicit continuing development of the nuclear programme, although the literature that 
reconstructs Kelly’s meeting states that there was confusion among the members of the 
United States delegation about what exactly Kang said in response to the allegation.77 Due 
to his strict instructions that forbade him from going beyond his pre-determined talking-
points Kelly did not ask First Vice Minister Kang further questions nor did he probe for more 
information.78 After hearing Kang’s response, Kelly left the room since he had followed and 
completed his directions to deliver the Bush administration’s message concerning 
enrichment. According to Carlin, the Korean speakers within the United States delegation 
did what they could to reconstruct a transcript based on what Kang had said in Korean.79 
Because there was no opportunity to schedule another meeting to ask Kang for clarification, 
the American Korean speakers had to compare notes among themselves.80 The United States 
delegation was unable to obtain a clear answer concerning whether the DPRK was engaged 
in industrial-scale enrichment that could have led to an arsenal of highly enriched uranium 
bombs, as believed by the American intelligence community and the Bush administration, 
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because Kelly was instructed by the Bush administration to present to his North Korean 
counterpart the United States’ message and leave no room for discussion.81  
Pritchard recalls how Kelly read, and then re-read the following day, his prepared 
script without variation during his meeting with his North Korean counterpart in October 
2002.82 Kelly was only allowed to reiterate the United States official position, which limited 
his ability to manoeuvre and gather information about the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Statements released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK also reported that Kelly 
merely recited the United States position of the complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program.83 Kelly was unable to enter into any form 
of meaningful diplomacy as Bush administration instructions included not only what Kelly 
could do, but also what Kelly could say at these diplomatic meetings. 
 
The process 
Yoichi Funabashi’s The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second North 
Korean Nuclear Crisis, which is based upon direct interviews with Assistant Secretary of 
State Kelly as well as other government officials from the participating states of the Six-
Party Talks, reports that the Bush administration gave the United States delegation headed 
by Kelly strict instructions, which he lists in the book.84 Although the talks were multilateral, 
the instructions were focused upon the United States delegation’s interaction with its North 
Korean counterpart. The series of instructions were exact, specific and expected to be 
followed.85 Charles Pritchard, United States special envoy to negotiations with North Korea 
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(2000-2003), reported that the Bush administration expected the United States delegation to 
follow its instructions precisely.86 The practice of giving strict instructions to Kelly and the 
United States delegation was routinised to the extent that, according to Pritchard, Kelly “had 
been completely hamstrung by onerous instructions from officials opposed to a negotiated 
settlement with North Korea.”87 Pritchard’s explicitly states that his recollections do “not 
attempt to present opposing views on issues in which [the author] was personally involved.”88 
Nevertheless, this particular observation on the tight constraints placed on Kelly in is not 
very controversial, given the prolific amount of information in the public arena about this 
issue, not the least from Funabashi’s work.  
According to Funabashi’s interview with Kelly, the United States delegation was not 
allowed to conduct any talks with their North Korean counterpart that could take the form or 
appearance of a bilateral negotiation.89 The objective was to enforce a sense of isolation on 
the DPRK delegation. The Bush administration also was using the Six-Party Talks as a space 
where it could enlist the other states into applying more pressure onto the DPRK to dismantle 
its nuclear program in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.90 These instructions 
however also meant that meaningful negotiations on a bilateral basis could not take place. 
With bilateral discussions not permitted, the United States delegation did not conceive of the 
diplomatic function of gathering information as either possible or necessary in the format of 
the Six-Party Talks. 
The United States delegation was instructed to conduct all US-DPRK consultations 
within the multilateral framework.91 The Bush administration gave strict instructions as to 
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the form that the multilateral processes could operate, thus also limiting the possibility for a 
negotiation process involving some form of compromise. Instructions included exact 
directions on what the US delegation should do to avoid the form or appearance of bilateral 
negotiations. The United States delegates were allowed to chat with the North Korean 
delegation during coffee breaks and buffet meals, either standing or seated on sofas, and they 
could enter with the North Korean delegation into a room equipped only with chairs or 
sofas.92 The delegation, however, was not allowed to enter into a room having a table, and if 
for some reason the United States delegation had to use a separate room with the North 
Korean delegation, it had to first request permission from the Secretary of State.93  
Throughout the talks in which Kelly was engaged, the approach was to reiterate the 
official US position during any bilateral exchange. A North Korean Foreign Ministry 
statement of 30 August 2003 asserts that during the first round of the Six-Party Talks, the US 
side “flatly denied a package solution and the order of simultaneous actions proposed by the 
DPRK,” and “made assertions that a full range of other issues of concerns including missiles, 
conventional weapons and human rights should be discussed for the normalization of 
relationship between the DPRK and US only after its nuclear program is scrapped.”94 Kelly 
was not able to offer views, however, on the North Korean proposal or exchange information 
about their respective proposals. The United States delegation was highly restricted to its 
instructions and pre-determined talking points, and this control over the process continued 
during the Six-Party Talks.95  
Press briefings from the White House and the State Department provide little to no 
information regarding the interactions between the United States delegation and the DPRK 
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delegation. They, however, repeatedly emphasise that the United States’ position on the 
nuclear issue was the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s 
nuclear program.96 Philip Reeker, Deputy State Department Spokesman, in a press briefing 
on 27 August 2003 is at pains to confirm that even in informal meetings, Kelly followed his 
instructions to avoid the appearance of bilateral negotiations with the North Korean 
delegation, ensuring that even informal meetings took place in the plenary meeting room 
where members of the other delegations to the Six-Party Talks were present.97  
 A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement released on 29 February 2004 indicates 
that even by 2004, James Kelly was still not permitted to step outside a tightly circumscribed 
remit. The DPRK statement asserts that Kelly “only read the prepared script,” and gave “no 
answer even to the questions raised.”98 Both Pritchard’s recollections and these North Korean 
statements confirm that Kelly abided by the instructions from Washington DC. North 
Korea’s comments and statements are not normally perceived as unbiased, accurate 
information, especially from the American perspective, which includes that of the United 
States government. They are, therefore, easily dismissed as being irrelevant or untruthful.99 
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The North Korean Foreign Ministry’s description of Kelly and Kim’s bilateral discussion as 
well as its description of the US delegation’s unwillingness to negotiate with the DPRK, 
however, align with Yoichi Funabashi’s construct of the rounds of the Six-Party Talks in his 
book, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Crisis.100 According to an 
interview that Funabashi held with a senior United States administration official, Kelly did 
not answer North Korea’s questions during the bilateral meeting of the first round of the Six-
Party Talks.101 Instead, Kelly repeatedly told Kim to carefully read his opening remarks at 
the plenary session.102 Kelly’s opening remarks were about how the United States position 
was the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear 
program.103 As stated by the North Korean Foreign Ministry statement of 30 August 2003, 
Kelly solely insisted upon the United States position by referring to his opening remarks.  
The instructions for the second round of the Six-Party Talks again limited Kelly’s 
ability to manoeuvre in the negotiations. Kelly could only reiterate that the United States 
policy was to insist upon the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North 
Korea’s nuclear program. The United States was not willing to negotiate with the DPRK.104 
Kelly, therefore, did not gather information about the DPRK’s position on the nuclear issue. 
Funabashi’s The Peninsula Question reports that the second round of the Six-Party Talks was 
summarized by Kelly as a “farewell to bilateral negotiations with North Korea.”105  
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Inadequate gathering of information about the nuclear issue 
The constraints placed upon the United States delegation headed by Assistant 
Secretary of State Kelly severely hampered the ability of United States officials to carry out 
one of the most basic functions of diplomacy, which is to gather information about the 
adversary. In this case, the United States delegation’s inability to gather more detailed 
information about the DPRK’s nuclear capacity and intentions was a product of the tight 
constraints under which American diplomats were placed which ruled out discussion, 
compromise proposals and bilateral talks. The lack of discussion at the October 2002 
meeting, for example, contributed to the output of highly mixed messages about North 
Korea’s nuclear capacity. 
Assistant Secretary of State Kelly’s opening remarks before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, delivered after the end of the second round of the Six-Party Talks, 
indicate that the United States delegation did not understand the diplomatic function of 
gathering information about the adversary’s position as necessary. Kelly’s opening remarks 
focus solely upon the United States objective of complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. 106  The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee is a body of government that is charged with leading foreign policy legislation 
and debate in the Senate. It, therefore, was important for Kelly to emphasize that he was 
executing the policy that the United States government legislated. Members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee believed that if diplomacy with the DPRK should occur, it 
must be preceded by the total dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program and include 
highly intrusive verification requirements.107 Kelly did not mention North Korea’s proposal 
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concerning the nuclear issue as there was no interest by the Bush administration in receiving, 
discussing or negotiating any other solution other than the stated objective of the 
administration. The United States delegation, therefore, had no need to gather information 
about the position of the DPRK concerning the nuclear issue. 
By contrast, in a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 15 July 
2004, Kelly outlined the DPRK proposal, after explaining the United States proposal tabled 
at the third round of the Six-Party Talks.108 Establishing the reason why Kelly discussed the 
DPRK proposal after the third round of the Six-Party Talks, but not after the second, is 
difficult as there is no government statement or document that provides such explanation. 
The Congressional Record of 15 July 2004 states that the objective of Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee’s hearing was to examine the current conditions on the latest round of 
the Six-Party Talks.109 Given that the proposal introduced by the North Korean delegation at 
the third round of Six-Party Talks was the official position of the DPRK, Kelly may have 
decided it was important that the US government become aware of what the DPRK’s 
proposal entailed for the record. 
Ambassador Hill was given slightly more room to manoeuvre then his predecessor 
Assistant Secretary Kelly, even though his activities were still closely monitored by those 
who still maintained the stance that the United States should never compromise with the 
DPRK. This meant, among other things, that information gathering became more accepted 
as a necessary function of the diplomatic process, particularly in respect of the DPRK’s 
energy sector. The 13 February 2007 statement formulated a change in approach in the 
“Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement”: “recalling Section 1 and 
                                                 
108 “Dealing with North Korea’s Nuclear Programs,” US Department of State Archive, July 15, 2004, accessed 
on February 8, 2017, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/34395.htm. 
109 Daily Digest, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., Congressional Record 150, pt. 98: D776. 
 128 
Section 3 of the Joint Statement of the 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in 
economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.” 110  To implement the 
September 2005 Joint Statement, the participating states of the Six-Party Talks established a 
Working Group on economy and energy cooperation. As a party of the Six-Party Talks, the 
US government needed information about the DPRK’s energy and economic situation in 
order to be able to address the duration and scale of the DPRK’s need for energy and 
economic assistance.111 
 
Lack of effective communication between the United States and the DPRK  
This section demonstrates that the United States delegations headed by Assistant 
Secretary of State Kelly and his successor, Ambassador Christopher R. Hill, were not 
consistently able to fulfil the normal diplomatic function of facilitating effective 
communication between states. The United States delegation was unable to clearly 
communicate to the DPRK that the proposal presented at the Six-Party Talks was the official 
policy of the Bush administration, as demonstrated by the DPRK’s continuous concern over 
the Bush administration’s policy intent. One factor in the inability of the United States 
delegation at the Six-Party talks to convince North Korean counterparts that they were 
engaged in meaningful diplomacy was that the Bush administration outsourced 
communication between the United States to the Chinese government. Throughout both Bush 
administrations, to a greater or lesser extent, Washington foreign policy officials hostile to 
the idea of negotiation with the DPRK, continued to constrain, limit and try to prevent their 
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own diplomats from engaging in some of the conventional functions and activities of 
diplomatic practice.  
The opening remarks that Assistant Secretary of State Kelly gave to the first and 
second round of the Six-Party Talks, and the North Korean Foreign Ministry statements 
about Kelly’s remarks demonstrate the lack of clear communication between the United 
States delegation and the North Korean delegation about United States policy intent towards 
the DPRK.112 Kelly reiterated that the United States government had no intention of invading 
or attacking the DPRK, or demanding regime change.113 These remarks, however, did not 
persuade the North Korean government. The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the 
DPRK stated that “the US did not show any stand to co-exist with the DPRK in peace” after 
the end of the second round.114 This statement from the North Korean Foreign Ministry, 
released on 29 February 2004, expressed concern that the United States government had no 
desire to improve relations with the DPRK, nor any intention to change its policy of regime 
change within the DPRK. The concerns of the North Korean government about the position 
of the United States are the same concerns described in the North Korean Foreign Ministry 
statement released on 30 August 2003.115 This indicates that the United States delegation was 
unable to clearly communicate to the DPRK delegation that the Bush administration did not 
have hostile intentions towards the North Korean state.  
The lack of clarity concerning the Bush administration’s intentions towards the 
DPRK persisted after the third round of the Six-Party Talks, as the North Korean government 
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continued to believe that the Bush administration had no intention to peacefully coexist with 
the DPRK, and instead sought its collapse. This belief eventually became the North Korean 
government’s justification as to why it suspended its participation in the Six-Party Talks. On 
10 February 2005, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement stating 
that the official political stance of the second Bush administration “contained no word 
showing any willingness to co-exist with the DPRK or make a switchover in its policy toward 
it.” 116 The statement explains that the DPRK suspended its participation in the Six-Party 
Talks because the rhetoric of the second Bush administration indicated that United States 
policy towards the DPRK was regime change. 117 The DPRK government, therefore, no 
longer found the Six-Party Talks beneficial to its interests. United States delegation to the 
Six-Party Talks could not convincingly communicate to the DPRK delegation that the actual 
objective of the Bush administration’s policy towards the DPRK was not the collapse of the 
North Korean regime. 
Christopher Hill also faced difficulty clearly communicating to the North Korean 
delegate that the proposal that the United States was presenting at the Six-Party Talks was 
the official policy of the Bush administration. As described in Ambassador Hill’s memoir, 
internal battles continued within the second Bush administration about how United States 
foreign policy towards the DPRK would be implemented.118 The division within the Bush 
administration impeded the negotiation process of the Six-Party Talks. For instance, just after 
the announcement of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, the US Treasury Department 
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placed economic sanctions on North Korean trading entities as well as Banco Delta Asia of 
Macau, a bank in which several North Korean companies held accounts.119 Hill states in his 
memoir that the purpose of this action was not to give him added negotiation leverage or to 
put further negotiating pressure on the DPRK, “but rather to sidetrack the negotiations 
entirely.”120 According to Ambassador Hill, the aim of the economic sanctions was to hinder 
the entire negotiation process.  
The freeze on North Korean-related accounts not only provoked strong condemnation 
from the North Korean government, but also led the DPRK to once again suspend its 
participation in the Six-Party Talks, with the repeated justification that the Bush 
administration was not serious about producing a negotiated solution, and instead sought the 
collapse of the North Korean regime.121  
 
Complicating factors  
 Prominent officials in the Bush administration perceived the North Korean 
government through a moralistic paradigm and this constrained diplomatic options. It would 
be remiss however not to identify other factors that inhibited the use of diplomacy in conflict 
resolution with North Korea. These included the lack of a consistent and coherent US foreign 
policy on North Korea, the lack of trust between the US and the DPRK, and the Bush 
administration’s overreliance upon the Chinese government. 122 
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Lack of a consistent and coherent US foreign policy towards the DPRK 
One reason that the United States delegation was unable to clearly communicate its 
intentions to the DPRK delegation was because of ongoing political debate within the Bush 
administration over which strategy should be adopted to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
issue. The Bush administration’s foreign policy towards the DPRK shifted from bilateral 
negotiations to placing restrictions onto the North Korean regime, including economic 
sanctions, with the aim of moving the North Korean regime towards a more democratic 
state.123 The aim remained broadly the same but there was an inconsistency in tactics. This 
confusion over tactics sent a message to the DPRK that the United States was also confused 
over policy aims.  
Harnisch argued in 2002, prior to the first round of the Six-Party Talks in 2003, that 
the Bush administration “suffered from serious bureaucratic infighting between moderate 
skeptics…and hardline critics.”124 Harnisch establishes that there officials within the Bush 
administration were divided; some sought a negotiated settlement, and others sought military 
action. Harnisch argues that the obstacles to diplomatic negotiations included the presence 
withn the Bush administration of those that wanted to undermine the negotiation process so 
that a military solution could not be ruled out.125 Harnisch shows that there was disagreement 
among officials over US foreign policy towards the DPRK since the early days of the Bush 
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administration while James I. Matray argues that the Bush administration lacked a coherent 
and consistent policy on North Korea throughout both administrations, from 2001 to 2008.126  
Matray argues that those who pursued a policy of regime change hindered the 
negotiation process, since their aim was not a negotiated settlement with the DPRK, but the 
destruction of the North Korean regime. 127 Matray argues that throughout the Six-Party 
Talks, there was a powerful sector within the Bush administration that pushed for 
administration official policy towards the DPRK to be regime change. The Bush 
administration’s lack of a coherent and consistent policy on North Korea allowed these 
powerful voices to shape policy on North Korea and hinder alternatives, even if it could not 
determine policy outcomes. This duality also made it difficult for the US delegation to the 
Six-Party Talks to clearly convey that it approach, which did not include regime change, was 
the official position of the Bush administration.  
  C. Kenneth Quinones also notes the divide within the Bush administration over its 
policy towards the nuclear crisis. 128  There were officials who favoured diplomatic 
negotiations with the DPRK and those who favoured a more assertive and unilateral 
approach.129 Quinones points to President George W. Bush and his indecision as the main 
reason for the continuous debate over strategy.130 Quinones empirically demonstrates this 
lack of coherence in North Korea policy by chronicling the times when different preferred 
policies were supported by President Bush.131  
 These scholarly articles demonstrate that there was a lack of a consistent and coherent 
United States foreign policy towards the DPRK during the first three rounds of the Six-Party 
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Talks, due to the internal division of the Bush administration on which strategy to adopt to 
resolve the nuclear issue. One ramification of internal division was that the United States 
delegation was unable to clearly communicate to the DPRK delegation that the proposal it 
was tabling at the Six-Party Talks was the Bush administration’s official policy towards the 
DPRK.  
 
The lack of trust between the US and the DPRK 
 The Bush administration perceived the DPRK as an unreliable negotiation partner. 
This was a view shared across the administration, including by those who favoured 
diplomacy. For regime change or neo-conservative sectors, however, this lack of trust, 
compounded by what they understand as DPRK direct deception, meant that diplomacy was 
an inherently inappropriate strategy.  
In a meeting with South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung, President Bush stated that 
Kim Jong-Il could not be trusted and stated his suspicions concerning whether the DPRK 
would keep to the terms of any future agreement.132 In a press conference two years after his 
meeting with President Kim, Bush made similar comments about the October 1994 Agreed 
Framework stating that “the United States honoured its side of the agreement; North Korea 
didn’t. While we felt the agreement was in force, North Korea was enriching uranium.”133 
The distrust that the Bush administration had towards the DPRK, and the DPRK’s perceived 
lack of compliance, were important factors in consolidating an aversion to diplomacy with 
those that preferred regime change. Others, however, while accepting they were dealing with 
a very difficult negotiating partner, understood diplomacy as a tough process that was 
precisely about forging agreements between inherently adversarial partners. 
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The Bush administration’s overreliance on the Chinese government 
The North Korean Foreign Ministry statement of 10 February 2005 referral to the 
rhetoric of senior officials of the Bush administration signifies that they understood that 
United States diplomats were not empowered to conduct diplomacy, in the sense of 
facilitating communication between the United States and the DPRK. Pritchard states that 
the Bush administration allowed the Chinese government to become the official and only 
channel of US communication with the North Korean government because dominant neo-
conservative foreign policy makers in Washington DC were uncomfortable with the direct 
contact between the United States Department of State and the DPRK Mission to the United 
Nations, sometimes called the New York channel.134  
The New York channel of communication had been the customary channel of 
communication between the United States and the DPRK, and at times considered by the 
United States to be the only official channel of diplomatic communication between the US 
and the DPRK.135 The Bush administration, therefore, allowed the Chinese government to 
facilitate communication between the United States and the DPRK, due to the influence of 
the sector within the administration that sought to have no appearance of direct or bilateral 
communication with the North Korean government. The Chinese government replacing the 
New York channel meant that when the North Korean government sent comments or 
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questions to the Bush administration through its United Nations mission in New York, the 
Bush administration would reply through the Chinese government.136 
This communicational setting was originally meant for communication regarding the 
trilateral talks among China, the United States, and the DPRK, that took place in April 
2003.137 Pritchard states that the Bush administration, however, continued to use this channel 
of communication on issues that were not related to the mechanism or logistics of multilateral 
talks.138 The Bush administration stopped using the New York channel and instead relied 
predominantly upon the Chinese government for all matters that concerned communication 
with the North Korean government. This allowed the Bush administration to avoid all forms 
of direct talks with the DPRK. This practice continued throughout the first three rounds of 
the Six-Party Talks, as confirmed by Donald Zagoria’s 2004 report on the Second Northeast 
Asia Security Conference, initiated by the non-profit organization National Committee on 
American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), and which took place after the third round of the Six-
Party Talks that was held from 23-26 June 2004.139  
Zagoria reported that a North Korean participant, “complained that the US is not 
negotiating with the DPRK in a serious manner, as demonstrated by its practice of relaying 
messages to the DPRK through China.” 140  The North Korean participant’s complaint, 
therefore, indicates that as at 2004, the Bush administration was avoiding all forms of direct 
talks with the DPRK by continuously relying upon the Chinese government to relay the 
United States government’s messages. The North Korean government believed that the Bush 
administration was being flippant about the Six-Party Talks and believed it had little reason 
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139 Donald Zagoria, “Conference on Northeast Asia Security,” NCAFP, August 9-11, 2004, accessed May 22, 
2015, 
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to consider the position that the United States delegation was presenting at the Six-Party 
Talks as the official position of the Bush administration. This made it difficult for the US 
delegation to convey to the DPRK delegation that the proposal that the US delegation was 
presenting at the Six-Party Talks was the official policy of the Bush administration towards 
the DPRK. 
 
The role of the DPRK  
Scott Snyder argues that the DPRK was not committed to reaching agreement through 
diplomacy.141 Snyder argued that DPRK concerns about the Bush administration as aiming 
at regime change was merely a North Korean negotiation tactic. Snyder’s argument is that 
concern expressed by North Korean governments over United States hostile intent is a North 
Korean negotiation tactic that the North Korean government practiced long before the advent 
of the Bush administration. Snyder argues that this is because the DPRK has a strong idea 
about sovereignty and this underpins North Korea’s strategy and tactics in international 
negotiations.142 He argues that North Korean negotiators place a strong emphasis on the 
“principle of non-interference with the state’s internal affairs,” as they often go out of their 
way to demonstrate the independence of the North Korean regime.143  
Snyder argues that North Korea’s “unique historical experience” shape negotiating 
tactics, and that it stems from Kim Il Sung’s life experience.144 The theoretical framework of 
Snyder’s Negotiating on the Edge draws from Raymond Cohen’s theory that a state’s cultural 
identity shapes the way its negotiators perceive negotiating choices.145 Cohen explains his 
                                                 
141 Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington, D.C.: United 
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142 Ibid., 9. 
143 Ibid., 31. 
144 Ibid., 9, 31. 
145 Ibid., 10.  
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theory in his own work, Negotiating Across Cultures (1997).146 Snyder identifies factors of 
North Korea’s national identity, values, and socializing processes, which he argues shapes 
North Korea’s negotiating behaviour. Snyder argues that North Korean cultural identity, 
which influences its negotiation behaviour, can be directly traced to the lifestyle and 
experiences of Kim Il Sung and that behaviour and worldview of North Korean negotiators 
are greatly influenced by the life of Kim Il Sung.147 The negotiation behaviours that Snyder 
examines are, however, derived from a number of negotiation processes that occurred when 
Kim Il Sung was alive. That the life of Kim Il Sung, the founder of the North Korean state, 
would have a great influence upon state affairs, including negotiation processes, while he 
was alive and in power, is a logical conclusion. Snyder’s analysis does not factor in 
negotiations between the United States and the DPRK that occurred before the 1990s, such 
as the USS Pueblo Incident of 1968.148 Moreover, since its publication in 1999, Snyder’s 
book has yet to be revised or updated. This begets the question of whether Snyder’s argument 
about the North Korean government’s concern over United States hostile intent is relevant 
and apposite to the DPRK’s negotiation behaviour at the Six-Party Talks.  
 
Opening the space for Track II diplomacy to the DPRK 
This chapter demonstrated that during the Bush administration active diplomatic 
engagement with the North Korean government was impeded by an understanding of 
American foreign policy as mission to engage in democracy promotion and which 
understood direct engagement of the Communist DPRK as a betrayal of those ideas. This 
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influential ideology of American moral exceptionalism did not prevent all contacts with the 
DPRK, especially from 2005 onwards, but it contributed to a lack of coherence to US policy 
as divisions within the administration continued. United States delegations that were 
nominally tasked with the negotiations with DPRK officials were hampered as they were 
unable to take part in the give and take of conventional negotiation processes nor were they 
able to gather useful information about the adversary’s position, or effectively facilitate 
communication between the United States and the DPRK.  
This chapter, therefore, provided contextual explanations for why United States non-
state actors pursued and initiated Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK. In the next three 
chapters, Track II diplomacy is explained as an effort to compensate for what was understood 
as the failings of United States official or Track I diplomacy. The core of my thesis, presented 
in the next three chapters, shows that United States’ non-state actors sought to compensate 
for what they understood as the gaps in United States official or Track I diplomacy, through 
the inception and pursuit of Track II diplomatic processes of dialogue between the United 
States and the DPRK. Through the analysis of three different Track II diplomatic efforts that 
took place during the Bush administration, the following chapters demonstrate that non-state 
actors initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy in order to compensate for the limitations of 
US Track I diplomacy towards the DPRK.  
The core aim of these next chapters is to not to demonstrate whether or how Track II 
diplomacy changed official policies or the perceptions of the government officials that make 
official policy, as that question is beyond the scope of this research. The question of whether 
Track II diplomatic initiatives have an impact on official government policymaking is 
research that deserves its own analytical framework and in-depth research. It is explored 
within the Ph.D. dissertation of Alexander Thomas Jacobson Lennon, titled, “Why Do We 
Do Track Two?: Transnational Security Policy Networks and U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation 
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Policy.” 149  Lennon’s analytical framework combines and condenses various models, 
observations, and descriptions to focus on what he calls four potential areas of influence.150 
The first are the contacts and perceptions facilitated by networks. The second are ways that 
networks seek to interact with government participants. The third is any network effect on 
the US policy agenda, and the fourth are potential policy options that networks may develop. 
As demonstrated by Lennon’s analytical framework explains the impact and influence of 
Track II diplomacy upon Track I diplomacy. By contrast, the analytical framework of this 
dissertation focuses on concepts of diplomacy, rather than models and concepts of policy 
implementation structures. 
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Chapter 5 Explaining the NCAFP Track II Diplomacy on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 
(NCAFP), a non-profit policy organization, pursued and initiated a series of Track II 
meetings from 2003 to 2005 to compensate for the United States delegation to the Six Party 
Talks’ inability to facilitate the communication of United States policy objectives to the 
DPRK. The United States delegation to the Six Party Talks, headed by Assistant Secretary 
of State James Kelly (2003-2005), was instructed by the Bush administration to not conduct 
direct talks with its North Korean counterpart, unless it was to reiterate the official United 
States policy of complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK’s nuclear 
program. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, these instructions were from the faction of the Bush 
administration’s whose perspective of United States foreign policy towards the DPRK was 
underlined by the philosophy of the ideology of American moralism, which impeded active 
diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government. The United States delegation to 
the Six Party Talks headed by Ambassador Chris Hill (2005-2009) was given permission by 
the Bush administration to conduct direct talks with its North Korean counterpart that went 
beyond the reiteration of US official policy. This chapter’s argument concerning the NCAFP 
Track II meeting on the North Korean nuclear issue is, therefore, relevant to the US 
diplomacy with the DPRK that was conducted from 2003 to 2005, and why this chapter’s 
timeframe of analysis is from 2003 to 2005.  
 In the first section, I outline the data of this chapter to introduce the supplementary 
data that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I analyse Herbert C. 
Kelan and Stephen P. Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop, which they establish 
in “The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution 
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of International Conflicts.”1 As established in the analytical framework of this dissertation, 
problem-solving workshops have the potential to compensate for limitations of official 
diplomacy. I will, therefore, be using their model to help explain the NCAFP’s Track II 
diplomatic approach. In the third section, I demonstrate the significance of the NCAFP as a 
nongovernmental organization that practices Track II diplomacy.  
In the fourth section, I establish the assumptions that inform the NCAFP’s Track II 
approach, the purpose of the NCAFP’s Track II meetings concerning the North Korean 
nuclear crisis, the objectives, the methodology, and the participants. The assumptions that 
inform the NCAFP’s approach towards conflict resolution is that there are aspects of conflicts 
in which the individual is the most appropriate unit of analysis, hence the NCAFP’s focus on 
the individual. The purpose of the NCAFP’s Track II meetings concerning the North Korean 
nuclear crisis was to compensate for the limitations of US diplomacy that occurred during 
the first three rounds of the Six Party Talks (2003-2005), and thereby assist the official 
negotiation process. The objectives of the NCAFP Track II meetings was to open a channel 
of communication between the United States and the DPRK, change participants’ 
perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue, and transfer the results 
generated by its meeting into the official policy sphere. The NCAFP’s procedure for 
accomplishing its objectives was to engage the participants in discussions, within a setting 
free from official diplomatic formalities and reiteration of official position, where 
participants would be exposed to new information concerning each other and the North 
Korean nuclear issue itself. The participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings 
share some of the qualities of Kelman and Cohen’s ideal participant for the problem-solving 
workshop, which would allow the results generated by the NCAFP Track II meetings to be 
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transferred back into the official decision-making process. In the last section, I establish that 
the NCAFP was able to partially achieve its objectives but had difficulties in meeting all of 
them. 
 
Data  
 This chapter first makes use of the scholarly literature concerning Track II diplomacy 
and the problem-solving workshop as this literature offers insights into the specific nature of 
the NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic activity.2 It analyzes the work of Herbert C. Kelman and 
Stephen P. Cohen. Kelman and Cohen are credited by Roger J. Fisher and Joseph Montville, 
themselves authorities in the theory of Track II diplomacy, as leaders in the field of the theory 
and practice of problem-solving workshops as part of the conflict resolution processes.3 
Kelman and Cohen’s scholarship is based upon their own experience in running problem-
solving workshops. 
 It then evaluates primary data from reports about the NCAFP Track II meetings 
available on the NCAFP website, and articles from the NCAFP’s flagship publication, 
American Foreign Policy Interests.4 It does not make use of interviews and instead relies 
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V.D. Volkan, J. Montville & D.A. Julius (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1991), 164 
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North Korean Nuclear Issue,” American Foreign Policy Interests 27, no 5 (October 2005): 450-453; “The 
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mainly on the written material provided on the NCAFP website, as I was unable to schedule 
interviews with the participants of the conferences. The reports were issued after every 
conference and were written by Dr. Donald Zagoria. Zagoria is the NCAFP Project Director 
for the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS), which is an initiative of the NCAFP that 
runs the Track II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear issue. He declined an 
invitation to be interviewed for this dissertation, recommending instead that the publicly 
available NCAFP reports should be used as the main source of information. 5  Zagoria 
moderated the NCAFP’s Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue, making these 
reports an especially valuable source of information.  
 The NCAFP Track II meetings were unofficial, as government officials participated 
in their private or unofficial capacity; the reports reveal who participated in these meetings, 
but they do not attribute specific comments to any of the participants. If appropriate, the 
reports identified the participants by nationality. The reports provide summaries of the 
discussions of the meetings, and state the various topics that the participants discussed, such 
as the question of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, and the scope of the proposed 
North Korean nuclear freeze.6 The reports and the journal articles, therefore, provide a vital 
source of material about the NCAFP-initiated Track II meetings.  
 Data is obtained from NCAFP reports pertaining to meetings that took place between 
27 August 2003, which is when first round of the Six Party Talks began, to 29 June – 1 July 
2005, the NCAFP’s Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The NCAFP held 
multiple Track II meetings with the DPRK during the Bush administration. Not all these 
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meetings resulted in publicly available reports. There is no report available on the NCAFP 
website concerning the First Conference on Northeast Asian Security that was held in 
September 2003. There is, therefore, limited data on some of the NCAFP Track II meetings 
on the North Korean nuclear issue. 
 There is a lack of scholarly literature concerning the NCAFP’s Track II meetings on 
the North Korean nuclear issue. The literature that discusses the NCAFP’s Track II project 
on the North Korean nuclear issue is more descriptive than analytical. 7  Moreover, the 
literature that discusses the work of the NCAFP is rather scarce. There is thereby little 
commentary about the NCAFP Track II meetings. The articles that refer to the NCAFP-
initiated Track II diplomacy do so to demonstrate that the US has had Track II exchanges 
with the DPRK. The articles, however, cannot be considered scholarly work, as they do not 
engage with any diplomatic or International Relations theory. There is, therefore, little 
analysis available concerning the NCAFP Track II diplomacy on the North Korean nuclear 
issue. This chapter is, therefore, original in that it provides a scholarly analysis of the NCAFP 
Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue.  
The chapter also makes use of primary data concerning the Six Party Talks. The data 
concerning the Six Party Talks are obtained from a variety of sources, including newspaper 
articles, government press conferences from respective states’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and document archives concerning the Six Party Talks compiled by nongovernmental 
organizations, such as the National Committee on North Korea or the Acronym Institute for 
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Disarmament Diplomacy.8 Although some of the opening remarks from the head of the 
delegations to the Six Party Talks are available, transcriptions of the discussions that were 
held during the rounds are not. There is, therefore, restricted data available for analysis 
concerning the Six Party Talks. Information concerning the issues that were discussed during 
the Six Party Talks is, however, derived from press conferences given by the heads of the 
participating states’ delegation, and documents concerning the Six Party Talks released by 
the states’ foreign ministries and their United States equivalent, the Department of State.9 
 
Problem-solving workshop: An approach to conflict resolution 
 Kelman and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop offers insight into the 
specific nature of the NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic activity. Kelman and Cohen’s work helps 
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 147 
explain the NCAFP’s Track II philosophy, purpose, objectives, method, and participants. 
This section, therefore, establishes the reasoning behind Kelman and Cohen’s model of the 
problem-solving workshop, the objectives and purpose of their model, the method, and the 
authors’ criteria of the ideal participant. 
 
Assumptions that inform Kelman and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop 
 Kelman and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop is based upon the 
assumption that that there are aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution where 
the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis, such as the satisfaction of 
human needs concerning identity and security.10 Kelman and Cohen’s approach concerning 
international conflict resolution, therefore, focuses on the changes that need to be made at 
the level of the individual. Kelman acknowledges that international relations are societal and 
intersocietal processes that cannot be reduced to the level of individual behaviour.11 He, 
however, argues that a mutually satisfactory resolution to an international conflict is one that 
addresses the identity, security and other psychological needs of the individual, as these 
unfulfilled needs drive conflict and create barriers to its resolution.12  
 Kelman and Cohen’s approach towards resolving international conflicts, therefore, 
assumes that conflict between states is driven by subjective and psychological processes. 
Conflicts can, however, be assessed on a variety of indicators, including the specific degree 
of subjectivity. Due to the lack of case studies that have adopted problem-solving workshops 
as a means to assist conflict resolution, it is yet to be determined whether Kelman and 
Cohens’ model of the problem-solving workshop may be generally applicable to different 
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kinds of conflicts. Kelman and Cohen are aware of the limitations of their model of the 
problem-solving workshop, and that it may not be applicable to all international conflicts.13  
  
Central purpose and series of objectives of problem-solving workshop 
 Kelman and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop is one in which 
“representatives of conflicting national groups are brought together for face-to-face 
communication.”14 Kelman and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop provides a 
space where participants can discuss potential solutions to the conflict that can then be 
transferred back into the official negotiation process. The central purpose of their model of 
the problem-solving workshop is seen by Kelman and Cohen as a supplement to or 
preparation for official, Track I negotiations.15 The series of objectives that is designed to 
achieve the central purpose of their model is to produce within the participants a positive and 
differentiated image of each other, and new realizations about the source and nature of the 
conflict; and to increase the probability that the insights and ideas generated by the problem-
solving workshops are transferred back into the official political process.16 
 
Methodology 
 The key elements of Kelman and Cohen’s methodology are an isolated and informal 
setting, guided discussions on specific topics, and capacity to invite participants who are able 
to communicate with the political leadership. Kelman and Cohen argue that the first two 
components are necessary because it gives participants “the freedom, opportunity, and 
impetus to move away from the rigid reiteration of official positions and from efforts to 
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justify their own side and score points against the other side, and instead, to absorb new 
information, explore new ideas, revise their perceptions, reassess their attitudes, and engage 
in a process of creative problem solving.”17  
 Kelman and Cohen argue that problem-solving workshops should be conducted 
within a relatively isolated setting that is free from governmental and diplomatic protocol. 
They argue that this type of setting encourages participants to move away from their 
respective states’ official position due to the confidentiality that this setting offers. The 
distance between the participants and their respective states’ official position allow the 
participants more freedom to engage in informal negotiations with the other side.18  
 The topic of discussion is a necessary component to Kelman and Cohen’s 
methodology, as they propose that the type of topic helps obtain the objective of changing 
participants’ perspectives, and thereby improve the atmosphere for conflict resolution.19 The 
discussions that take place within Kelman and Cohen’s problem-solving workshop are 
guided. Kelman and Cohen argue that the organizer of the problem-solving workshop, or one 
who moderates the problem-solving workshop “keep the discussion moving in constructive 
directions. And they inject ideas, observations, and information on which new learnings and 
insights can be build.”20 The organizers of the problem-solving workshop are, therefore, able 
to direct the discussions in the manner they deem necessary. 
 Kelman and Cohen propose that the discussions should first focus on specific 
functional problems, such as common or parallel institution problems of education or 
welfare.21 They argue that a focus on this type of topic will permit the development of trust 
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between participants.22 By beginning the discussions with a relatively less controversial 
topic, it increases the chance that the participants’ perspectives of the other side will begin 
to change as a modicum of trust is developed among participants.23 Kelman and Cohen then 
argue that over a series of workshops, the discussions would gradually address topics that 
are more closely related to the core issues.24 They conclude that the trust and openness in 
communication that was developed from discussing the topics of past series of workshops 
will help create an atmosphere in which participants can engage in creative problem solving.  
 Kelman and Cohen argue that the participants, who engaged in the guided discussions 
of the problem-solving workshop, are exposed to new information concerning the specific 
topic, which may change their own perceptions and attitudes.25 They are, therefore, able to 
acquire new insights into “the goals and intentions, the perceptions and anxieties, the 
flexibilities and limits of the other side.”26 Kelman and Cohen argue that these new insights 
may affect the participants ideas of what is feasible, necessary, and promising in the search 
for solutions.27 The changes within the participants’ perspectives that are formed by the 
candid and open discussions of the problem-solving workshops is, therefore, a means 
towards the development of an atmosphere in which creative problem-solving can become 
possible. These changes are then to be transferred back into the official policy process 
through the participant’s efforts to communicate with the political leadership.28 
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Ideal participant of the problem-solving workshop 
 Kelman and Cohen perceive the type of participant to be an important feature of their 
model of the problem-solving workshop, which is why this section focuses on their work 
concerning the ideal participant of the problem-solving workshop. Kelman and Cohen argue 
that the “selection of potentially influential participants and the coordination with political 
leaders” is geared to achieving the second objective of their model of the problem-solving 
workshop. 29  The participant is, therefore, crucial to their model of the problem-solving 
workshop. Kelman and Cohen explain that the ideal participant for the problem-solving 
workshop are individuals who are generally influential within their respective societies, who 
speak for some significant segment of opinion, and who have potential access to political 
leaders. 30  The government officials who participate in problem-solving workshops are 
invited as private individuals. They, therefore, participate in their private or unofficial 
capacity, rather than as official representatives of their respective government. Kelman and 
Cohen do not provide any other information concerning the status of government officials, 
such as whether they still retain their diplomatic status while participating in the problem-
solving workshop. They, however, underline that since the workshop is of an unofficial 
character, the participants are invited as private individuals.31 
 According to Kelman and Cohen, the ideal participants are those who are at an 
intermediate distance from official leadership.32 These are individuals whose perceptions and 
attitudes are able to make a difference in the policy process, but are not too close to the 
leadership that they are constrained by official positions and decision-makers’ expectation. 
The participant is, therefore, not responsible for speaking on behalf of its government, but 
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has access to speak to its government. They are able to freely move between the private and 
public sphere. Kelman and Cohen assume that this quality of the participant is what allows 
for coordination between the Track II process and the official policy process. The type of 
participant is, therefore, an important feature of Kelman and Cohens’ model of the problem-
solving workshop.  
 
Critiques of the Kelman and Cohen’s model 
A limitation of Kelman and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop that the 
authors acknowledge is the problem of transferring the changes into the policy process.33 
Kelman and Cohen’s criteria for the ideal participant is more theoretical than empirical, in 
that their scholarship does not empirically demonstrate whether their ideal participant is able 
to successfully transfer the results generated by the workshop into the official negotiation 
process. Although Kelman and Cohen have their own experience in running problem-solving 
workshops, they do not provide a specific example of the ideal participant in their 
scholarship. Moreover, while Kelman and Cohen discuss their understanding of “potential 
influential participants,” they do not elaborate on what “coordination with leadership” 
entails.34 Kelman and Cohen assume that since the ideal participant has influence within the 
policymaking community, that individual will have an impact on the policy process and will, 
therefore, be able to enhance the probability that the insights and ideas generated by the 
workshop will be transferred into the official policy process. Kelman and Cohen, however, 
do not adequately demonstrate in their scholarship that a participants’ deliberate effort to 
communicate with political leaders after the problem-solving workshop can have a direct 
impact on the official decision to start negotiations. Their proposal concerning the question 
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of transfer is too broad, and relies too much upon the individual. The question of coordination 
and cooperation between Track I and Track II diplomacy is, therefore, still a matter of 
ongoing research, as the question of how the results and products generated by Track II 
diplomacy can be transferred and thereby contribute, to the processes and outcomes of 
official negotiation still remains. 
 
The National Committee on American Foreign Policy 
 In this section, I establish the significance of the National Committee on American 
Foreign Policy as a nongovernmental organization that conducts Track II diplomacy. The 
NCAFP has had a significant impact on different international conflicts. Under the leadership 
of then-Chairman William J. Flynn, the NCAFP contributed to the Peace Process in Northern 
Ireland in 1994. It has also made an impact on Cross-Taiwan-Strait relations. The NCAFP is 
currently the only policy organization in the United States that is hosted annually for visits 
to Taipei, Taiwan and Beijing, China by Taiwan’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the 
PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Furthermore, the NCAFP’s personal connection with former 
Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger contributes to the NCAFP’s influence within the 
official Track I levels. 
 The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) was founded in 1974 
by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau and others. It is a non-profit policy organization “dedicated 
to the resolution of conflicts that threaten US interests. Toward that end, the NCAFP 
identifies, articulates, and helps advance US foreign policy interests from a nonpartisan 
perspective within the framework of political realism.”35 The NCAFP is important as it is 
one of the few non-governmental foreign policy organizations that hosts dialogues which 
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stimulate and inform the American public and US government on current issues, such as 
cybersecurity initiatives, US-Russia relations, and the Middle East. The NCAFP fulfils its 
mission through Track I ½ and Track II diplomacy, which according to the NCAFP consists 
of “closed-door and off-the-record conferences” that “provide opportunities for senior US 
and foreign officials, subject experts, and scholarship to engage in discussions designed to 
defuse conflict, build confidence, and resolve problems.” 36  The NCAFP is funded by 
corporations and individuals, who in 2016 included Carnegie Corporation of New York, 
Henry Luce Foundation, and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.37 
 The Forum on Asia-Pacific Security (FAPS) is one of the initiatives of the NCAFP. 
It is “dedicated to building peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific…and runs Track II 
dialogues with some of the region’s most influential officials and policy experts on key 
security issues.”38 FAPS runs six major Track II dialogues on regional security issues in the 
Asia-Pacific. The focus areas are reducing strategic mistrust between the United States and 
China through a U.S-China strategic dialogue; exploring and building support for a 
cooperative, multilateral means of ensuring a denuclearized Korean Peninsula; improving 
cross-Taiwan Strait relations through a US-China-Taiwan trilateral dialogue; promoting 
quadrilateral cooperation among the region’s powers—the United States, Japan, China, and 
South Korea; fostering trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and 
China on North Korea policy; and managing China-Japan tensions through a US-China-
Japan trilateral dialogue.39 The work of the Forum on Asia-Pacific Security is accomplished 
through a variety of exchanges, which includes annual conferences on each of the six projects 
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attended by government officials, former officials, and area experts, and private roundtable 
discussions with visiting delegations, all with the goal of stimulating productive dialogue.  
 The NCAFP recognized the serious challenge that the DPRK’s efforts to develop 
nuclear weapons posed upon the international community.40 It also recognized that the Bush 
administration’s policy on North Korea was incoherent due to the infighting within the 
administration.41 Moreover, the inability of US officials to talk directly with their North 
Korean counterparts, as well as the harsh US rhetoric from the high levels of governance, 
such as President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, became a 
concern of the NCAFP.42 Due to these elements, the NCAFP launched its Track II project on 
the denuclearization of North Korea to increase mutual understanding and communication 
between the US and the DPRK.43 The NCAFP-initiated Track II meetings concerning the 
North Korean nuclear issue are officially titled as “Conference on Northeast Asian 
Security.”44 During the timeframe of when Assistant Secretary of State Kelly was head of 
the US delegation to the Six Party Talks (2003-2005), the NCAFP sponsored three of these 
conferences. 
 The NCAFP’s First Conference on Northeast Asian Security was launched in 
September 2003.45 The Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security was held on 9-11 
August 2004.46 The Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security was held from 29 June to 
1 July 2005.47 These conferences were hosted by the NCAFP with a North Korean delegation 
led by Ambassador Ri Gun, deputy director of the DPRK Institute of Disarmament and 
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Peace. The last NCAFP-initiated Track II meeting that was attended by US participants and 
DPRK participants was in July 2012. Since then, there have been other Track II meetings 
concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, but they were not attended by the DPRK.48 
 
NCAFP Track II approach: Supplement to, and preparation for Six Party Talks 
 The NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic approach concerning the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula, particularly from 2003 to 2005, can be explained by Kelman and Cohen’s 
model of the problem-solving workshop. I reconstruct the NCAFP’s Second and Third 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security in order to demonstrate that the NCAFP designed 
its Track II meetings as a supplement to, and preparation for the official, Track I negotiations. 
The NCAFP report concerning the First Conference on Northeast Asian Security is not 
publicly available. In this section, I establish the assumptions that inform the NCAFP’s Track 
II approach, the purpose of the NCAFP’s Track II meetings concerning the North Korean 
nuclear crisis, the objectives, the methodology, and the participants to better demonstrate this 
chapters’ argument.  
 
Assumptions that inform the NCAFP Track II approach 
 The assumption that informs Kelman and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving 
workshop is that there are aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution where the 
individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis.49 There are, therefore, certain 
processes central to conflict resolution that need to take place at the level of the individual. 
The NCAFP view was that the individual is a crucial unit of analysis in order to adequately 
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resolve the conflict. The NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic approach, therefore, placed its focus 
upon individual and interaction between the individuals.  
 The NCAFP states in its website how it fulfils its mission through Track II diplomacy. 
The NCAFP is dedicated to the resolution of conflicts that threaten US interests, through 
Track II diplomacy. The NCAFP understands Track II diplomacy as “closed-door and off-
the-record conferences” that allow “senior US and foreign officials, subjects experts, and 
scholars to engage in discussions designed to defuse conflict, build confidence, and resolve 
problems.” 50  The NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic approach, therefore, focuses on the 
individual and interactions between the individuals. The NCAFP recognized that North 
Korea’s nuclear ambitions was to some degree driven by unfulfilled human needs, and that 
interactions between individuals could have a role in developing a mutually satisfying 
resolution. The NCAFP’s Track II approach is consequently informed by the same 
assumption as Kelman and Cohen’s model, in that there are aspects of international conflict 
and conflict resolution where the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis. 
 
Purpose of NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue 
 In this section, I establish the reason to why the NCAFP initiated its Track II meetings 
on the North Korean nuclear issue. The central purpose of the NCAFP’s Track II meetings 
concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis was to compensate for the limitations of US 
diplomacy that occurred during the first three rounds of the Six Party Talks (2003-2005), and 
thereby assist the official negotiation process. The limitations of US diplomacy that the 
NCAFP Track II meetings aimed to compensate for was the United States delegation to the 
Six Party Talks’ inability to ensure clear communication of objectives between the United 
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States and the DPRK. Kelman proposes that problem-solving workshops can “play an 
important complementary role at all stages of the negotiation process,” such as creating a 
political atmosphere that is conducive to the negotiation process.51 Although Kelman does 
not elaborate more upon this relation, his analytical framework on the problem-solving 
workshop helps explain why the NCAFP designed its Track II meeting to be a supplement 
to, or preparation for the official Six Party Talks.  
 In the previous chapter, I established that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks 
headed by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly (2003-2005) was unable to fulfil the 
normal diplomatic function of ensuring clear communication of objectives between the US 
and the DPRK. The US delegation was given instructions by the Bush administration, which 
forbade the US delegation from conducting direct talks with its North Korean counterpart. 
During the timeframe of 2003 to 2005, the faction within the Bush administration that was 
reluctant to engage in negotiations with the DPRK held more influence on US-DPRK foreign 
policy decisions than the faction that preferred a diplomatic approach that accented 
traditional negotiation.52  
 The United States delegation to the Six Party Talks was not allowed to have any direct 
communication with the DPRK delegation other than the reiteration of US policy, which was 
the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. The 
US delegation was, therefore, unable to persuade the North Korean delegation that the Bush 
administration did not intend to seek regime change. Since the beginning of the Six Party 
Talks (27 August 2003), the North Korean government suspected the Bush administration’s 
policy towards the DPRK to be regime change. As demonstrated by the North Korean 
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Foreign Ministry’s statement of 30 August 2003 and its statement of 29 February 2004, the 
DPRK expressed its concern that the US government had no desire to improve relations with 
the DPRK, nor any intention “to co-exist with the DPRK in peace.”53 As there were some 
government officials within the Bush administration who favoured a policy that would result 
in the collapse of the North Korean regime, the US delegation to the Six Party Talks faced 
the issue of trying to assure the North Korean delegation that the official position of the Bush 
administration towards the DPRK was not regime change.54 Throughout the first three rounds 
of the Six Party Talks, the North Korean government continued to believe that the Bush 
administration had no intention to peacefully coexist with the DPRK, and instead sought its 
collapse. This belief eventually became the North Korean government’s justification as to 
why it suspended its participation in the Six Party Talks. On 10 February 2005, the North 
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement that pointed to the US’ “aim to seek 
the latter’s ‘regime change’” as the DPRK’s reason for the its suspension.55  
 The United States delegation’s inability to clearly communicate US policy objectives 
to its North Korean counterpart is why the NCAFP initiated its Track II meetings concerning 
the North Korean nuclear issue. Although the NCAFP’s Track II meetings, in general, sought 
to compensate for this limitation of US diplomacy, the NCAFP designed the Second 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security in a subtly different manner than the Third 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The purpose of the Second Conference on 
Northeast Asian Security Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security (9-11 August 
2004) was to become a supplement to the Six Party Talks. At the Second Conference on 
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Northeast Asian Security, the NCAFP aimed to have the US delegation engage in discussions 
with the North Korean delegation that they could not conduct at the official level, concerning 
the differences from the third round of the Six Party Talks (23-26 June 2004).56 One of the 
differences that remained from the third round was the DPRK and the United States both 
harboured deep suspicion that the other side did not seek a genuine resolution of the North 
Korean nuclear issue.57 The Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security was meant to 
enhance the discussions that the state actors were having concerning the differences 
remaining from the third round of the Six Party Talks. The purpose of the Third Conference 
on Northeast Asian Security (29 June-1 July 2005) was to become a preparation for the Six 
Party Talks, as the NCAFP designed this Track II meeting to help the state actors restart the 
Six Party Talks that was suspended by the DPRK in February 2005. 58 The DPRK had 
suspended its participation in the Six Party Talks due to its suspicion over US policy intent. 
The Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security was meant to be a forum where the state 
actors could break the diplomatic impasse.  
 According to Fisher, the level of coordination and cooperation between the Track I 
and Track II level can include a spectrum of engagement.59 Coordination between the two 
levels can be of an indirect nature, wherein coordination is limited to the sharing of 
information and analyses that assist the formal negotiations.60 It can also involve the most 
engaged forms of strategy planning and joint implementation.61 The articles published by the 
NCAFP do not specify whether the form of coordination that the NCAFP sought between its 
Track II activity and the official policy process was to be limited to information sharing, or 
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expanded to the more engaging activities of joint strategy planning and collaboration in 
implementation. This dissertation, however, assumes that the NCAFP aimed to have more 
collaboration and engagement than just information sharing between its Track II meetings 
and the official Track I diplomatic process. The articles published by NCAFP’s journal 
underline the “continuing need for meetings such as ours,” and the “important role” a Track 
II effort, such as the NCAFP’s Track II projects, can play in assisting the official policy 
process.62 The NCAFP’s emphasis concerning its role indicates that the NCAFP wanted the 
US government to use its Track II meetings as complementary role to the official negotiation 
process.  
 
Objectives of NCAFP Conference on Northeast Asian Security 
  I establish in this section the series of objectives designed to achieve the central 
purpose of the NCAFP Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue. These 
objectives can be explained through the paradigm of Kelman and Cohen’s model of the 
problem-solving workshop. The objectives of the NCAFP Track II meetings on the North 
Korean nuclear issue were to open a channel of communication where the US delegation to 
the Six Party Talks could engage in discussions with the North Korean delegation that could 
not be conducted at the Track I level due to the restrictions of the US government’s official 
position; change participants’ perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear 
issue so that participants could engage in a process of creative problem solving; and transfer 
the information and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the resolutions 
generated by its Track II meetings into the official policy process.  
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  The NCAFP’s article about its Track II diplomacy on the North Korean nuclear issue 
establishes that the NCAFP was concerned about the “lack of direct talks between 
Washington and Pyongyang.”63 The NCAFP realized that an obstacle hindering the process 
of official negotiation was the US delegation to the Six Party Talks’ inability to talk directly 
with North Korean delegation. 64 The NCAFP, therefore, wanted its Track II diplomatic 
approach concerning the North Korean nuclear issue to open another channel of 
communication between the US and the DPRK.65 Unlike the channel of communication 
established by the official Six Party Talks, in the channel of communication established by 
the NCAFP, representatives of the US delegation would be able to talk face-to-face with their 
North Korean counterpart on the various issues pertaining to North Korea’s nuclear program, 
such as the DPRK’s misgivings about the Bush administration. The US delegation would, 
therefore, be able to engage in discussions that could not be conducted at the Track I level 
due to the instructions of the Bush administration. 
 The NCAP reports concerning the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security 
and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security demonstrate that an objective of the 
NCAFP was to change the participants’ perspective of each other and the North Korean 
nuclear issue itself, so that the participants could engage in a new process of problem-solving. 
The report of the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security states that the second 
conference was sponsored in “an effort to foster mutual understanding among the parties to 
the official Six-Party Talks and to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear 
issue.”66 As indicated by the NCAFP’s Track II approach that is stated within its website, the 
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NCAFP’s understanding of fostering mutual understanding among the parties to the official 
Six-Party Talks was changing the attitudes of the conflicted parties by working to break down 
negative stereotypes and generalizations of the other side resulting from political barriers.67 
The change within the participants’ perspectives would then help create an atmosphere that 
would allow participants to provide new options for negotiation by generating creative 
ideas.68 By changing the participants’ perspectives of each other and the conflict, the NCAFP 
aimed for its participants to generate a resolution towards the North Korean nuclear issue.69 
 The content of the report of the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security 
reiterate that that the objective of the NCAFP’s Track II meeting concerning the North 
Korean nuclear issue was to facilitate change within the participants’ perceptions of each 
other and the North Korean nuclear issue, so that the participants could engage in a process 
of creative problem-solving. The report states that American participants and North Korean 
participants, who included US and North Korean government official representatives, 
engaged in discussions that aimed to change the DPRK’s perspective of the Bush 
administration and US policy intent. The American participants conducted talks with the 
North Korean participants that changed the DPRK’s view that US government’s policy 
towards the DPRK was regime change.70 The report states that in the following session, 
participants proceeded to discuss possible ways to break the diplomatic impasse and thereby 
provided new options for negotiation. 71  This sequence of topics demonstrates that the 
NCAFP aimed to change the participants’ perspectives of each other and the state of the 
North Korean nuclear issue, so that they could engage in a process of conflict resolution.  
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 The last objective of the NCAFP Track II meetings was to transfer the information 
and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the resolutions generated by its Track 
II meetings back into the official policy process. This objective is indicated by the type of 
individuals that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings. As will be further demonstrated 
in the later section, these individuals had political access to political leaders, and had the 
potential to have an impact on the official policy process. The individuals that the NCAFP 
had invited to its Track II meetings, therefore, had capability to transfer the products 
generated by the problem-solving workshop back into the official policy process, as argued 
by Kelman and Cohen.72  
 
Methodology 
 In this section, I establish the procedure that the NCAFP used to accomplish its 
objectives. The main components of the NCAFP’s methodology were an informal and 
isolated setting free from governmental and diplomatic protocol, ability to engage 
participants in informal negotiation, open discussion on specific topics, and capability to 
invite participants who are able to communicate with the political leadership. The NCAFP 
modality can be partially understood through the prism of the Kelman and Cohen analytical 
framework. The ability to engage participants in informal negotiation is not a part of Kelman 
and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop, and, therefore, cannot be explained 
through the paradigm of Kelman and Cohen’s analytical framework.  
 The NCAFP conducted its Track II meetings in a setting that was unofficial and 
private.73 The setting created by the NCAFP offered to its participants confidentiality and 
freedom from the formality of formal dialogues. An informal and isolated setting free from 
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governmental and diplomatic protocol was, therefore, a necessary component for the 
NCAFP’s Track II meetings as the NCAFP believed that this type of setting would encourage 
the participants, particularly the US government officials and North Korean government 
officials who were invited to the Track II meetings, to move away from their respective 
states’ official position, and instead to feel free to participate in discussions that they could 
not have at the official level due to the Bush administration’s instructions.74 The NCAFP, 
therefore, assumed that an informal and isolated setting would give participants the freedom 
to move away from reiteration of official policy, and instead to absorb new information, 
explore new ideas, revise their perceptions, reassess their attitudes, and engage in a process 
of creative problem solving, as argued by Kelman and Cohen.75 Through this type of setting, 
the NCAFP would be able to achieve its objective of becoming a channel of communication 
where US and North Korean government officials could engage in discussions that they could 
not conduct at the official Six Party Talks due to the instructions of the Bush administration.  
 The components of open discussion on specific topics and the ability to engage 
participants in informal negotiations were necessary to the NCAFP’s methodology. These 
components were geared to facilitate the process of changing participants’ perspectives of 
each other and the North Korean nuclear issue, so that participants would be able to engage 
in a process of creative problem-solving. This section assumes that the NCAFP did not 
control the direction of the discussions. The NCAFP does not explicitly explain its role as 
moderator of the discussions. When mentioning its role within the reports on the NCAFP 
Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear issue, the NCAFP highlights its ability to 
convene the meetings, rather than on what ideas, observations, and information the NCAFP 
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provided to its participants.76 Based upon this account, this section assumes that the NCAFP 
did not guide the participants’ discussion in the sense that the NCAFP did not intervene or 
provide a certain paradigm in which participants were to perceive the specific topic. The 
NCAFP allowed the participants to approach the specific topic from whichever viewpoint 
the participant chose. The discussions were, therefore, open in that participants could address 
the topic from their own paradigm.  
 The NCAFP’s objective of changing participants’ perspectives of the adversary and 
the North Korean nuclear issue so that participants could engage in a process of creative 
problem solving was to be accomplished through the NCAFP’s open discussions on its topics 
concerning the issues of the official Six Party Talks, and the NCAFP’s ability to engage 
participants in informal negotiation. The NCAFP believed that its participants would become 
exposed to new information concerning each other and the North Korean nuclear issue, as 
the NCAFP assumed that the setting of its meetings would encourage participants to engage 
in discussions that could not be conducted at the official Track I level. The participants’ 
exposure to the new information would allow participants to change their own perceptions 
and attitudes of the other side and the North Korean nuclear issue. The change within the 
participants’ perspectives would provide the participants the basis to build not only 
professional networks, but also personal relations. As relations are built, confidence and trust 
is developed among the participants. These newly established relations that are based upon 
trust and confidence were a means towards the development of an atmosphere in which 
creative problem-solving becomes possible process.77 As participants build professional and 
personal relations with each other, participants would feel more free to move away from the 
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reiteration of their respective official government’s position and instead engage in a process 
where participants consider new options for negotiation by generating creative ideas. The 
participants would thereby be engaging in a process of informal negotiation, as they consider 
the areas of commonalities between their respective states’ different interests. This process, 
which is directed at changing individual perceptions and attitudes, would result in a 
facilitation of resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue, or at least partial agreement on 
the different interests.78 
 The topics that the NCAFP selected for the participants to discuss at the NCAFP 
Track II meetings were about specific problems that stemmed from the stage of the official 
Six Party Talks that the NCAFP wanted its Track II meeting to play a complementary role 
to. The topics were thereby closely related to the issues of the official Six Party Talks. The 
NCAFP’s selection of its topics further reinforced that participants would be able to have 
discussions concerning the issues of the official Six Party Talks that could not be conducted 
at the official level. It, therefore, also provided participants the opportunity to change their 
perspectives, so that they could enter into a process of resolving the topic, since participants 
would be exposed to new information concerning these topics. The discussions of the Second 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security focused on the differences that remained from the 
third round of the Six Party Talks.79 The discussions of the Third Conference on Northeast 
Asian Security focused on the state of the official Six Party Talks, and possible ways to 
resume the Six Party Talks.80 
 The proposal that the DPRK tabled at the third round of the Six Party Talks (23-26 
June2004) offered a freezing of its nuclear programs in return for compensatory measures, 
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while the United States’ proposal sought an agreement on a framework that would result in 
the total dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. 81  A difference between the 
proposals was thereby the question of sequence, as the North Korean proposal sought a freeze 
as the first step, while the US proposal sought complete dismantlement rather than a freeze. 
Another difference between the two proposals concerned the scope of the preliminary 
measures towards nuclear dismantlement, specifically on whether North Korea’s freeze of 
its nuclear programs included its uranium enrichment program.82 Other differences included 
how the freeze would be adequately verified, and what the corresponding measures 
entailed. 83  The statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China on 26 June 2004 concerning the third round of the Six Party Talks stated 
that some states severely lacked mutual trust.84 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was referring 
to the issue of mistrust between the US and the DPRK. The lack of trust between the US and 
the DPRK was, therefore, an obstacle to the progress of the negotiation progress of the 
official Six Party Talks. 
 The NCAFP reports that the topics of discussion for the Second Conference on 
Northeast Asian Security were the mutual lack of trust between the US and North Korea, the 
question of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, the scope of the proposed North 
Korean nuclear freeze, North Korea’s right to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program, 
US participation in delivering fuel aid to North Korea, and US willingness to negotiate with 
North Korea.85 By selecting the differences that remained after the third round of the Six 
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Party Talks as the focus of the discussions of the Second Conference on Northeast Asian 
Security, the NCAFP aimed to change participants’ perspectives of each other and the North 
Korean nuclear issue, so that the participants could achieve at least partial agreement 
concerning the differences of the tabled proposals.  
  The discussions of the NCAFP’s Third Conference on Northeast Asia Security 
focused upon the question of the Bush administration’s policy intent and the basis on which 
the DPRK would be willing to return to the Six Party Talks. The NCAFP hoped that by 
focusing on this topic, participants would have informal talks where participants, particularly 
American and North Korean participants, would be able to understand the other side’s 
concerns and thereby change their perspectives. The NCAFP believed that the change would 
lead participants into a process of creative problem-solving where participants would find a 
way to break the diplomatic impasse in order to resume the Six Party Talks.  
  The participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings have the qualities 
of the ideal participant, as understood by Kelman and Cohen. 86  The qualities of the 
participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings indicate that the aim of the 
NCAFP was to invite individuals who had influence within the US government. Its reasoning 
was that the products generated by the NCAFP Track II meetings could then be transferred 
back into the official policy process.  
 
NCAFP Track II meeting participants 
 The participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings concerning the North 
Korean nuclear crisis match the criteria of Kelman and Cohen’s ideal participant. 87 The 
American participants that the NCAFP invited to its Second Conference on Northeast Asian 
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Security and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security included United States 
government officials, who were participating in their private capacity, and former United 
States government officials. A complete list of the participants can be found in either the 
NCAFP reports or NCAFP journal articles.88 The North Korean participants were from the 
Institute of Disarmament and Peace, which is a policy research institute under the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The Institute studies ways to achieve disarmament, peace, and security 
on the Korean Peninsula, and makes policy recommendations in this regard.89 The Institute, 
thereby, has a role within the policy-making structure of the North Korean government, as it 
provides policy recommendation but the final decision rests in the hands of the Supreme 
Leader of the DPRK. 
Of the individuals that the NCAFP invited, I argue that Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, 
former Secretary of State; the Honorable Joseph R. DeTrani of the State Department of the 
United States, special envoy to the Six Party Talks; Charles W. Jones, Director of Asian 
Affairs, National Security Council; and Dr. Victor Cha, Director of Asian Affairs, National 
Security Council are of importance to the NCAFP. These individuals participated in both the 
Second Conference on Northeast Asian Conference and the Third Conference on Northeast 
Asian Conference. Moreover, the NCAFP consistently highlighted their participation in its 
reports or articles concerning the NCAFP Track II meeting.90  
The National Security Council, and the US Department of State provides policy 
recommendation to the United States President. The National Security Council’s function is 
                                                 
88 “News and Views,” (2005): 460; “The Nuclear Standoff with North Korea,” 74; Zagoria, “Conference on 
Northeast Asia Security.” 
89 “Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, accessed on August 26, 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.kp/en/about-us/. 
90 “News and Views,” (2005): 460; Zagoria, “Conference on Northeast Asia Security.” 
 171 
to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. 91  The US 
Department of State is the agency responsible for negotiations with North Korea.92 
These agencies have a role within the United States policy-making structure, as they 
provide much of the intelligence about DPRK’s nuclear program to the president, which can 
influence his thinking about United States foreign policy issues. Due to their positions within 
the United States government, these individuals had access to the official leadership, and 
thereby the capability to have an impact on the policy process. The participants that the 
NCAFP invited to its Track II diplomatic meetings were, therefore, those who had the 
potential to transfer the results of the problem-solving workshops back into political process, 
as understood by Kelman and Cohen.93  
 Of the American participants, Kissinger, attended not only the Second and Third 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security, but also the First Conference on Northeast Asian 
Security.94 The NCAFP states that it “benefited greatly” from Kissinger’s participation in all 
three of the meetings.95 The NCAFP report underlines that he was not speaking on “behalf 
of the government,” but his “ties to the current Bush administration lent substantial authority” 
to the NCAFP’s endeavours.96 Although Kissinger was no longer directly involved in the 
decision-making process, he was considered an influential member of the policymaking 
community during the Bush administration. Beginning from 2001, Kissinger met with 
President Bush every other month, as he advised the Bush administration on the Iraq War.97 
                                                 
91 “National Security Council,” White House, accessed on August 26, 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/. 
92 “Remarks on the Appointment of Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun,” U.S. 
Department of State, August 23, 2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/285370.htm. 
93 Kelman and Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop,” 84. 
94 “News and Views,” (2005): 460; “The Nuclear Standoff with North Korea,” 74; Zagoria, “Conference on 
Northeast Asia Security.” 
95 “A Case for Track II Diplomacy,” 452. 
96 Ibid. 
97 The Associated Press, “Woodward: Kissinger Advising Bush,” The Washington Post, September 29, 2006, 
accessed March 16, 2017, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
 172 
President Bush also sought his advice concerning issues on the US-Russia agenda. 98 
Kissinger, therefore, had the ability to have an impact on the policy process, as his 
perceptions and opinions were sought by the Bush administration.  
United States Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Joseph R. DeTrani attended the 
Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The US government provides 
little information regarding what DeTrani’s position entails.99 The information concerning 
the responsibilities of this position is, therefore, drawn from Charles L. Pritchard’s Failed 
Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb.100 Before his resignation 
in 2003, Pritchard was US Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, or what at that time was 
titled as the Special Envoy for Negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea.101 This section assumes that DeTrani, who was Pritchard’s successor, had similar job 
responsibilities as Pritchard. According to Pritchard, the position of special envoy was to be 
the official interface with North Korea for talks on a variety of issues.102 For DeTrani, his 
position was to be the official interface with North Korea for the official Six Party Talks and 
issues pertaining to the Six Party Talks. As US Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, 
Pritchard communicated and met directly with the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of 
State, and the Assistant Secretary of State of the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs.103 
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Pritchard was able to recommend policy for US policy towards the DPRK.104 He prepared a 
memo for Kelly that outlined the objectives, themes, and goals for the trilateral talks of April 
2003.105 The instructions he had written for Kelly had, however, been re-written by National 
Security Council Staff.106 This incident demonstrates that Pritchard had the potential to have 
an impact on the policy process, but was not directly accountable for policy decisions. Based 
upon Pritchard’s account of his time as US Special Envoy for the Six Party Talks, DeTrani 
had access to American leaders of high-governance. Moreover, he was able to have some 
influence over the official policy process since he was able to communicate with such 
leaders. DeTrani, however, was not directly involved in the making of US foreign policy 
decisions. As understood by Kelman and Cohen, DeTrani had the capability to transfer the 
products generated by the NCAFP Track II meetings into the official policy process, making 
him an ideal participant for the Track II meetings.107  
 The director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC) attended the 
Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. For the Second Conference on 
Northeast Asian Affairs, this post was held by Charles W. Jones.108 For the Third Conference 
on Northeast Asian Affairs, the post was held by Dr. Victor Cha.109 Jones was, therefore, the 
director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council for the first Bush administration, 
while Cha was the director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council for the second 
Bush administration. Jones and Cha, however, were not the head of the Asian Affairs office. 
The title for the head of the Asian Affairs office of the NSC is Special Assistant to the 
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President and Senior Director. 110  The Senior Director of Asian Affairs of the National 
Security Council advises and assists the high-levels of American governance, who include 
the President and members of the President’s Cabinet, on national security and foreign policy 
matters pertaining to the Asia-Pacific region.111 There is little information concerning the 
responsibilities for the position of director of Asian Affairs. The responsibilities of the 
position of director are, however, drawn from the general responsibilities of the Asian Affairs 
office.  
 The Asian Affairs office of the NSC is part of the National Security Council Policy 
Coordination Committees (PCCs) that was established for the East Asia region.112 The PCCs 
provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NCS system, 
the Deputies Committee and the Principals Committee who consist of the President and the 
members of the President’s cabinet.113 The PCCs are also responsible for the management of 
the development and implementation of national security policies, and are accountable for 
the day-to-day interagency policy coordination.114 This section, therefore, assumes that Cha 
and Jones were part of these processes. Due to the lack of information concerning their 
responsibilities, this section cannot determine whether Cha and Jones had access to the senior 
government officials of the Bush administration. They, however, had the potential to have 
some impact on the policy process, as they were responsible for providing policy analysis 
for consideration by the senior government officials of the Bush administration. Cha and 
Jones, similar to Kissinger and DeTrani, had qualities of the ideal participant of the problem-
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solving workshop, as understood by Kelman and Cohen. The reason why the NCAFP 
continued to invite these individuals to its Track II meetings on the North Korean nuclear 
issue was because they had the capability to transfer the products of the Track II meetings 
back into the official policy process.  
  
Achievements of the NCAFP Track II diplomacy on the DPRK nuclear issue 
 In this section I demonstrate that the NCAFP was able to partially achieve its 
objectives but had difficulties in meeting all of them. The NCAFP partially achieved its 
objective of opening a channel of communication where the US delegation could engage in 
talks with the North Korean delegation that could not be conducted at the official Track I 
level. Although the NCAFP opened a channel of communication between the US and the 
DPRK, it was used by the Bush administration more as a forum where the US and the DPRK 
could work out certain details that would a provide a decisive diplomatic breakthrough when 
official negotiations were not proceeding. 
 The NCAFP was not able to achieve its objective of changing participants’ 
perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue so that participants could 
engage in a process of creative problem solving at the Second Conference on Northeast Asian 
Security. The NCAFP was, however, able to partially achieve this objective at the Third 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security, as the NCAFP helped make possible a change 
within the North Korean participants’ perspective of the US and the Bush administration’s 
policy objectives towards the DPRK. The change within the North Korean participants’ 
perspective that the NCAFP helped facilitate was, however, not what allowed participating 
US government officials to engage in a process of problem-solving with the North Korean 
officials. Participants were able to engage in this process due to external factors, such as the 
Bush administration’s policy on the DPRK, rather than the NCAFP’s modality. 
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 The NCAFP did not achieve its objective of a successful transfer of the information 
and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the resolutions generated by its Track 
II meetings back into the official policy process in either the Second Conference on Northeast 
Asian Security or the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The participants that 
the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings had a contradictory effect, which made this 
transfer process implausible. The contradictory effect of the individuals that the NCAFP 
invited was that the NCAFP wanted US government officials to attend its meetings, but the 
US government officials were unable to be a part of the processes of the NCAFP Track II 
meetings, such as changing their perspectives and attitudes, due to the constraints of the US 
government’s official position and expectations of US decision-makers. Since the 
participating US government officials were unable to experience the change within their 
perspective which would lead to the formulation of solutions, I argue there was nothing for 
the participants to transfer back into the official policy process.  
 
Open a channel of communication between US delegation and DPRK delegation 
 In this section I demonstrate that the NCAFP partially achieved its objective of 
opening a channel of communication where the US delegation could engage in talks with the 
North Korean delegation that could not be conducted at the official Track I level. Although 
the NCAFP opened a channel of communication between the US and the DPRK, it was used 
by the Bush administration more as a forum where the US and the DPRK could work out 
certain details that would a provide a decisive diplomatic breakthrough when official 
negotiations were not proceeding. The US delegation’s usage of the channel of 
communication that was opened by the NCAFP was dependent upon whether the Bush 
administration’s political approach towards the DPRK accented direct engagement.  
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 The NCAFP sought to open another channel of communication between the US and 
the DPRK due to its concern that the US and the DPRK were not engaging in direct talks at 
the official Six Party Talks.115 In order for the NCAFP to successfully open a channel of 
communication between the US and the DPRK, an important factor was, therefore, that 
representatives of the US and the DPRK attend the NCAFP Track II meetings. Members of 
the US delegation and the North Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks participated in the 
Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. From the US delegation, 
Ambassador DeTrani, Special Envoy to the Six Party Talks, attended both conferences.116 
From the North Korean delegation, Ri Gun, deputy negotiator for the Six Party Talks, also 
attended both conferences. To encourages these participants to have discussions that could 
not be conducted at the official Six Party Talks due to the restrictions of the US government’s 
official position, the NCAFP hosted its Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian 
Security within a setting that was to be free from governmental and diplomatic protocol. It 
is also why the NCAFP invited government officials to participate as private individuals 
rather than official representatives. The NCAFP, therefore, provided its participants a setting 
where the invited-US government officials would be able to engage in discussions with the 
North Korean government officials that they could not conducted at the Track I level.  
 Although the NCAFP conducted its second and third Track II meeting on the North 
Korean nuclear issue within the same informal and isolated setting, the participating US 
government officials did not engage in direct discussions with the participating North Korean 
government officials at the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security, but they did so 
at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security.117 As reported by the NCAFP, during 
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the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security, the US government officials were not 
allowed much room by the Bush administration to take part in direct dialogues with the North 
Korean participants.118 This indicates that the instructions of the Bush administration, which 
forbade the US delegation from engaging in direct talks with its North Korean counterpart, 
applied to informal settings. The US officials who attended the Second Conference on 
Northeast Asian Security were, therefore, unable to freely engage in direct discussions with 
the North Korean government officials. The same NCAFP report, however, states that US 
government officials talked directly to the North Korean government officials at the Third 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security.119  
 The NCAFP’s ability to open a channel of communication where US delegation could 
engage in talks with the North Korean delegation that could not be conducted at the official 
Track I level was, therefore, not dependent on the setting of the NCAFP Track II meetings, 
but the Bush administration’s policy towards the DPRK. One of the main differences 
between the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security and the Third Conference on 
Northeast Asian Security, which I argue had the biggest impact on how the US delegation 
used the channel of communication that was opened by the NCAFP, was the Bush 
administration’s political approach towards the DPRK. The NCAFP initiated its Second 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security (9-11 August 2004) almost immediately after the 
third round of the Six Party Talks (23-26 June 2004). The instructions that the Bush 
administration gave to the US delegation who attended the third round of the Six Party Talks, 
which forbade the delegation from entering into any form of direct engagement with its North 
Korean counterpart, demonstrates that the Bush administration was disinterested and 
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unwilling to enter into bilateral negotiations with the DPRK.120 As implied by the NCAFP 
report, the instructions of the Bush administration extended to all forms of direct engagement 
with the DPRK, including engagement held within an informal setting.  
 The political atmosphere between the Bush administration and the DPRK had, 
however, changed when the NCAFP initiated its Third Conference on Northeast Asian 
Security (29 June – 1 July 2005). In past NCAFP Track II diplomatic conferences, 
participating US government officials were not able to freely discuss with their North Korean 
counterparts. At the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, US government officials 
were able to talk directly to the North Korean government officials.121 A reason for this 
change in the constraints imposed upon American participants was due to important changes 
in personnel that took place during President Bush’s second term. Condoleezza Rice had 
replaced Colin Powell as Secretary of State. Moreover,  government officials who did not 
support engagement with the DPRK, such as Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Joseph, had left 
the Bush administration.122 Rice identified herself as a realist, and therefore believed that 
relationships among countries are governed by considerations of power, not mortality.123 As 
a result, she and the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs Christopher Hill were able to move the Bush administration’s policy towards the 
DPRK toward a more accommodative stance.  
Moreover, beginning from the spring of 2005, senior US government officials had 
decreased its usage of harsh rhetoric and began to show some flexibility in its policy. 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had publicly stated that the United States recognized 
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that North Korea is a sovereign state; President Bush began to refer to North Korea’s leader, 
Kim Jong-Il, as “Mr.” Kim Jong-Il; and Ambassador DeTrani had met with North Korean 
Ambassador Han Song-ryol of the DPRK Permanent Mission to the United Nations twice.124 
The softening of the Bush administration’s stance towards the DPRK indicate that the Bush 
administration’s policy objective towards the DPRK during this timeframe was to restart the 
Six Party Talks, which had been stalled since June 2004. The Bush administration, therefore, 
aimed to make use of the channel of communication that the NCAFP had opened to 
accomplish its policy objective, as the NCAFP reports that the United States delegation 
conducted private discussions with the North Korean government officials to reach determine 
the way in which to break the diplomatic impasse.125  
 The NCAFP, therefore, had little control over how the United States delegation to the 
Six Party Talks would use the channel of communication that the NCAFP had opened. The 
NCAFP aimed for the United States delegation to use its channel of communication as a way 
to avoid the restrictions of the United States government’s official position. The United 
States government’s official position that had restricted the level of interaction between the 
United States and the DPRK at the official Six Party Talks, however, had also restricted the 
level of interaction between the United States and the DPRK at the NCAFP Track II 
meetings. These American participants were, therefore, constrained by official positions and 
decision-makers’ expectation, despite being in an informal setting. When the Bush 
administration’s political approach towards the DPRK had softened, the United States 
delegation was able to engage in direct discussions with the participating North Korean 
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government officials at the NCAFP Track II meetings. The NCAFP had successfully opened 
another channel of communication between the United States and the DPRK. It, however, 
was used by the United States delegation to achieve the Bush administration’s policy 
objectives towards the DPRK when official negotiations were not proceeding. When the 
channel of communication between the DPRK and the United States provided by the official 
Six Party Talks was no longer available, the Bush administration had the United States 
delegation use the channel of communication that the NCAFP had opened to fulfil its policy 
objective. 
 
Change participants’ perspectives of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue 
 In this section, I demonstrate that the NCAFP was not able to achieve its objective of 
changing participants’ perspectives of the adversary and the North Korean nuclear issue so 
that participants could engage in a process of creative problem solving at the Second 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The NCAFP was, however, able to partially achieve 
this objective at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, as the NCAFP helped 
make possible a change within the North Korean participants’ perspective of the Bush 
administration’s policy intent towards the DPRK. The change within the North Korean 
participants’ perspective that the NCAFP helped facilitate, however, was not what allowed 
US participants to engage in a process of problem-solving with the North Korean 
participants. This process was due to external factors rather than the NCAFP’s modality.  
 The NCAFP’s objective of changing participants’ perspectives of the adversary and 
the North Korean nuclear issue so that participants could engage in a process of creative 
problem solving was to be accomplished through the NCAFP’s open discussions on topics 
concerning the issues of the official Six Party Talks, and the NCAFP’s ability to engage 
participants in informal negotiation. During the Second Conference on Northeast Asian 
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Conference, the NCAFP was unable to commence the implementation of its methodology, 
due to the instructions of the Bush administration that did not allow the US delegation to 
engage in direct talks with the North Korean delegation. The NCAFP, however, was able to 
partially implement its methodology at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Conference, 
as the instructions of the Bush administration were no longer relevant. The NCAFP was, 
therefore, able to engage the participating US government officials in a direct discussion with 
North Korean government officials.  
 The first step of the NCAFP’s modality was for participants, particularly the US 
government officials and North Korean government officials, to engage in discussions that 
could not be conducted at the official Track I level. This was necessary so that participants 
would be exposed to new information concerning the other side and the North Korean nuclear 
issue, which would then lead participants into a process of problem-solving. At the Second 
Conference on Northeast Asian Conference, the US officials did not engage in direct 
discussions with the North Korean officials pertaining to the differences that remained from 
the third round of the Six Party Talks. As reported by the NCAFP, the participating US 
delegates were not given much room by the Bush administration to take part in direct 
dialogues with the North Korean officials.126 Since the first step of the NCAFP’s method was 
unable to be achieved, the remaining steps could not be implemented.  
 Moreover, the NCAFP report concerning the Second Conference on Northeast Asian 
Security demonstrates that participants chose to expand on their government’s respective 
position, rather than to engage in conflict resolution. The report provides a summary of the 
conference, and thereby includes the topics that the participants discussed as well as the 
content of the discussions.127 The reports’ lack of information about how new ideas or 
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solutions were generated indicates that participants did not come to the Second Conference 
on Northeast Asian Conference to achieve at least partial agreement on the differences from 
the third round of the Six Party Talks. The NCAFP sought to play an important role in 
assisting the official Six Party Talks. 128  Its report would, therefore, highlight all the 
contributions that the NCAFP made concerning its assistance to the official Six Party Talks. 
The NCAFP report on the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security states that 
participants, including the North Koreans and Americans, agreed that the NCAFP conference 
had been useful in clarifying differences.129 The contribution that the NCAFP highlights is, 
therefore, that its participants were able to further expand upon their respective government’s 
position. The report does not mention that participants aimed to resolve the differences of 
their respective government’s position. 
 The report records that some participants offered ideas to alleviate the differences 
between the two proposals, such as the suggesting a trade-off between the US and the DPRK 
in response to question of US participation in delivering fuel aid to North Korea after specific 
conditions are met.130 The idea proposed that the US would provide heavy fuel oil to the 
DPRK in the first stage, and in return the DPRK would fully expose its suspected uranium 
enrichment program.131 The report, however, provides no record to how participants further 
discussed how the ideas could become part of a future solution to the North Korean nuclear 
issue. At the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security, participants clarified the 
differences that remained form the third round of the Six Party Talks, instead of aiming to 
resolve them. 
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 While the NCAFP was unable to implement its modality for the Second Conference 
on Northeast Asian Security to achieve the objective of changing participants’ perspectives 
of each other and the North Korean nuclear issue, the NCAFP was able to partially implement 
the procedures at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The participating US 
government officials were able to have direct talks with the participating North Korean 
government officials. The NCAFP was, therefore, able to achieve the first step of its 
modality, allowing the NCAFP to implement the remaining procedures. The participating 
US government officials made the distinction between American rhetoric about regime 
change and actual US policy intent. The discussions between the North Korean and US 
government officials at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security allowed the North 
Korean officials to change their perspective concerning the Bush administration’s policy 
intent. 132  The NCAFP report states that a North Korean participant said that he was 
“relieved” to hear some of the American presentations. 133 This indicates that the North 
Korean participant was reassured by these presentations, and thereby less anxious that the 
Bush administration’s official policy towards the DPRK was regime change. From these 
discussions, the North Korean participants were able to obtain some official assurance that 
the Bush administration did not seek regime change, which consequently changed their 
perspective concerning the Bush administration’s policy objectives towards the DPRK.134  
 The NCAFP report on the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security highlights 
that the participants had a session on how they would break the impasse, indicating that 
participants entered into a process of problem-solving.135 Participants discussed possible 
                                                 
132 “A Case of Track II Diplomacy,” 451; “Multilateral Dialogue to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue.” 
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ways to break the diplomatic impasse.136 An American participant stated that “a good way to 
break the impasse would be to reconvene the six-party talks.”137 The first steps of this 
participant’s solution for breaking the diplomatic impasse was for the parties to set an early 
date for the resumption of talks. 138  The United States and DPRK government officials 
implemented this participants’ recommended solution, as DeTrani and Ri discussed ways to 
resume the Six Party Talks. In a private discussion between DeTrani and Ri at the Third 
Conference on Northeast Asian Conference, Ri told DeTrani that if the US side were to meet 
the head of the North Korean delegation to the Six Party Talks, Kim Gye-Gwan, then the 
DPRK would be willing to return to the Six Party Talks.139  
 This section, however, cannot confidently conclude that it was the NCAFP’s modality 
that led the US participants to enter into a process of problem-solving with the DPRK. Rather, 
it proposes that the US participants entered into this process because the Bush administration 
wanted the participating US government officials to enter into a process of problem-solving 
with the DPRK.140 The Bush administration wanted to resolve the issue of the suspended Six 
Party Talks and find a way to break the diplomatic impasse.141 The cause for participating 
US government officials to enter into a process of problem-solving with the DPRK was, 
therefore, because this process, and the development of solutions that would emerge from 
this process, was within the expectations of United States decision makers. The United States 
delegation was consequently implementing the policy objectives of the Bush administration 
at the Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security. The development of solutions which 
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would break the diplomatic impasse did not emerge from the discussions moderated by the 
NCAFP, but was rather the Bush administration’s efforts to re-start the Six Party Talks.  
 
Transfer of results from NCAFP Track II meeting back into official policy process 
 In this section, I argue that the NCAFP did not achieve its objective of a successful 
transfer of the information and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, and the 
resolutions generated by its Track II meetings back into the official policy process at either 
the Second Conference on Northeast Asian Security or the Third Conference on Northeast 
Asian Security. Since this chapter assumes that the NCAFP aimed to have more collaboration 
and engagement than just information sharing between its Track II meetings and the official 
Track I diplomatic process, this chapter’s understanding of a successful transfer is one where 
the official Track I diplomatic process has been shaped by the participants’ efforts to 
communicate to the Bush administration about the products that had been generated by the 
Track II meetings. I argue that a successful transfer did not occur, as the participants that the 
NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings had a contradictory effect, which made this transfer 
process implausible. The NCAFP thereby was unable achieve this objective.  
 To enhance the possibility that the products generated by the NCAFP Track II 
meetings would be transferred back into the official policy process, the NCAFP invited 
individuals who had influence within the US government and access to the US political 
leadership. The NCAFP assumed that the participants’ efforts to communicate with the 
leadership would allow for a successful transfer of information into the policy process. As 
demonstrated in an earlier section, the NCAFP had invited individuals that matched the 
criteria of an ideal participant, as understood by Kelman and Cohen. 142  The Second 
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Conference on Northeast Asian Security and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, 
however, demonstrate that the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings 
had a contradictory effect, which made it difficult for them to transfer the products generated 
by the Track II meetings back into the official political process. 
 The contradictory effect of the individuals that the NCAFP invited to its Track II 
meetings was that the NCAFP wanted United States government officials to attend its 
meetings, but the US government officials were unable to take part of the processes of the 
NCAFP Track II meetings, such as the changing of their perspectives and attitudes, due to 
the constraints of the United States government’s official position and expectations of United 
States decision-makers. The NCAFP wanted United States government officials to attend its 
meetings, since the NCAFP designed its Track II meetings in consideration of the United 
States delegation to the Six Party Talks. Moreover, these government officials had the 
capability to transfer the results generated by the Track II meetings back into the policy 
process. At the Second and Third Conference on Northeast Asian Security, the US 
government officials, however, were not necessarily participating in the discussions, but 
rather implementing the Bush administration’s policy. The United States government 
officials did not go beyond what the United States decision-makers were prepared to 
accommodate. Although the United States government officials were invited as private 
individuals, they were still constrained by the United States government’s official position 
and the American decision-makers’ expectations. The individuals whose perceptions and 
attitudes that the NCAFP hoped to make a difference were, therefore, too close to the 
leadership.  
 Kelman and Cohen argue that participants who are too close to the leadership are 
“less free to take an analytical role, less open to new information and insights, and less 
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available for change in their perceptions and attitudes.”143 According to Kelman and Cohen’s 
explanation, the US government officials were unable to become an actual participant of the 
NCAFP Track II meetings. Since the US government officials were hindered from taking 
part in the processes that would result changed perceptions and attitudes, and formulation of 
problems and solutions, there were no products to be transferred back into the official policy 
process.  
 This chapter argued that Kissinger was also an ideal participant of the problem-
solving workshop, as understood by Kelman and Cohen. Since Kissinger was a former US 
government official, he was not constrained by the US government’s official policy or the 
expectations of decision-makers. Moreover, he had access to President Bush. This section is, 
however, unable to conclude that Kissinger’s efforts to communicate with President Bush 
led to a change in the Bush administration’s policy on the DPRK. The literature that seeks to 
explain why the Bush administration changed its policy refers to: the evolving security 
situation of the Korean Peninsula; the effect of American domestic politics on foreign policy 
as the Democratic Party, who favoured a more accommodative approach towards the DPRK, 
gained control of Congress; and the changes in personnel during the Bush administration’s 
second term.144 The literature, therefore, proposes that the change in policy was made due to 
the changes that were being made at the level of the state. There is no reference to how the 
Track II meetings of the NCAFP was able to influence the Bush administration concerning 
United States policy towards the DPRK. This, however, indicates that there is a need for 
further research concerning the question of coordination and cooperation between the Track 
                                                 
143 Kelman and Cohen, “The Problem-Solving Workshop,” 84. 
144 Bonnie S. Glaser and Wang Liang, “North Korea: The Beginning of a China-US Partnership,” Washington 
Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2008): 165-80; Wade L. Huntley, “US Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: 
Tempting Goliath’s Fate,” Asian Survey 47, no. 3 (2007): 455-480; Sang-young Rhyu and Jong-Yun Bae, 
“The Politics of Economic Sanctions against North Korea: The Bush Administration’s Strategy towards a 
Multilateral Governance,” Pacific Focus 25, no. 1 (2010): 112-135; Robert Sutter, “The Democratic-Led 
110th Congress: Implications for Asia,” Asia Policy 3 (2007): 125-150. 
 189 
I and Track II level, as the question remains on whether Kissinger was able to influence 
President Bush’s position on the North Korean nuclear issue.  
 The US government officials were unable to transfer the products of the NCAFP 
Track II meetings back into the official policy process, as they were unable to experience the 
processes which would generate the products of the NCAFP Track II meetings. The products 
of the workshop were, therefore, unable to be generated, and there was consequently nothing 
to transfer back into the official policy process. Although participants formulated a solution 
that would resume the Six Party Talks and break the diplomatic impasse at the Third 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security, this solution did not shape the Bush 
administration’s policy towards the DPRK, as the Bush administration was already prepared 
and eager to see the resumption of the Six Party Talks. The NCAFP did not achieve its 
objective of transferring the information and ideas, the changed perceptions and attitudes, 
and the resolutions generated by its Track II meetings back into the official policy because 
the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings had a contradictory effect, 
which made this transfer process implausible.  
 Although the NCAFP Track II meetings did not generate change perceptions and 
attitudes within participating US government officials, and thereby formulation of solutions, 
the NCAFP Track II meetings still had a tangible achievement. The NCAFP had successfully 
opened a channel of communication between the US and the DPRK which ultimately played 
a decisive role in the resumption of the Six Party Talks. Critiques of Track II diplomacy, 
therefore, cannot conclude that the NCAFP Track II meetings were ineffective.145  
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Conclusion 
In Chapter 5, I argued that the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 
(NCAFP), a non-profit policy organization, pursued and initiated a series of Track II 
meetings from 2003 to 2005 to compensate for the US delegation to the Six Party Talks’ 
inability to clearly communicate US policy objectives to the DPRK. In the first section, I 
outlined the data of this chapter to introduce the supplementary data that pertains specifically 
to this chapter. In the second section, I analysed Herbert C. Kelan and Stephen P. Cohen’s 
model of the problem-solving workshop, which they establish in “The Problem-Solving 
Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International 
Conflicts.” 146 I used their model to help explain the NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic approach. 
In the third section, I demonstrated the significance of the NCAFP as a nongovernmental 
organization that practices Track II diplomacy. In the fourth section, I established the 
assumptions that inform the NCAFP’s Track II approach, the purpose of the NCAFP’s Track 
II meetings concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis, the objectives, the methodology, and 
the participants that the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings. In the last section, I 
established that the NCAFP was able to partially achieve its objectives but had difficulties in 
meeting all of them.
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Chapter 6 US Science Diplomacy to the DPRK: Track II diplomacy in action 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explain that the visits by Stanford University academics to the 
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in the DPRK between January 2004 and 
November 2010, and the activities of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability 
DPRK Energy Experts Working Group between June 2006 and September 2010, can be 
understood as science diplomacy as explained by Fähnrich, Weiss, and Flink and 
Schreiterer.1 The literature on science diplomacy is helpful in explaining the aims of the 
Stanford University academics’ visits to Yongbyon and the Nautilus Institute’s DPRK 
Energy Experts Working Group meetings. It does not, however, help in the development of 
my thesis, which investigates science diplomacy as a distinct strand of the Track II diplomacy 
that, effectively, compensated for the failings in official, or Track I, US diplomacy to the 
DPRK.  
I argue that the Stanford University academics’ visits to Yongbyon and the activities 
of the Nautilus Institute’s DPRK Energy Experts Working Group can be understood as a 
distinct and discrete strand of United States Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK. In lieu 
of the unsuccessful efforts by the Bush administration to obtain information about the 
DPRK’s nuclear program, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, these activities can be explained by 
diplomatic theories, also introduced in previous chapters, especially the work of Bull, 
Langhorne, Fisher, and Kelman and Cohen.2 I argue that the scientific activities can be 
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understood as fulfilling the Track I diplomatic function of gathering information about 
another state. By gathering information and transferring their findings back into the United 
States Track I policymaking processes, the Stanford University academics and the Nautilus 
Institute compensated for the Bush administration Track I diplomatic limitations. 
 In the first section, I introduce the primary data, which includes data from interviews 
and policy reports, that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I critique 
the scholarly and policy literature on science diplomacy. I then draw on diplomatic theories 
introduced in previous chapters to establish a theoretical framework for discussion in the 
following section of the significant science diplomacy conducted by Stanford University and 
the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK. The final section connects the theoretical framework with 
the empirical material to conclude the chapter.  
 
Data 
 There is no scholarly literature that analyzes the Stanford University academics’ visits 
to Yongbyon, as well as the activities of the Nautilus Institute’s DPRK Energy Experts 
Working Group project within the context of US foreign policy towards the DPRK. There is 
consequently a lack of secondary literature that is available for analysis, which is why this 
chapter relies mainly upon primary data. This chapter makes use of primary data from 
interviews with Dr. Siegfried Hecker of Stanford University, and policy analyst Robert 
Carlin, who were members of the delegation that visited the Yongbyon Nuclear Research 
Scientific Center.3 I was unable to interview Professor John W. Lewis, who led and organized 
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3 Robert Carlin, interview with author, November 10, 2016; Siegfried Hecker, interview with author, 
December 9, 2016 
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the visits to Yongbyon. He did not respond to the e-mail request for an interview.4 This 
dissertation however makes use of Professor Lewis’ oral interview for Stanford University’s 
Oral History Collections, where he briefly discusses some of his earlier Track II diplomatic 
work with the DPRK.5 I had e-mail correspondence with Dr. Peter Hayes, Director and co-
founder of the Nautilus Institute, when he gave permission to quote or cite his co-authored 
report, “Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, 
Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment.”6 Hayes, 
however, did not respond to the e-mail request for an interview. Although interviews raise 
some methodological and theoretical concerns, interviews with participants of these 
endeavours are important as there is a lack of information concerning the details and logistics 
of these events. Interviews are, therefore, essential as they help fill the gaps that appeared 
after the primary literary was reviewed and analysed.  
 The chapter also makes use of primary data from the reports and articles written by 
Dr. Hecker concerning his visits to Yongbyon.7 The reports about Yongbyon that were sent 
to the US government were written by Dr. Hecker, making them a valuable source of 
information.8 The chapter then evaluates primary data from the reports about the DPRK 
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Energy Experts Working Group project available on the Nautilus Institute website, as well 
as the report released by the Nautilus Institute about the DPRK energy needs, “Foundations 
of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and 
Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment.” 9  These reports establish the 
purpose of the project and the information that the Nautilus Institute obtained from the 
meetings of the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group.  
 
Scholar and policy literature on science diplomacy  
 The scholarship on science diplomacy focuses on two areas; the first is on whether 
science and technology have an impact on international affairs and the second is on 
establishing the political objectives, strategies, and instruments of specific participants of 
science diplomacy, as demonstrated respectively by Weiss, and Flink and Schreiterer.10 The 
policy literature on science diplomacy focuses on establishing the roles of science diplomacy, 
and how these roles can be put into practice by the scientific and political community on 
specific issues, such as climate change or nuclear disarmament.11 The conventional literature 
identifies the key actors in science diplomacy as scientists, academics, and the state; the 
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purpose of science diplomacy as the usage of science as an instrument of foreign policy; and 
the aims of science diplomacy as providing the official policymaking process with scientific 
advice, building cooperation among states based upon science, and using science cooperation 
to improve international relations between states.12 
 
Scholarly literature on science diplomacy 
 The concepts of science diplomacy, within the field of political science, have been 
analysed with a specific focus on researching the impact that science and technology have 
on the conduct of international relations. 13  According to Weiss and Fähnrich, Eugene 
Skolnikoff’s The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of 
International Politics is one of the few studies that provides a comprehensive contribution 
on this subject.14 Skolnikoff considers the overall impact that science and technology have 
on traditional concepts of International Relations, such as state sovereignty, competition and 
dependency, and military force.15 His conclusion is that the impact of science and technology 
upon international affairs has been substantial but incremental, posing only limited 
challenges to the fundamentals of state governance. Skolnikoff argues that “it is more likely 
that the fundamentals of the present system of nation-states will prove to be more, rather than 
less, necessary to manage the increasingly difficult future international environment that 
technology will help create.”16 According to Skolnikoff, science and technology, therefore, 
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do not have the capability to alter the underlying concepts of international affairs. 
Skolnikoff’s work, however, does not take into consideration the usage of the Internet and 
the World Wide Web, as these were not as widely used and accessible during the time of this 
book’s publication, compared to their usage in the 21st century. His work is, therefore, in 
need of a revision as science and technology have advanced since 1993. Although Skolnikoff 
provides one of the few comprehensives studies concerning the impact of science and 
technology on international affairs, his work does not provide a framework that would 
explain the scientific activities pursued by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute. 
Skolnikoff’s work aims to explain whether science and technology will produce some 
revolutionary change to the traditional order of sovereign states, rather than explaining why 
the state or scientific community uses science as a tool of diplomacy.  
 Drawing upon the work of Skolnikoff, Charles Weiss’ “Science, technology and 
international relations,” seeks to “go beyond” Skolnikoff’s conclusion, and analyzes “the 
many and diverse impacts of science and technology, and the mechanisms by which science 
and technology influence and are influenced by international relations.”17 Weiss, therefore, 
does not agree with Skolnikoff’s conclusion that science and technology constitute only 
limited challenges to the conduct of international relations. Instead, Weiss argues that science 
and technology impacts international relations in various ways, as his article aims to create 
an alternative comprehensive framework in the form of an empirical classification or 
typology that establishes the different types of impact that science and technology have on 
international relations. He does so that students and practitioners of International Relations 
can easily recognize typical patterns of science, technology, and international affairs, and 
thereby better understand and anticipate the implications that science and technology have 
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on international relations, and the implications that developments in politics, economics, and 
culture have on science and technology.18 Weiss argues that science and technology can 
impact international affairs through one of four main mechanisms: changing the architecture 
of the international system such as its structure, its key organizing concepts, and the relations 
among its actors; changing the processes by which the international system operates, 
including diplomacy, war, administration, policy formation, commerce, trade, finance, 
communications, and the gathering of intelligence; creating new issue areas, new constraints 
and trade-offs in the operational environment of foreign policy; and providing a source of 
changed perceptions, of information and transparency for the operation of the international 
system, and of new concepts and ideas for International Relations theory.  
 Weiss, however, demonstrates his argument by listing scientific cases that he argues 
prove the mechanisms of his framework, leaving his work largely unsubstantiated. He does 
not provide an adequate analysis of how the numerous cases in which he lists are consistent 
with the comprehensive framework that he has placed upon them. A mechanism of Weiss’ 
framework is that science and technology impacts international relations by creating new 
issue areas, new constraints and trade-offs, and issues in which domestic and international 
issues penetrate each other, and by changing the scope and domain of different paradigms of 
International Relations theory. To demonstrate the impact, Weiss lists the results of scientific 
endeavours, as he states that many scientific issues “have given rise to new treaties,” and that 
“advances in technology have led to new international organizations.”19 He, however, does 
not provide a narrative that sufficiently demonstrates the process of how a scientific issue 
gave rise to a treaty or how advances in technology have led to new international 
organizations. Nor does he address the states’ response to these scientific issues. By not doing 
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so, Weiss implies that science and technology has had more of an impact on international 
relations than it actually did. Weiss’ work does not provide an appropriate framework for 
explaining the science diplomacy conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus 
Institute, since Weiss concentrates on establishing the ways that science and technology 
impact international relations, rather than explaining why the scientific community 
conducted science diplomacy.  
 Chalecki argues that the scientific community as a whole is capable of helping refine 
state interests by bringing fact-based knowledge to public policy formation. 20 Chalecki, 
therefore, seeks to demonstrate that the scientific community can and has changed the minds 
of politicians and diplomats. Chalecki analyzes three historical cases in which she argues the 
scientific community made a significant contribution to the political outcome. They are the 
German-American Pork War of 1880-1881, the International Geophysical Year of 1956-
1957, and the Montreal Protocol of 1987. Chalecki describes the scientific issue and its effect 
on international affairs, and the scientific community’s response to the issue. Chalecki, 
however, does not substantiate her argument. In her reconstruction of the German-American 
Pork War of 1880-1881, she states that the “American science community, bolstered by their 
‘emerging scientific internationalism,’ began pushing foreign policy from behind, and in 
1890, Congress passed two laws requiring that pork be microscopically inspected for 
trichinae.”21 Chalecki does not provide a clear logical narrative that demonstrates that it was 
the pushing from the scientific community that led Congress to pass the two laws, as she 
does not adequately demonstrate that it was the scientific community who influenced the 
decisions of policymakers and diplomats. 
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over the quality of American exported pork.  
 199 
 Chalecki, moreover, does not address the political community’s response to the 
scientific community’s recommendations concerning the conflict. Similar to Weiss’ “Science, 
technology and international relations,” she does not address the political context in which 
the scientific community operated within. Addressing the political context would better 
demonstrate whether it was the scientific community that influenced the political outcome. 
Chalecki does not provide a framework that can explain the science diplomacy pursued by 
Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute, as her work does not demonstrate the transfer 
process of information from the scientific community to the political community. Since an 
important feature of Track II diplomacy is the transfer process, it is critical that the theoretical 
framework that explains the science diplomacy pursued by Stanford University and the 
Nautilus Institute takes into account how scientific knowledge is transferred into the 
policymaking process. 
 Skolnikoff addresses the political context in which scientists were working within. 
Skolnikoff extends his conclusion that he establishes in his book, The Elusive 
Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International Politics, 
concerning the capability of science and technology to transform the traditional order of 
sovereign states, as he argues that the role of science and scientists in influencing foreign 
policy issues has decreased since the end of the Cold War.22 Skolnikoff analyzes case studies 
that Keynan and de Cerreño reviewed, which includes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
Pugwash, and the International Institute of Science and Technology.23 Skolnikoff argues that 
they present case studies that argue that scientists have used science for political ends.24 
Skolnikoff aims to provide an additional perspective to the question of whether science 
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influences foreign policy, as he argues that the scientists were able to advance political 
comity among states not because science is neutral and universal, but because the scientists’ 
objectives were parallel to that of the government. In his analysis of the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, Skolnikoff demonstrates that this agreement was reached, not because of the 
efforts of the scientific community, but because of the strong political interests of the 
governments in reaching agreement. Skolnikoff, therefore, indicates that the state is also a 
main actor concerning science cooperation, as he examines not only the scientific context 
but also the political context of these cases.  
 Flink and Schreiterer aim to contribute to the understanding about the different 
objectives or the strategies, administrative procedures, and resources deployed of science 
diplomacy.25 Flink and Schreiterer conduct a comparative study of six countries’ science 
diplomacy. They examine the respective science diplomatic objectives, priorities, programs, 
and resources of France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 26  They find that the field of science diplomacy is generally increasing with 
importance in the practice of foreign policy, but that there are varying strategies and 
organizational structures concerning the motives, objectives, instruments, and intensity of 
the government science initiatives. 27  They also find that the different strategies and 
objectives in science diplomacy result from differences in the state’s knowledge capacity and 
political cultures.28 
  Since this chapter analyzes US science diplomacy, this section focuses on Flink and 
Schreiterer’s analysis of the United States. The main point of Flink and Schreiterer’s analysis 
of the science diplomacy being conducted by the United States is that US science diplomacy 
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is characterized by a lack of cooperation between government departments that conduct 
science diplomacy. The authors conclude that US science diplomacy is highly fragmented, 
and thereby has neither the administrative responsibilities nor the human resources necessary 
to design or carry out collaborative programs or other research-related activities.29 Their 
conclusion goes against Huddle and Stein, who both argue for a more positive analysis of 
US science diplomacy, which perceive the United States as the world’s largest and sole 
remaining national system of innovation amongst the highly developed countries in the early 
twenty-first century, and one of the pioneering nations in systematically applying science 
and technology in its foreign policy.30 Flink and Schreiterer do not provide any analysis to 
why the United States’ pursuit of science diplomacy is uncooperative, making it difficult to 
determine whether US’ practice of science diplomacy is constructive or not.  
 Flink and Schreiterer’s work is highly empirical. This, however, may be intentional, 
as the authors state that science and technology does not fit well into the common theoretical 
frameworks of International Relations.31 Flink and Schreiterer believe that the use of science 
within the domain of diplomacy cannot be explained by existing theories of International 
Relations. Flink and Schreiterer, however, do not substantiate their claim about science and 
International Relations theories, making it more of an opinion than a concrete argument. 
Flink and Schreiterer’s claim can be contrasted with Hans Morgenthau’s work on the factors 
that make for the power of a state, which he establishes in Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace.32  
                                                 
29 Flink and Schreiterer, “Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs,” 674. 
30 Franklin P. Huddle, “Science, Technology, US Diplomacy: History and 1978 Legislation,” Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 17 (1980): 353-363; Stein, “Globalisation, science, technology and policy,” 
403. 
31 Flink and Schreiterer, “Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs,” 668. 
32 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., 1948).  
 202 
 Morgenthau argues that the industrial capacity of a state, which he argues is an 
element of a state’s power in international affairs, depends upon “the quality and productive 
capacity of the industrial plant, the know-how of the working man, the skill of the engineer, 
the inventive genius of the scientist, the managerial organization.”33 Morgenthau’s section 
on industrial capacity demonstrates that his theory of International Relations takes into some 
consideration the relationship between science and international relations. According to 
Morgenthau, the relationship between science and international relations is that states 
perceive science as making up a part of an important factor for the power of a nation. 
Morgenthau’s work demonstrates that Flink and Schreiterer’s statement that science and 
technology do not fit well into the common theoretical frameworks of International Relations 
needs further reviewing. Flink and Schreiterer’s article cannot be used as an appropriate 
framework to explain the science diplomacy pursued by Stanford University and Nautilus 
Institute. The main unit of analysis of Flink and Schreiterer’s article is the state, while 
Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute are both non-state actors. The framework 
offered by Flink and Schreiterer’s article is, therefore, not compatible because the features 
of the state are not the same as those of a non-state actor.  
 Fähnrich seeks to explain why scholars participate in science diplomacy. In order to 
enhance the political community’s understanding of scholars’ experiences and perceptions 
of science diplomacy, Fähnrich interviewed thirty academics who were funded to participate 
in the German government initiative “Promote Innovation and Research in Germany,” and 
conducted a secondary analysis of the interview data.34 The result of Fähnrich’s analysis is 
that “scholars had different views on the science diplomatic program.”35 He elaborates that 
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some scholars argued that political support was necessary to pursue their international 
projects, while others felt restricted within the political framework.36 With regard to what 
these scholars perceived as their role within science diplomacy, Fähnrich concludes that 
scholars were divided between those who emphasized their independence and those who 
believed it was the role of scientists to support political interests.37 Fähnrich’s analysis of his 
data, therefore, demonstrates that there is no one answer concerning the question of why 
scholars participate in science diplomacy. Fähnrich’s article is, moreover, case specific as he 
only analyzes participants of one German science diplomatic program. As acknowledged by 
Fähnrich, because he analyzes only a single case, the validity of his results is limited and 
cannot be generalized in regard to other science diplomatic programs.38 Fähnrich’s article, 
therefore, does not provide an adequate framework that can explain the science diplomatic 
activities conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute, as his results cannot 
be securely applied to scholars who participated in an American science diplomatic program.  
 The incompatibility of applying Fähnrich’s framework to the scientific activities 
conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute is further supported by the 
literature that argues that scholars who participate in American science diplomatic programs 
do so in a different political framework than those who participate in a German science 
diplomatic program. According to Fähnrich and J.-J. Salomon, Germany and the United 
States use science diplomacy for different purposes. Germany mainly uses science 
diplomatic programs to attract highly skilled people to create a foundation for international 
networks that would strengthen its economic, diplomatic, and scientific ties aboard. 39 In 
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contrast, the United States uses science diplomacy as a means of bringing opposing sides 
closer together, to achieve the end of improving political relations.40 The main purpose of a 
German science diplomatic program, therefore, differs from that of an American program, 
indicating that scholars are participating within different objectives. The perspectives and 
motives that stems from the participants of a German science diplomatic program may 
consequently not be applicable to those who participate in an American science diplomatic 
program. 
 
Policy literature on science diplomacy 
 In this section, I analyse the nature of science diplomacy with reference to the policy 
literature from professional associations engaged in the practice of science diplomacy, 
particularly the Royal Society based in London, UK, and the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS). I analyse the policy literature on science diplomacy, 
specifically the report, “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” as this report is useful in 
understanding the characteristics of the scientific activities in the DPRK that were pursued 
by the academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute. 
 The report released by the Royal Society and the AAAS, “New frontiers in 
diplomacy,” establishes that the roles of science diplomacy are informing foreign policy 
objectives with scientific advice (science in diplomacy); facilitating international science 
cooperation (diplomacy for science); and using science cooperation to improve international 
relations between countries (science for diplomacy).41 Of the three dimensions, the first 
dimension of science diplomacy, “science in diplomacy,” is of importance and of use to this 
chapter, as the aim of both the Stanford University academics’ visits to Yongbyon and the 
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Nautilus Institute’s DPRK Energy Experts Working Group was to inform the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy on the North Korean nuclear issue with science-based 
advice.42 This section, therefore, focuses specifically on the first dimension.  
 The Royal Society is a fellowship of many of the world’s most eminent scientists and 
is the oldest scientific academy in continuous existence.43 The Royal Society has historically 
perceived science as an essential element of foreign policy and recognized that advances in 
science have relied upon the international flows of people and ideas. The Royal Society 
argues that this is demonstrated by how the post of Foreign Secretary of the Royal Society 
was instituted in 1723, nearly sixty years before the British government appointed its first 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.44 The fundamental purpose of the Royal Society is to 
recognize, promote, and support excellence in science and to encourage the development and 
use of science for the benefit of humanity.45 The Royal Society, therefore, has an interest in 
practicing science diplomacy, since the dimension of science diplomacy that understands 
science and technology of being able to help resolve international conflicts, reflects the latter 
part of the Royal Society’s purpose.  
 In 2009, the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for “a new role for science in 
international policymaking and diplomacy.”46 As a response to that call, the Royal Society, 
in partnership with the AAAS, hosted a two-day meeting titled “New frontiers in science 
diplomacy,” where participants discussed the role of science in international affairs and how 
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scientists, diplomats, and other policymakers can make this role work in practice. 47 The 
content of the report, “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” is based upon the evidence 
gathered from this meeting. Attendees of the meeting included government ministers, 
scientists, diplomats, policymakers, business leaders, and journalists, which indicates that the 
Royal Society aimed to obtain perspectives from all the participants of science diplomacy in 
order to provide an extensive as possible understanding of the roles of science diplomacy.48 
Since 2010, the Royal Society has been hosting various conferences that cover different 
dimensions of science diplomacy, and the interactions between science and foreign policy.49  
 The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) is a non-profit 
organization that seeks to “advance science, engineering, and innovation through the world 
for the benefit of all people.”50 To fulfil this mission, the AAAS sets the following broad 
goals of promoting international cooperation among scientists and in science; defending 
scientific freedom; encouraging scientific responsibility in public policy; and supporting 
scientific education and scientific outreach for the betterment of all humanity.51 The AAAS, 
which is considered as a reputable and politically powerful scientific society, concomitantly 
founded a Center for Science Diplomacy (CSD) in the fall of 2008 as the use of science in 
international affairs is part of the goals of the AAAS.52 The purpose of the AAAS Center for 
Science Diplomacy is to advance “the overarching goal of using science to build bridges 
between countries and to promote scientific cooperation as an essential element of foreign 
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policy by raising the profile of science diplomacy.”53 The Center for Science Diplomacy, 
therefore, has particular interest in identifying opportunities for science diplomacy to serve 
as a catalyst between societies where official relationships might be limited, and to strengthen 
civil society interactions between partnerships in science and technology.54 Similar to the 
Royal Society, the AAAS hosts conferences on the different dimensions of science 
diplomacy. In their third annual conference, “Science Diplomacy 2017,” on 29 March 2017, 
the participants discussed a broad variety of topics, such as conservation and national security 
at the US-Mexico border, the technical and diplomatic aspects of space security, and science 
diplomacy as a foundation for mitigating disease threats across the globe.55 
 According to “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” released by the Royal Society 
and the AAAS, the scientific community can contribute to the foreign policymaking process 
by providing the policymakers with scientific-based advice.56 The report argues that this is a 
role that scientists must play because many of the international challenges that policymakers 
face have scientific dimensions.57 It does not further elaborate upon why scientists must 
adopt this role, but the report’s emphasis that science will be critical to addressing such 
challenges indicates that scientists are better equipped to finding a resolution to the issue 
because they have a better knowledge of the issue than policymakers. Informing 
policymaking with scientific advice is, therefore, a critical role for scientists to play. Due to 
their expertise about the scientific aspect of the international issue, scientists can find a 
resolution to the issue better than policymakers. 
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 Scientists can carry out this role by ensuring that policymakers are provided with 
high-quality scientific advice and that the policymakers are able to comprehend the given 
information, so that the policymakers will be able to create more efficient solutions to these 
challenges.58 Scientists should also identify where uncertainties exist, or where the evidence 
base is inadequate.59 To demonstrate how scientists can put this role into practice, the report 
provides various examples of existing mechanisms that inform policymaking with scientific 
advice, such as the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC).60 The report then 
discusses ways in which the scientific community can communicate their work to the 
political community in an accessible and intelligible way. To do so, the report again provides 
examples of scientific bodies that have established and nurtured links between the scientific 
and policymaking community.61 The report is, therefore, more empirical than analytical, as 
it is focuses on demonstrating how scientists can put into practice the first dimension of 
science diplomacy. This section of “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” however, helps 
explain the aim of the scientific activities of the academics of Stanford University and the 
Nautilus Institute, as it establishes how providing the political community with science-based 
information concerning an issue that policymakers face is a role that scientists should play 
within the diplomatic domain.  
 The Royal Society and the AAAS report, “Scientific cooperation to support nuclear 
arms control and disarmament,” is more detailed and focused than “New frontiers in science 
diplomacy,” as it aims to demonstrate how the second dimension of science diplomacy, 
“diplomacy for science,” can be used to support the issue of nuclear arms control and 
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multilateral disarmament process.62 The second dimension of science diplomacy seeks to 
facilitate international cooperation, whether in pursuit of strategic priorities for research or 
collaboration between individual scientists and researchers. 63  The report, “Scientific 
cooperation to support nuclear arms control and disarmament,” therefore, seeks to 
demonstrate how one dimension of science diplomacy can be applied to a specific 
international issue. The report does not explain why science cooperation between states can 
help the progress of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Rather the report focuses on 
demonstrating how states can put this dimension into practice as it introduces different 
procedures of scientific cooperation, such as joint research on the topic of managing the 
civilian nuclear fuel cycle, or establishing disarmament laboratories.64 The report does not 
demonstrate whether the procedures that it discusses will accomplish the objective placed 
upon them. While the report’s dominant focus is on the second dimension of science 
diplomacy, the report dedicates a section that discusses how the scientific community has 
been and can continue to inform the political community with scientific-based advice. The 
report’s inclusion of this sector reinforces that informing policy objectives with scientific-
based advice is a role for scientists. The report recommends that the scientific community 
should advise the international community about the technical challenges involved about 
nuclear arms control and disarmament, and to identify the research and international 
cooperation necessary to address them.65  
 In October 2011, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) released its’ report, 
“Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security,” which focuses on demonstrating how science 
diplomacy can be applied to help resolve the various aspects of nuclear security, such as 
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nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms reduction, and countering nuclear 
terrorism.66 The United States Institute of Peace is a US nonpartisan institute that works to 
prevent, reduce, and resolve armed conflict around the world by applying practical solutions 
directly in conflict zones, and provides analysis, education, and resources to those working 
for peace.67 Alongside the 25th anniversary of the Reykjavik Summit in October 1986, the 
USIP held a symposium on science and diplomacy with the National Academy of Sciences 
Committee on International Security and Arms Control on 19 January 2011.68 The National 
Academy of Sciences is a private, non-profit organization which consist of leading American 
researchers, and provides objective, science-based advice on critical issues affecting the 
United States.69  In 1980, the National Academy of Sciences formed the Committee on 
International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) in order to connect the resources of the 
Academy to critical problems of international security and arms control. CISAC advices the 
US government, contributes to the work of non-governmental organizations, and informs the 
public about the scientific and technical issues related to international security and arms 
control.70 
 During the symposium in January 2011, titled “From Reykjavik to New START: 
Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security in the 21st Century,” the participants examined the 
roles of transparency and confidence building in 21st century nuclear security in support of 
                                                 
66 Micah D. Lowenthal, “Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security,” Unites States Institute for Peace, October 
2011, accessed on November 2, 2017, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR_288.pdf.  
67 “Impact Where America Needs It: A USIP Fact Sheet,” United States Institute of Peace, 9 May 2017, 
accessed on 2 November 2017, https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/05/impact-where-america-needs-it 
68 “Reykjavik to New Start,” accessed on November 2, 2017, https://www.usip.org/events/reykjavik-new-
start. 
The Reykjavik Summit is the summit meeting between US President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of 
the Community Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1986 that eventually resulted in the 
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the US and the USSR. 
69 “About Us,” National Academy of Science, accessed on November 2, 2017, http://www.nasonline.org/. 
70 “Committee on International Security and Arms Control,” The National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine, accessed on November 2, 2017, 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/cisac/PGA_048467. 
 211 
international security. 71 Participants were experts from the United States and Russia, 
including scientists, diplomats, and high-level government officials, implying that the USIP 
and CISAC aimed to obtain the perspectives of the different actors of US-Russia science 
diplomacy.72 The symposium addressed: examples from past US-USSR/Russia interactions 
and how the lessons learned can be applied to current and future challenges; monitoring and 
verification needs in the future; and the scientists’ role in enhancing security communication 
and confidence between and among states.73 From this symposium emerged the USIP report, 
“Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security,” which summarizes the main ideas that were 
offered during the symposium.74 
 The USIP “Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security,” identifies “essential 
ingredients for successful science diplomacy on nuclear security” and addresses “promising 
areas for science diplomacy to contribute to nuclear security in the twenty-first century.”75 
The USIP’s understanding of science diplomacy draws from the understanding of science 
diplomacy that is established “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” as the USIP states that 
science diplomacy can include “science informing diplomacy and diplomacy supporting 
science.”76 The USIP’s understanding of science diplomacy, therefore, draws from the roles 
of science diplomacy that are established in “New frontiers in science diplomacy,” 
particularly the first and second role.  
 The report identifies seven factors that would further the success of science 
diplomacy: openness to new possibilities, vision and leadership, good science, human 
connections, communication, time, and self-interest.77 It, however, does not demonstrate 
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whether these seven factors will actually make science diplomacy more successful. The 
report then identifies topics that participants of the symposium argued would benefit from or 
demand science diplomacy: nuclear energy and non-proliferation, nuclear arms reductions, 
countering nuclear terrorism, cooperation on ballistic missile defence, and the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.78 This report does not discuss how scientists can 
inform political discussions with science. It rather focuses on discussing the facilitation of 
international science cooperation, or more specifically, how science cooperation between the 
United States and Russia can be strengthened in order to help resolve the issue of nuclear 
security. 
This literature is helpful in understanding the aforementioned aspects of science 
diplomacy, but is not sufficient of itself to help explain the activities of Stanford University 
academics and the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK.  
 
US science diplomacy: manifestation of Track II diplomacy 
 In this section, I examine the work of Bull, Langhorne, Lisowski, Fisher, and Kelman 
and Cohen, to establish a theoretical framework that helps explain why the scientific 
activities conducted by Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute can be 
understood as a partial compensation for the US government’s inability to gather information 
about the DPRK nuclear situation.  
 
Theoretical Framework: Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy 
 The first assumption of this theoretical framework is that non-state actors are 
engaging in activities that have been understood as core diplomatic tasks, such as gathering 
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information, as illustrated by Langhorne and Lisowski.79 The second assumption is that a 
feature of Track II diplomacy is the ability of non-state actors to transfer findings that were 
produced by Track II diplomatic processes back into the official, or Track I, policymaking 
process, as argued by Fisher, and Kelman and Cohen.”80 
 According to Bull, one of the normal functions of diplomacy is the gathering of 
intelligence or information about foreign countries.81 Bull argues that diplomatists have 
conventionally played an important role in the gathering of intelligence as states permit other 
states access to information on a selective basis, particularly military information.82 Bull 
elaborates that while states seek to deny other states access to information about their military 
capacities, at the same time they seek to impress them with selected military information for 
the sake of deterrence.83 It is, therefore, the diplomatist’s role to gather as much information 
as the other state is willing to display to the diplomatist.   
 Lisowski demonstrates that non-state actors are also engaging in the diplomatic task 
of information gathering.84 Lisowski specifically seeks to explain why nongovernmental 
organizations are able to impact negotiation outcomes concerning climate change and 
environmental issues. In so doing, his article demonstrates that non-state actors are taking on 
the task of gathering and providing information to the political community about 
international issues. Liswoski states that “accredited NGOs are welcome [by the state] to 
distribute documents, meet face-to-face with negotiators, and attend most formal and 
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informal negotiation sessions.”85 The state relies, and acts on the information provided the 
NGOs. Liswoski further demonstrates that non-state actors perform this diplomatic task as 
he quotes government officials from developing countries and developed countries who 
describe how environmental NGOs have provided them with information, advice, and 
valuable insights. 86  He, thereby, demonstrates the ways in which NGOs are gathering 
information on the behalf of the state and state officials. 
 According to Langhorne, non-state actors are engaging in activities that have 
conventionally been understood as core diplomatic tasks due to an increase in situations that 
are becoming difficult for traditional international and diplomatic processes to resolve 
efficiently. 87  Langhorne argues that the rise of such situations is because of better and 
advanced technology. 88  Due to the information gained through technology, the public 
domain does not behave in ways that are parallel with the system of the states, which thereby 
leads to the emergence of a wide range of human activities that has no connection or ties to 
government permission or regulation. 89  According to Langhorne, much of these human 
activities are able to weaken governmental authority, diminish its role, and loosen the bonds 
of loyalty between the population and its government. 90  He then elaborates that the 
weakening of state structures leads to state collapse and domestic political violence. 91 
Langhorne argues that these types of situations have proven to be very difficult for the 
traditional international and diplomatic processes to efficiently resolve.92 The result is that 
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non-state actors adopt higher profile roles as they fill in this gap because they promise levels 
of efficiency and responsiveness that the state cannot.93  
  Fisher, and Kelman and Cohen demonstrate that a feature of diplomacy conducted by 
non-state actors is the capability of the participant to transfer the findings, or results, of the 
Track II diplomatic process back into the official policymaking process. Kelman and Cohen, 
and Fisher argue that the participants’ ability to do so is dependent upon their relationship 
with the official political community. The authors argue that the ideal participant of the Track 
II diplomatic process known as the problem-solving workshop, is someone who is influential 
within the political sphere, and has potential access to political leaders.94 The individual, 
however, should not be someone who is directly responsible for decision making, because if 
the individual is too close to the leadership, he becomes constrained by official positions and 
the expectations of policymakers.95 Kelman, Cohen, and Fisher argue that individuals with 
influence within the political community are the ideal participant of the problem-solving 
workshop because they increase the probability that the insights and ideas generated by the 
problem-solving workshops are transferred back into the official political process. 96 
Transferring the results of the problem-solving workshop back into the official policymaking 
process is one of the main objectives of Kelman and Cohen’s model of the problem-solving 
workshop.97 The participant, and his capability to transfer the findings, is, therefore, an 
important feature of Track II diplomacy.  
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Explaining the activities of Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute 
in the DPRK 
 Using the assumptions outlined in the theoretical section, I examine the empirical 
record to demonstrate that the scientific activities of the academics of Stanford University 
and the Nautilus Institute in the DPRK can be understood as an important strand of United 
States Track II diplomacy that helped compensate for gaps in United States Track I 
diplomacy to the DPRK. The academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute 
transferred their findings back into the official policymaking process. In so doing, the 
information gathered by the academics of Stanford University and the Nautilus Instituted 
helped fill in the intelligence gap about the DPRK nuclear situation, thus partially 
compensating for the limitations of US diplomacy between the Bush administration and the 
DPRK. 
 In this section, I analyse the historical context, actors, aims, and activities of the 
Stanford University academics’ visits to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, 
and the Nautilus Institute’s DPRK Energy Experts Working Group. In January 2004, August 
2007, February 2008, and November 2010, academics from Stanford University, as well as 
current and former US government officials, visited the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific 
Research Center, where they were given access to see the different facilities of North Korea’s 
nuclear program. I specifically focus upon the January 2004 and February 2008 visit, as these 
two are important visits. The January 2004 visit was the first visit of the Stanford academics 
to Yongbyon, and the February 2008 visit was coordinated with the implementation of the 
September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. In June 2006, March 2008, and September 2010, the 
Nautilus Institute initiated its project concerning the DPRK energy sector, the DPRK Energy 
Experts Working Group. The Nautilus Institute has been analysing the DPRK energy sector, 
and working with the North Korean government to help improve the DPRK energy situation 
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since 1995. To better understand how the Nautilus Institute’s DPRK Energy Experts 
Working Group came about, it is important to address the Nautilus Institute’s earlier projects 
concerning the DPRK energy sector.  
 
Stanford University academics’ visits to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center 
 The Stanford University academics’ visits to Yongbyon was led and organized by 
Professor John W. Lewis, the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Emeritus, at the 
time of his passing.98 Professor Lewis had been involved in Track II diplomacy with the 
DPRK since his first visit to North Korea in 1986. During this visit, Professor Lewis told the 
North Korean officials that he was going to invite them to Stanford University.99 In the early 
1990s, Professor Lewis kept his word and invited the first North Koreans to come unofficially 
to the United States.100 During this meeting at Stanford University, American and South 
Korean government officials were also present.101 Professor Lewis stated in his interview for 
the Stanford University Oral History Collections that he was involved in much of the work 
on negotiating with North Korea that occurred from 1993 to 2000.102 The timing indicates 
that the Track II diplomatic meeting that Professor Lewis was hosting at Stanford University 
was happening within the same time period as the official diplomatic talks that the Clinton 
administration was holding with the DPRK. It is, however, not clear whether the Track II 
diplomatic meeting was deliberately coordinated to support the negotiation process between 
the Clinton administration and the DPRK. Since the 1990s, Professor Lewis continuously 
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hosted official North Korean delegations at Stanford University, building and maintaining 
his relationship with DPRK officials, which at times provided the only channel of 
communication between the US and the DPRK when the two states were not talking to each 
other.103  
 Professor Lewis is a pioneer in unofficial meetings with North Korea. There is, 
however, a severe lack of data concerning Professor Lewis’ Track II diplomatic activities 
with North Korea from the 1990’s to the 2000’s, demonstrated by how the Hoover Institution 
Library & Archives at Stanford University holds little to no documents that record his Track 
II diplomatic activities that were hosted at Stanford University.104 There is, therefore, a lack 
of information that explains why Professor Lewis initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy 
with the DPRK at Stanford University. This chapter assumes that this scarcity of information 
can be attributed to Professor Lewis’ “humility” and the understanding that depending upon 
the situation and people involved, Track II diplomatic activities are private and 
confidential.105  
 In August 2003, Professor Lewis visited the DPRK before the first round of the Six 
Party Talks (27-29 August 2003).106 During this visit, the North Korean officials indicated 
that they would allow Professor Lewis and his delegation to visit the nuclear facilities at the 
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Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. Professor Lewis then contacted his colleague, 
Dr. Siegfried Hecker, to accompany him to provide scientific expertise. Dr. Hecker considers 
his visits to Yongbyon as part of his “adventure in science diplomacy,” which is why this 
chapter analyzes the Stanford University academics’ visits to Yongbyon predominantly from 
his perspective.107 Moreover, the majority of information concerning the Stanford University 
academic’s visit to Yongbyon stems from his personal accounts.  
 Dr. Hecker’s immediate reaction to Professor Lewis’ invitation was that neither the 
DPRK nor the US would allow him to go to Yongbyon.108 Contrary to his belief, he received 
permission from both governments. There is no direct account from the North Korean 
government that explains why it allowed Professor Lewis to bring Dr. Hecker into the 
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. Dr. Hecker, however, conjectures that he was 
allowed to go inside Yongbyon because the North Korean government believed that through 
Dr. Hecker, the DPRK could accurately deliver its message to the US and the international 
community that it had created a nuclear bomb.109 According to Dr. Hecker, the visit was 
approved by the US government due to the interest and support of high-level government 
officials, and the condition that the visit was in the context of an unofficial and non-
governmental visit.110 
 Dr. Hecker’s first tour of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center began on 
8 January 2004. Joining him at the invitation of Professor Lewis was Ambassador Charles L. 
Pritchard, and two Senate Foreign Relations Committee experts on Asian affairs, Mr. W. 
Keith Luse and Mr. Frank S. Januzzi.111 This American delegation was accompanied by 
                                                 
107 Hecker, “Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy,” 31.  
108 Hecker, 2016. 
109 Hecker, 2016; Hecker, “Extraordinary Visits,” 445. 
110 Hecker, 2016. 
111 Hecker, “Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing,” 1. 
 220 
Ambassador Li Gun, an official from the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, and a security 
escort.112 The Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center reports to the General Bureau 
of Atomic Energy.113 When they arrived at Yongbyon, they were greeted by Professor Dr. 
Ri Hong Sop, Director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.114 Dr. Hecker’s 
second visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center was from 12-16 February 
2008. Joining him at the invitation of Professor Lewis was, again, Mr. W. Keith Luse, and 
Joel S. Wit, former official of the US Department of State.115 The American delegation was 
hosted by nuclear specialists from the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center and officials from 
the General Bureau of Atomic Energy. 116 The tour of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific 
Research Center for both visits consisted of the following facilities: the 5 megawatt electric 
(MWe) reactor; the spent fuel storage pool building next to the 5 MWe reactor; and the 
Radiochemical Laboratory, also known as the plutonium reprocessing facility.117  
 
Aims of Dr. Hecker’s visits to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center 
 Dr. Hecker’s aim concerning his visit to Yongbyon in January 2004 was to clarify 
the ambiguities associated with the DPRK nuclear situation, while his aim concerning his 
visit to Yongbyon in February 2008 was to help verify that the DPRK was actually 
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implementing its obligations of the Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the 
September 2005 Joint Statement. 118  These aims of Dr. Hecker stem from his own 
understanding of the role of scientists within the diplomatic process on nuclear issues. In his 
article, “Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy,” Dr. Hecker states that in January 1986, 
during the depths of the Cold War, he became convinced that world leaders needed help 
solving the problems related to nuclear energy, and that scientists could be that help, hence 
his work in lab-to-lab cooperation with Russian scientists in the 1990s.119 Scientists, and 
engineers, therefore, have a critical role to play within the realm of nuclear policy because 
there is an aspect about the nuclear issue which scientists can address, and therefore find a 
resolution to, better than policymakers. Dr. Hecker sees three ways, or roles, in which 
scientists can be of assistance to the diplomatic process on nuclear issues. The first is to bring 
clarity to the nuclear issue, so as to facilitate a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis.120 
The second role is, if a diplomatic solution is found, scientists must help to implement any 
part of the solution such as nuclear freeze or eventual denuclearization.121 The third role is 
that scientists must help verify the implementation of any such diplomatic solution.122  
 Based upon his understanding about the roles that scientists must play within the 
diplomatic process on nuclear issues, Dr. Hecker sought to find out as much as he possibly 
could about the status of North Korea’s nuclear program from what the DPRK was willing 
to show him, so that he could present the US policymaking community with an as close to 
possible accurate view of the condition of the North Korean nuclear program. Dr. Hecker 
was concerned about the ambiguities associated with nuclear-weapons related matters.123 As 
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stated in his hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 21 January 2004, 
Dr. Hecker elaborated that ambiguities often lead to miscalculations, and in the case of 
nuclear weapons-related matter, such miscalculations can be disastrous.124Around the time 
when the academics of Stanford University first visited Yongbyon in January 2004, certain 
ambiguities associated with North Korea’s nuclear program included the question of whether 
the DPRK had actually taken the 8000 fuel rods from the spent fuel pool, moved them to the 
reprocessing facility, and extracted the plutonium.125 According to Dr. Hecker, there was 
great argument within the US scientific community about whether the DPRK had or had not, 
but no one was certain.126 Concerning his visit to Yongbyon in February 2008, Dr. Hecker 
sought to confirm that the DPRK was meeting its obligations of the Second-Phase Actions 
for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement.127 
 
Modality of Dr. Hecker on gathering information about DPRK nuclear program 
 Before the invitation from Professor Lewis, Dr. Hecker had not studied North Korea’s 
nuclear program.128 To prepare for his visit, and to gain some perspective of what he could 
expect, Dr. Hecker read as much as he could about the DPRK’s nuclear program. He stated 
in his interview that David Albright’s The North Korean Nuclear Puzzle gave him the 
strongest picture of what he might be able to see when he arrived at the Yongbyon Nuclear 
Scientific Research Center.129 He also spoke to his colleagues at the Los Alamos National 
Lab who were familiar with aspects of the DPRK nuclear program due to their experience 
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on freezing the DPRK’s nuclear program during the timeframe of the implementation of the 
October 1994 Agreed Framework.130  
 When Dr. Hecker arrived at Yongbyon, he approached the DPRK’s nuclear program 
in his capacity as a nuclear scientist, rather than a representative of the Bush administration 
or an inspector. Due to this attitude, he was able to have “good, frank” discussions with the 
North Korean nuclear specialists about the scientific aspects of the DPRK nuclear 
program.131 Dr. Hecker moreover did not limit himself when it came to making inquiries, 
and he orally expressed his scepticism over the Yongbyon nuclear specialists’ claims 
concerning their nuclear program, such as the claim that they had produced a plutonium metal 
product. This led the Yongbyon nuclear specialists to give Dr. Hecker permission to make 
further inspections of the nuclear facilities, which allowed him to gain more concrete 
information about the conditions of the DPRK’s nuclear program.  
 During the visit in January 2004, to demonstrate that the 5 MWe reactor, or what the 
DPRK calls the Experimental Nuclear Power Plant, was working as designed, the US 
delegation was given a tour of the control room, the observation area for the reactor hall, and 
the top of the reactor.132 Their guide was Li Song Hwan, Chief Engineer of the Nuclear 
Facility.133 The Yongbyon nuclear specialists then suited the US delegation in protective 
clothing to show them the spent fuel storage pool. The guide for the US delegation’s tour of 
the spent fuel storage pool building was also Li Song Hwan.134 During the tour of this facility, 
the Yongbyon nuclear specialists stated that they had removed all 8000 fuel rods from the 
spent fuel storage pool, and had shipped them to the Radiochemical Laboratory to be 
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reprocessed so as to extract the plutonium.135 Dr. Hecker’s initial look into the spent fuel 
pool showed him that the locking plates and associated structures that the US Spent Fuel 
Team had put in place during the 1990s were gone.136 After the tour of the spent fuel pool, 
Ri Hong Sap, Director of the Nuclear Facility, told Dr. Hecker that the US delegation was 
able to confirm that the fuel rods had been removed and sent to be reprocessed due to the 
tour.137 Dr. Hecker, however, disagreed, and expressed his scepticism about the DPRK’s 
claim that the spent fuel was gone. He pointed out that although a third of the canisters were 
open, a third of the canisters were still closed, and the remaining third seemed to be 
missing.138 In order to convince Dr. Hecker that the spent fuel was gone, Director Ri allowed 
Dr. Hecker to pick a closed canister at random, and examine the inside of it.139 With the aid 
of a light, Dr. Hecker was able to verify that the canister was empty and that indeed no fuel 
rods were remaining.  
 At the Radiochemical Laboratory, the US delegation viewed the operation of the 
nuclear radiation containment chambers, commonly referred to within the scientific 
community as hot cells.140 Their guide of the Radiochemical Laboratory was Li Yong Song, 
Chief Engineer of the Radiochemical Laboratory. 141  The Yongbyon nuclear specialists 
demonstrated to the US delegation the requisite facilities, equipment, and technical expertise 
required for reprocessing plutonium.142 From these demonstrations, Dr. Hecker was able to 
confirm that the DPRK possessed an industrial-scale reprocessing facility that appeared in 
good repair.143 During the tour of the Radiochemical Laboratory, Dr. Hecker asked if they 
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could visit the Dry Storage Building, which serves as the port of entry for the fuel rods into 
the Radiochemical Laboratory.144 Director Ri, however, replied that it was not available for 
a tour because there was no activity and no workers in the building.145 Although Dr. Hecker 
was not able to visit the waste facilities nor see the glove boxes used for the final plutonium 
production, he was able to see and inspect the plutonium product that the Yongbyon nuclear 
specialists claimed to be from their most recent processing campaign.146 Near the end of the 
tour of Yongbyon, Director Ri told Dr. Hecker that they had shown him their deterrent.147 
Dr. Hecker, however, replied that they had not.148 After some more discussions, Dr. Ri asked 
Dr. Hecker if he wanted to see the plutonium, to which Dr. Hecker replied positively.149 The 
North Korean nuclear specialists brought him a metal box.150 Inside the metal box was a 
white wooden box that held two jars that the North Korean nuclear specialists claimed to be 
carrying plutonium.151 Dr. Ri allowed Dr. Hecker to closely inspect the jars.152 Dr. Hecker 
concluded from his assessment of the plutonium product that what the Yongbyon nuclear 
specialists gave him looked and felt like plutonium. 153  He, however, was not able to 
definitively confirm that what the he saw was actually plutonium metal due to the lack of 
proper instrumentation.154  
 During the February 2008 visit, the delegation led by Professor Lewis was shown the 
5 MWe reactor, the storage site for the fuel rods fabricated for the 5 MWe and 50 MWe 
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reactor, and the Radiochemical Laboratory. 155  On 3 October 2007, the Six Party Talks 
reached an agreement concerning the disablement of the 5 MWe reactor, the Radiochemical 
Laboratory, and the fuel fabrication facility at Yongbyon, to be carried out by 31 December 
2007.156 Through his independent assessment of the disablement process, Dr. Hecker was 
able to verify to the US policymaking community that the DPRK had fulfilled ten of twelve 
disablement actions that had been made by the Yongbyon nuclear specialists concerning the 
disablement process, and that the disablement actions that had been fulfilled would 
effectively delay a potential restart of plutonium production.157  
  
Liaison between Dr. Hecker and the Bush administration 
 After each of his visits to Yongbyon, Dr. Hecker prepared a report about what he 
learned during his visits to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, which he then 
sent to the US government and the North Korean government.158 On 21 January 2004, Dr. 
Hecker had a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, where he shared 
his report of his visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea.159 
This hearing, therefore, enabled him to successfully transfer his findings into the official 
policymaking process. The members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to whom 
he presented before included then-Senators Richard G. Lugar and Joseph R. Biden.160  
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 At this hearing, Dr. Hecker was able to verify to the US policymaking community 
that the DPRK’s 5 MWe reactor had been restarted and that it appeared to be operating 
efficiently, providing heat and electricity while also accumulating approximately six 
kilograms of plutonium per year in its spent fuel rods.161 He was also able to inform the 
policymaking community that the canisters in the spent fuel pool were empty, and that the 
approximated 8000 fuel rods had been removed, due to his personal confirmation.162 Dr. 
Hecker stated in his hearing that he was not able to definitively substantiate the DPRK claim 
that it had reprocessed all 8000 fuel rods during one continuous campaign from mid-January 
2003 to end of June 2003, nor was he able to validate the claim that the 8000 fuel rods were 
estimated to contain up to 25 to 30 kilograms of plutonium mental.163 He was, however, able 
to conclude, through the demonstrations of the Radiochemical Laboratory staff concerning 
its facility, equipment, and technical expertise, that the DPRK appeared to have the capacity 
to do what they claimed to have done with the 8000 fuel rods.164 Dr. Hecker also reported to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the product inside the jar was plutonium, 
along with his assessment that if the DPRK could make plutonium of that shape, then the US 
must assume it can create a rudimentary bomb. 165  Upon his return to the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, Dr. Hecker and his technical colleagues simulated in one of the 
laboratories, the conditions in the Yongbyon conference room, where he had held the jars.166 
This setting allowed Dr. Hecker to conclude that what he had held was indeed plutonium 
metal.167  
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 Although it was not in the format of an official Senate Committee hearing, Dr. Hecker 
continued to transfer to the US government his findings and observations that he gathered 
from his other visits to the DPRK.168 He stated in his interview that he had worked and talked 
very closely with officials of the Bush administration.169 Dr. Hecker, therefore, had access to 
a channel in which he was able to transfer his findings back into the US policymaking 
process. In his report concerning his February 2008 visit, Dr. Hecker was able to inform the 
US policymaking community that the DPRK was meeting its obligations. He, however, also 
emphasized in his report that the DPRK leadership had made the decision to permanently 
shut down plutonium production if the United States and the other four participating states 
of the Six Party Talks meet their respective October 3, 2007 obligations.170 He did so, as he 
argues that this was the message that the North Korean government wanted to deliver to the 
Bush administration.171 Dr. Hecker acknowledges that he was used by the North Korean 
government as a means of facilitating communication from the DPRK to the Bush 
administration.172 Dr. Hecker, therefore, included his discussions with the North Korean 
government officials within his report to deliver the messages that the North Korean 
government wanted him to send on its behalf to the US policymaking community.  
Dr. Hecker’s work concerning the DPRK continued after the last round of the Six 
Party Talks, and he continues to write about this issue a decade later in 2018. Dr. Hecker 
made another visit to Yongbyon in November 2010, where he was able to confirm that the 
DPRK was creating a uranium enrichment facility.173 This visit was his last, as the North 
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Korean government did not offer another initiation. Dr. Hecker, however, continues to 
publish his analysis concerning the denuclearization of the DPRK. His most recent report, 
published in 2018, discusses how denuclearization within North Korea should be passed over 
a ten year period to allow the United states to reduce and manage risks.174 
 
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability DPRK Energy Experts Working Group 
 The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, a public policy think tank based 
in Berkeley, California, argues that the unavailability of natural resources in the DPRK for 
energy consumption is a critical dimension to many of the issues involving North Korea, 
including the creation and resolution of the DPRK’s nuclear program.175 Other issues include 
military transgressions, economic collapse, and food shortages.176 Due to this assumption, 
the Nautilus Institute is, and has been, invested in multiple projects concerning the DPRK’s 
energy sector since its establishment in 1992 to address the issue of the DPRK’s energy 
needs. One of the Institute’s major projects was the DPRK renewable energy project, the US-
DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project.177  
 The US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project installed seven wind turbine towers 
in Unhari, a rural village on the west coast of North Korea, which provide clean, renewable 
energy to the village’s medical clinic, kindergarten, and households. 178  The idea of the 
project emerged from a series of trips that Dr. Hayes made to the DPRK, beginning in 
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1991.179 In November 1997, Dr. Hayes invited a delegation of North Korean renewable 
energy experts to come to the United States.180 The North Korean delegation visited several 
renewable energy sites in the United States, including the Sacramento Utility Municipal 
District solar cell central station in California; the Zond Corporation wind farm in Tehachapi, 
California; and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Colorado.181 At the conclusion 
of the visit, the DPRK renewable energy delegation and the Nautilus Institute agreed to 
establish the US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project. 
 The installation of the renewable energy system began in May 1998, and was 
completed in October 2000.182 The first Nautilus mission to the DPRK in May 1998 installed 
the first of seven wind turbine towers and laid out the plans for building the powerhouse and 
installing the system.183 The Nautilus delegation returned in September 1998 to raise the 
other towers, install the turbines, and to link the system to twenty households, a kindergarten, 
and a medical clinic.184 The third mission took place in September 2000 and October 2000 
where the Nautilus delegation installed a water-pumping windmill and transferred an 
ultraviolet water purification unit.185 
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  During its visits to Unhari, the Nautilus Institute delegation also conducted household 
energy use surveys, and held meetings with their North Korean counterparts. 186  These 
surveys and meetings provided information on what types of fuels the DPRK needed, what 
types of technologies might be applied to meet the energy demand, what kinds of energy-
sector investments would be most beneficial, and what types of local preferences would 
affect the acceptance of different energy options.187 The information gained from conducting 
the US-DPRK Village Wind Power Pilot Project contributed to the Nautilus Institute’s 
database on the DPRK’s demand for and supply of the various forms of energy used in the 
DPRK.  
 The Nautilus Institute’s database is another project of the Institute, which according 
to the Nautilus Institute is one of the only detailed energy supply and demand databases in 
existence for the DPRK.188 The Nautilus Institute developed the database by assembling as 
much information on the DPRK that could be obtained from as many data sources as possible, 
which include: the Nautilus Institute’s energy projects in the DPRK; several consulting 
missions to the DPRK on energy sector and environmental issues on behalf of international 
agencies, such as the United National Development Programme (UNDP); and reports made 
by the media, DPRK trading partners, South Korean government agencies, and visitors to 
and observers of the DPRK.189 The collected information was then analysed by the Nautilus 
Institute to see which pieces of information matched and was compatible with other data, 
thereby creating a logical narrative about the conditions of the DPRK energy sector.190  
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 The database, however, initially only included information for the years 1990, 1996, 
and 2000, and was not updated after 2002. The demand for data on the DPRK energy sector 
by participants of the Six Party Talks, and states in bilateral negotiations with the DPRK, 
however, greatly increased. As stated in Section 3 of the Joint Statement of the 19 September 
2005, the participating state of the Six Party Talks agreed to cooperate in economic, energy, 
and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK.191 In order to be able to adequately address the 
duration and scale of the DPRK’s need for energy and economic assistance, and therefore, 
properly carry out Section 3 of the Joint Statement of the 19 September 2005, these states 
needed information about the DPRK’s energy and economic situation. From this demand of 
information emerged the Nautilus Institute’s DPRK Energy Experts Working Group 
project.192  
 To assist in meeting the demands for current information on the DPRK energy sector, 
and for analysis on the different potential DPRK energy futures, the United States 
Department of Energy provided the Nautilus Institute a special grant to update its DPRK 
energy sector database and analysis.193 The US Department of Energy, specifically its Office 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI) specializes in specializes in monitoring 
nuclear proliferation, and thereby provides unique expertise to the intelligence community.194 
With this grant, the Nautilus Institute held three DPRK Energy Experts’ Working Group 
meetings, in June 2006, March 2008, and September 2010. The DPRK Energy Expert 
Working Group was also funded by the Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, John D 
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and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, and the Ploughshares 
Fund.195 
 
Aim of Nautilus Institute DPRK Energy Experts Working Group project 
 The main aim of the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group was to update the 
Nautilus Institute’s DPRK energy database and related analysis, so that the Institute could 
inform the parties of the Six Party Talks about the current status of the DPRK energy sector 
and possible approaches to the DPRK energy sector redevelopment. 196  The first DPRK 
Energy Experts Working Group was held from 26-27 June 2006 at Stanford University.197 It 
was co-hosted by the Preventive Defense Project at Stanford University and the Center for 
the Pacific Rim at University of San Francisco. The second DPRK Energy Experts’ Working 
Group was held from 8-9 March 2008 in Beijing, China. The objectives of the meetings were 
to: compile a quantitative and physical description of the energy situation in the DPRK; 
compile sectoral specific data pertaining to North Korea’s energy economy, both supply and 
demand, including those of the military; examine the total data set for consistency, errors, 
and oversights; include biomass energy as well as fossil energy supply to the data set; 
examine the energy demand and supply in the DPRK within multiple dimensions, including 
energy economy, technology, and environment; examine motives and rates of change that 
determine future possible energy paths; and compartmentalize policy options into categories 
that relate to situations that arise from possible scenarios of DPRK nuclear dismantlement.198 
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Modality of Nautilus Institute on gathering information about DPRK energy sector 
  The Nautilus Institute updated its database by bringing together those with expertise 
on the DPRK energy supply and resources, and the DPRK energy demand and economy. 
Experts in attendance at the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group meetings included 
scholars and researchers from the: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; US Department 
of State; US Department of Energy; Institute of World Development, Development Research 
Center of the State Council, PR China; Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory; European Commission; Samsung Economic Research 
Institute; and Korea Institute of Construction Technology.199 At the meetings, the experts 
made presentations where they provided pertinent, recent data and special insights on topics 
such as the DPRK’s agricultural sector and implications for energy use, forest and other 
biomass production in the DPRK, the DPRK’s mineral resources and inter-Korean 
cooperation, the DPRK energy and energy-related trade with China, and the DPRK’s power 
sector.200 Through the compilation of the data gathered from the presentations, the Nautilus 
Institute aimed to make its database as reflective as possible of the actual conditions of the 
DPRK energy sector. 
 The final product of the meetings was a synthesis report concerning the DPRK energy 
sector that was made available to the participating states of the Six Party Talks, participants 
of the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group, and the public. 201  The report is titled 
“Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement 
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Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment,” and incorporated input 
from the first and second DPRK Energy Experts Working Group meetings.202 The report lists 
the sources of the fuels used in the DPRK economy, shows the processes that produce or 
refine primary fuels for consumption, such as electricity generation facilities, and then lists 
the final demands for fuels, typically by sector. 203  The sector categories for the DPRK 
supply-demand balance are industry, transport, residential, agricultural, fisheries, military, 
public and commercial sectors, non-specified and non-energy.204 The forms of energy that 
the database measures include electricity and coal output, oil imports, and the use of wood 
and biomass. 205  The content of the report indicates that the Nautilus Institute aimed to 
provide the policymaking community with a comprehensive understanding of the DPRK 
energy sector. The latest update of this report includes estimated DPRK energy supply-
demand balances for the years 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009.206  
 
Liaison between Nautilus Institute and the Bush administration 
 The special grant given to the Nautilus Institute by the US Department of Energy 
indicates that the Nautilus Institute had a connection with the US Department of Energy, and 
thereby the US government.207 The relationship indicates that the information gathered by 
the Nautilus Institute was able to be transferred back into the official policymaking process 
since the Institute had access to the US political leadership. Moreover, the Nautilus Institute 
states on its website that it has provided policy analyses and briefings at their request to US 
government officials on the DPRK’s energy needs, its likely negotiating postures and 
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demands, and possible negotiable options.208 This implies that the Nautilus Institute was able 
to create a channel of communication between itself and US government officials of the Bush 
administration. The website, however, does not specify which agency or department of the 
United States government the Nautilus Institute provided information to.  
The Nautilus Institute’s work concerning the energy sector of North Korea began in 
1998, and Dr. Peter Hayes’ most recent reports about DPRK energy needs was released in 
2014.209 These reports were published by the Center for Energy, Governance, and Security 
at Hanyang University in Seoul, South Korea, indicating that the Nautilus Institute 
maintained its relationships with the South Korean government and continued to provide 
policy analysis and briefings to South Korean government officials. After the last round of 
the Six Party Talks in 2008, Dr. Hayes, along with Dr. David F. von Hippel, continued to 
apply their comprehensive energy security assessment framework to North Korea’s energy 
sector, and provided further analysis of the energy policies that would be useful to the issue 
of the DPRK energy insecurity. Furthermore, from 2008 to 2011, the Nautilus Institute 
launched another project, “DPRK Building Energy Efficiency Training.”210 The Institute, 
partnered with EEMP in China and the Global Cities Institute in Australia, performed an 
energy efficiency upgrade in a certain building in Pyongyang, North Korea, with the aim of 
building trust and reinforcing communication between North Korea and the international 
community. 
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Conclusion  
Science diplomacy has influenced the United States’ relations with North Korea, as 
science is a commonality between North Korea and the United States, in which bridges can 
be built. The dialogues and actions of the science engagements created by the academics of 
Stanford University and the Nautilus Instituted allowed for the forging and maintaining of 
communication and cooperation that then produced information about the DPRK’s science 
sector, including its nuclear sector. Moreover, science diplomacy between such actors and 
the North Korean government provided an opportunity for interactions between the United 
States and the DPRK when formal communication avenues became increasingly limited.   
Due to the unsuccessful efforts by the Bush administration to obtain information 
about the DPRK’s nuclear program, the Stanford University and the Nautilus Institutes’ 
science diplomatic activities can be understood as contributing to fulfilling one of the normal 
functions of official Track I diplomacy. As demonstrated in this chapter, the Stanford 
University and the Nautilus Institute aimed to gather information respectively about the 
status of the DPRK nuclear facilities, and the DPRK energy sector. Both institutions, 
moreover, were able to transfer their findings back into the official policymaking process. 
By gathering information and transferring their findings back into the official policymaking 
process, the Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute were able to 
compensate for the Bush administration Track I diplomatic limitations, and its inability to 
adequately gathering information about the DPRK nuclear program. Although the visits by 
the Stanford University academics to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the 
activities of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability’s DPRK Energy Experts 
Working Group can be perceived as science diplomacy, these activities can also be 
understood as an identifiable manifestation of United States Track II diplomacy towards the 
DPRK. 
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Chapter 7 Americans in Pyongyang: Explaining the New York Philharmonic’s Visit to the 
DPRK 
 
Introduction 
From 26-28 February 2008, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra visited 
Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, to play a public concert and interact with North 
Korean musicians. The stated aim of the visit, according to Zarin Mehta, president and 
executive director of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, was to help the furthering of the 
normalizing of relations between the US and the DPRK by presenting a more positive image 
of the United States to the North Korean government and North Korean public. 1  This 
dissertation argues that non-state actors initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy because 
they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of US Track I 
diplomacy with the North Korean government that took place during the Bush administration 
(2001-2009). Within the context of my central thesis, Chapter 7 shows that the New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a partial compensation 
for the US delegation’s inability to fulfil the normal diplomatic function of minimizing 
diplomatic friction between the United States and the DPRK. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, 
the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Christopher R. Hill (2005-2009) faced difficulties fulfilling the normal 
functions of diplomacy. The analytical framework of this dissertation argues that Track II 
diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors compensate for the 
constraints that state actors face in official diplomacy. The orchestra aimed to present a 
positive image of the United States to the North Korean government and the North Korean 
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public. In so doing, the activities of the New York Philharmonic can be understood as a 
partial compensation for the US delegation’s inability to ease the diplomatic friction between 
the US and the DPRK. 
 In the first section, I introduce the supplementary data that pertains specifically to 
this chapter. In the second section, I establish the limitations of Track I or official United 
States diplomacy. I demonstrate that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Assistant 
Secretary of State Ambassador Hill faced difficulties minimizing the effects of international 
friction between the US and the DPRK, because the US delegation was unable to adequately 
show the North Korean delegation that the policy objective which the US delegation was 
seeking at the Six Party Talks was consistent with the interests of the DPRK. In the third 
section, I establish the motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra concerning its visit to Pyongyang. In the fourth section, I analyse the literature 
concerning music and US diplomacy to demonstrate that this bulk of scholarship does not 
provide a sufficient framework that explains the New York Philharmonic’s visit to 
Pyongyang.2 In the last section, I argue that the literature on post-Cold War literature on 
diplomacy explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to the DPRK because it 
offers insight into why the visit can be understood as a partial compensation for the US 
delegation to the Six Party Talk’s inability to achieve a diplomatic objective. 
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Data 
 This chapter makes use of primary data from newspaper articles and the documentary 
about the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang, “Americans in 
Pyongyang.”3 Secondary data is derived from Robert Carlin’s reconstruction of the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang in Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin’s 
The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History.4 Carlin’s reconstruction is important since it is 
based upon interviews with Mehta. Mehta was a key organizer of the New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang, whom I was unable to interview in person due 
to issues pertaining to schedule and availability.5  
 The chapter nonetheless makes use of interviews with other key organizers of the 
New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit, who include Evans Revere, president of The 
Korea Society; Professor Frederick F. Carriere, executive vice president of The Korea 
Society; and Eric Latzky, head of communications of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra. 
The Korea Society helped organize the New York Philharmonic’s visit to the DPRK. These 
individuals held these institutional positions at the time of when the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra visited North Korea (2008). At the time when the interviews took place (2016), 
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these individuals no longer held the previous positions. The majority of data concerning the 
logistics of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit is derived from these interviews.  
 As underlined in Chapter 1, interviews raise some methodological and theoretical 
concerns, due to problems such as distinguishing truth from authenticity, potential bias, and 
the interviewee’s memory.6 For a variety of reasons, the informant may omit important 
details, or they may view the situation through “distorted lenses” and provide an account that 
is misleading and unable to be checked or verified.7 Due to the lack of accessible information 
concerning the details and logistics of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to the 
DPRK, interviews with the organizers of the visit are necessary. To limit the margin of error 
concerning interviews as much as possible, the interviewees were asked similar questions 
concerning the logistics of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit, with the intent that 
this would allow the accounts to become verifiable. The interviewees provided similar 
answers, indicating that the account they provided concerning the logistics of the visit was 
not distorted. The form of interview was semi-structured interview as it allowed for specific 
topics to be addressed and gave space for the interviewees to address unconsidered question 
or topics.  
 This chapter analyses the literature on musical diplomacy, but shows that this 
scholarship does not provide a sufficiently helpful analytical framework that explains the 
New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to the DPRK. It analyzes the special forum on US 
musical diplomacy, published by the journal Diplomatic History.8 The articles within this 
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forum demonstrate that music and American ensembles were used by the US government as 
a tool of diplomacy, particularly during the Cold War. These articles do not engage with US 
foreign policies and national security concerns, and, therefore, do not properly demonstrate 
why the US government sends musical groups abroad to implement US foreign policies. 
There is little to no scholarly literature that analyzes the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s 
visit to the DPRK within the prism of International Relations theories or diplomatic theories. 
The literature that discusses the visit is mainly descriptive.9 This research is, thereby, original 
in that it provides a scholarly analysis of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to 
Pyongyang. 
 
US delegation unable to minimize effects of friction within US-DPRK relations 
 In this section, I argue that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by 
Ambassador Christopher Hill (2005-2009) was unable to fulfil the normal diplomatic 
function of minimizing friction between the US and the DPRK. According to Hedley Bull’s 
The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, “friction is the chafing or 
rubbing together of things on proximity.”10 Given the juxtaposition of these different political 
communities, some degree of friction will arise even between states that perceive a wide area 
of common interests, and whose relations are close and amiable.11 Friction in international 
relations, therefore, routinely occurs between almost all states due to the fact that states have 
different political communities, each with its own values, preoccupations, prejudices, and 
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sensibilities. The effects of Bull’s understanding of friction is the rise of tension and discord 
that may be unrelated to the actual interests of the states involved.12 The effects of friction 
have the capability to hinder the negotiation process because it can hinder the states’ ability 
to determine the area of overlapping interests. As argued by the literature on classical 
diplomacy, negotiation of an agreement is possible when the interests of the conflicted states 
overlap at some point and if the conflicted states are able to perceive that they do overlap.13 
Minimizing the effects of friction between the conflicted states is, therefore, an important 
function of diplomacy, since it helps prevent states from losing their focus on the areas of 
overlapping interest.  
 Bull argues that a diplomatist can help minimize diplomatic friction by observing 
what he calls the conventions of language.14 Observing such conventions of language helps 
the diplomatist minimize friction because it ensures effective communication between the 
diplomatist and the other party about their respective states’ interests and objectives. Bull 
explains that these conventions of language are: avoiding arguments that are intended to give 
vent to feelings or to satisfy the diplomatist’s own or the diplomatist’s country’s pride or 
vanity; seeking always to reason or persuade rather than to bully or threaten; trying to show 
that the objective for which the diplomatist is seeking is consistent with the other party’s 
interests; speaking of “rights” rather than of “demands,” and to show that these rights stem 
from rule or principles which both states hold in common, and which the other state has 
already conceded; and trying to find the objective for which the diplomatist is seeking in a 
framework of shared interests and agreed principle that is common ground between the states 
concerned.15 These conventions of language allow the diplomatist to demonstrate to the other 
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party that the objective in which the diplomatist is seeking should not be conceived as the 
enforcement of a claim to universal authority, the promotion of the true faith against heretics, 
or as the pursuit of self-regarding interests that take no account of the interests of others.16 
These conventions of language are, therefore, conducive to the negotiation process since it 
allows the diplomatist to bring attention to the common ground between the conflicted states’ 
differing interests, and the realization that negotiation is thereby possible.  
 The US delegation led by Ambassador Christopher Hill (2005-2009) faced 
difficulties observing the conventions of language which would help minimize the effects of 
friction between the US and the DPRK. The US delegation was inept in showing the North 
Korean delegation that the policy objective for which the US delegation was seeking at the 
Six Party Talks was in the interests of the North Korean government, because the US 
delegation was unable to adequately persuade the North Korean delegation that the objective 
the US was seeking at the Six Party Talks was the actual policy objective of the Bush 
administration towards the DPRK. The US delegation aimed to show the North Korean 
delegation that the Bush administration’s policy towards the DPRK was not regime change. 
Rather, the Bush administration was sincere in implementing the Joint Statement of the 
Fourth Round on the Six-Party Talks of September 19, 2005, which included the clause of 
how the US would move towards full diplomatic relations with the DPRK in return for the 
dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program.17 The US delegation was, however, unable 
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17 “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing, September 19, 2005,” US Department 
of State Archive, September 19, 2005, accessed April 20, 2017, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm; “North Korea-Denuclearization Action Plan,” US Department of 
State Archive, February 13, 2007, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm. 
 245 
to do so due to the internal division within the Bush administration over how United States 
foreign policy towards the DPRK would be implemented.18  
The internal division within the Bush administration impeded the negotiation process 
of the Six Party Talks, as it led to a lack of a coherent and consistent foreign policy towards 
the DPRK. Within the Bush administration were government officials who favoured 
diplomatic negotiations with the DPRK, such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and his 
Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs James Kelly.19 This group preferred a multilateral, 
diplomatic approach towards the North Korean nuclear issue, that would accent traditional 
negotiation and multilateral coordination. 20  Others in the administration, such as State 
Department Under Secretary for International Security Affairs John Bolton and Defence 
Department Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, favoured a more assertive and unilateral 
approach to North Korea.21 This group of foreign policy advisors were more concerned about 
the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defence of the United States.22 
They, therefore, pushed for the development of a home based, national missile defence 
system to defend against what they perceived as rouge nations equipped with weapons of 
mass destruction.23  
The division created a debate over how to achieve the goal of dismantling North 
Korea’s nuclear program, which persisted throughout President Bush’s terms as president. 
President Bush allowed the debate to continue, as he did not play his role as ultimate arbiter 
but rather continued to rely on the ideas and information of his advisers, giving his foreign 
                                                 
18 Christopher R. Hill, Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2014), 210; C. Kenneth Quinones, “Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy,” 
Asian Perspective 27, no. 1 (April 2003): 1-28. 
19 Quinones, “Dualism in the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy,” 2. 
20 Ibid., 5. 
21 Ibid., 3, 8, 12. 
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policy towards the DPRK a duality.24 This consequently hindered the US delegation’s ability 
to persuade the North Korean delegation that that policy objectives that the US delegation 
were seeking at the Six Party Talks were the actual policy objectives of the Bush 
administration towards the DPRK.  
 Immediately after the announcement of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, 
which objective was the denuclearization of North Korea, the US Treasury Department 
placed economic sanctions on North Korean trading entities as well as on Banco Delta Asia 
of Macau, a bank in which several North Korean companies had accounts with. 25 
Ambassador Hill states in his memoir, Outpost: A Diplomat at Work, that the purpose of this 
action was not to give him leverage during the negotiations, but to derail the negotiation 
process.26 The imposition of economic sanctions ultimately became a serious setback to the 
negotiation process as it contributed to the significant deterioration of the negotiation 
atmosphere. The freeze on the North Korean-related accounts provoked strong condemnation 
from the North Korean government, as the DPRK interpreted the sanctions as a method of 
the US government to facilitate regime change in North Korea.27 Kim Gye-Gwan, Vice 
Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of DPRK and head of the North Korean 
delegation to the Six Party Talks, called the imposing of financial sanctions on North Korea 
“a new US conspiracy to topple the North Korean regime.”28 The North Korea government 
reverted to its suspicion that the Bush administration was not serious about resolving the 
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nuclear issue through negotiations, and instead sought the collapse of the North Korean 
regime. This belief continued to be prevalent within important sectors of the North Korean 
government, such as the military, during and after the fifth round of the Six Party Talks (9 
November 2005 – 13 February 2007), which indicates that the US delegation had difficulty 
minimizing the effects of friction throughout this time frame.29  
 The US delegation to the Six Party Talks aimed to show the North Korean delegation 
that the Bush administration did not seek regime change, and that the US would comply with 
its obligations as stated by the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round on the Six-Party Talks 
of September 19, 2005. The US delegation was, however, incapable of doing so due to the 
Bush administration’s lack of a coherent and consistent foreign policy towards the DPRK. 
The United States delegation was, therefore, unable to show the North Korean delegation 
that the objective for which it was seeking at the Six Party Talks was consistent with the 
interests of the North Korean government. Since it could not do so, the US delegation was 
unable to observe the appropriate conventions of language, and thereby faced difficulties 
minimizing diplomatic friction between the US and the DPRK.  
 
Motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic’s visit to Pyongyang 
 In this section, I establish the motivation of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra 
that guided the management of the orchestra to further explore the DPRK’s invitation to play 
in Pyongyang. I also address the aim and outcome of the visit. The New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra in its history has participated actively in American musical diplomacy, as its music 
directors, such as Leonard Bernstein (1958-1969), believed in the idea that music could 
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improve relations between the peoples of adversarial states. 30  Musical diplomacy has, 
therefore, traditionally been a part of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s philosophy. 
Having been interested in pursuing this philosophy, Zarin Mehta, president and executive 
director of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, took the DPRK’s invitation into serious 
consideration.31  
 Between 1955 and 1961, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra was sponsored by 
the President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Special International Program for Cultural 
Presentations to make five tours abroad.32 The most well-known venture is the New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s tour of the Soviet Union during 1959 led by its music director, 
Leonard Bernstein. As part of President Eisenhower’s Special International Program for 
Cultural Presentations, the New York Philharmonic’s visit was meant to contribute to the 
improvement of mutual understanding between the people of the US and the Soviet Union.33 
Bernstein called the tour “a mission of friendship,” and believed that the contacts that the 
orchestra made with the citizens of the Soviet Union through its music would present an 
image that would go deeper than the impressions that the Russian people routinely received 
from the Soviet press that demonized the US.34 According to Bernstein, the purpose of the 
New York Philharmonic’s tour of the Soviet Union was to improve mutual understanding 
and appreciation between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union by presenting 
a more positive image of the United States.  
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 The orchestra spent three weeks touring Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, and presented 
twenty concerts to local audiences.35 The tour was well received by the peoples of the Soviet 
Union, as according to Bernstein, “everywhere we went, audiences broke all the rules. They 
shouted and screamed, and wouldn’t let us go.”36 Based upon Bernstein’s account of the tour, 
the Russian audience was, therefore, quite receptive to the New York Philharmonic Orchestra 
and himself. There is, however, a lack of scholarly literature that explains whether the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra’s tour of the Soviet Union led to better relations between the 
US and the USSR. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra again undertook a tour in the 
Soviet Union in 1976 led by Thomas Schippers and Erich Leinsdorf, and in 1987 led by 
Zubin Mehta.37  
 With the New York Philharmonic’s history of being an American cultural diplomat 
in mind, Mehta chose to not dismiss the DPRK’s invitation when it arrived in August 2007, 
and instead, to further explore the authenticity and sincerity of the invitation.38 Mehta stated 
in a telephone interview with Daniel J. Wakin, reporter for The New York Times, that it would 
be “a wonderful thing” if the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang helped 
in the furthering of the normalizing of US-DPRK relations.39 The stated aim of the New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang was to make a contribution to improving 
relations between the US and the DPRK by presenting a more positive image of the United 
States to not only the North Korean government, but also the North Korean public.  
 The New York Philharmonic Orchestra was not going to the DPRK to resolve the 
North Korean nuclear issue, as resolving an international conflict is outside the jurisdiction 
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of a musical exchange between states. The orchestra, however, believed it was going to the 
DPRK with the support of the Bush administration. Latzky underlined in his interview that 
the New York Philharmonic Orchestra did not undertake this journey as an independent 
entity, and went only “at the behest, or the cooperation, the encouragement of the US 
government.”40 According to Latzky, the orchestra did not feel it was its place to act as an 
independent cultural diplomat. He, therefore, made sure that the orchestra had received the 
US government’s approval before accepting the DPRK’s invitation. Mehta also stated that 
the orchestra would not consider going to North Korea without US government support.41 
These statements demonstrate that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra believed it was 
going to Pyongyang at the encouragement, and thereby with the support, of the United States 
government.  
 The Bush administration, however, treated the visit as a private cultural event, rather 
than a government-supported cultural visit. During a White House press briefing, when 
White House Press Secretary Dana Perino (2007-2009) was asked about the White House’s 
position on the visit to North Korea by the New York Philharmonic, Perino stated that the 
White House considered “this concert to be a concert,” and “not a diplomatic coup.”42 She 
continued to describe the visit as a “private invitation that was issued” to the orchestra by the 
North Korean government.43 Perino’s description of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s 
visit to DPRK indicates that the Bush administration sought to distance itself from this 
endeavour. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice provided a similar answer to that of Perino 
when asked by the press, what potential the concert may possibly have for opening up further 
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relations between the US and the DPRK. While Rice mentioned that she believed that it was 
a good thing that the New York Philharmonic was going to Pyongyang, she also stated that 
“we shouldn’t get carried away with what listening to Dvorak is going to do in North 
Korea.”44 Rice’s answer indicates that the Bush administration did not believe that the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang would have any significant impact upon 
the leadership of the DPRK and its policies concerning the denuclearization of its nuclear 
program. The Bush administration, therefore, had little intention to link the New York 
Philharmonic’s visit to the DPRK with the North Korean nuclear issue. Based upon the Bush 
administration government official’s description of this endeavour, the orchestra’s visit to 
Pyongyang cannot be understood as a state-sponsored US symphony orchestra tour.  
 In order to present a more positive image of the United States to the North Korean 
government and North Korean public, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to 
Pyongyang entailed a public concert that was televised live within North Korea, master 
classes between musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra and young North 
Korean music students of the Pyongyang National Conservatory, and a chamber music event 
by an ensemble that was made up of musicians of the New York Philharmonic and musicians 
of the State Symphony Orchestra of the DPRK, which is the national orchestra of North 
Korea. The New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit consisted of activities that would allow 
for human relationships to be made between Americans and North Koreans based upon the 
repertoire of music. This section assumes that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra 
believed that these interactions would allow the orchestra to provide the North Korean 
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government and North Korean public an alternative, non-adversarial paradigm for perceiving 
the United States. 
 The management of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra sought to hold a concert 
that could be experienced by as many North Koreans as possible. To them, this meant a live, 
simultaneous broadcast of the concert within North Korea.45 That the concert be broadcasted 
live was not a request of Mehta, but one of his conditions for going to Pyongyang that he had 
laid before the North Korean officials in the first meetings.46 A televised concert was an 
important element to the New York Philharmonic’s visit because it would permit a wide as 
possible North Korean audience to see the different side of the United States that the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra was offering.47 In addition, by making it accessible to the 
North Korean public, the orchestra would be able to counter the claim from the the US press 
that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra was catering to the North Korean regime and 
giving the Kim regime the appearance of legitimacy.48  
 The management of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra arranged for musicians 
of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to engage with young North Korean music students 
of the Pyongyang National Conservatory through a series of master classes.49 This was an 
important component of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit because it allowed for 
re-humanized relationships to be developed between Americans and North Koreans. During 
the master classes, the North Korean music students played for the musicians of the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra, and in response the musicians gave direction and 
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recommendation.50 The music students then re-played the music as recommended by the 
musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.51 In essence, the master classes were 
simply a music lesson. The musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra were able to 
create a standard teacher-student relationship with the young North Korean musicians.  
 Another event that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra organized during its stay 
in Pyongyang was a chamber music event.52 Larin Mehdel, the music director of the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra, decided that the chamber music would be a performance of 
Mendelssohn’s Octet in E-flat major, Op. 20, performed by four American musicians and 
four North Korean musicians.53 The chamber music event was an important component of 
the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit since, according to the musicians of the 
orchestra, there is no greater act of cooperation than chamber music.54 Similar to the master 
classes, the chamber music event allowed relations to be built between the US and the DPRK.  
 Glenn Dicterow, Concertmaster of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, and 
Cynthia Phelps, principal viola, both participated in the chamber music event. After the 
performance, Dicterow stated that the North Korean musicians, with whom they had never 
played with before, were in tune with the American musicians, as they were able to quickly 
recognize the American musicians’ interpretation of the music. 55  Phelps made similar 
comments, as she noted that the North Koreans were receptive to the kind of musical phrasing 
and rhythmic intensity that the American musicians were trying to build together.56Their 
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experience demonstrates that the American and North Koreans musicians were able to create 
a musical dialogue and arrive at human relationships. 
 The New York Philharmonic Orchestra was able to present a more positive image of 
the United States to not only the North Korean government, but also the North Korean public. 
Mehta was able to ensure that the concert would be broadcast live within the DPRK, which 
thereby allowed a wide as possible audience to see the image of the United States that the 
orchestra was offering. This section is, however, unable to determine whether the New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit actually changed the DPRK’s adversarial image of 
Americans, as there is currently no way to accurately measure the North Koreans’ perception 
of Americans after the concert. 
 When Mehta told Song Sok Hwan, Vice-Minister of Culture of the DPRK, that the 
concert was to be broadcast live, Song did not give Mehta an immediate response as he did 
to Mehta’s other demands, such playing the US national anthem and having both the US flag 
and the DPRK flag on the stage.57 According to Carlin, there was no precedent of a live 
broadcast within the DPRK.58 It was not until two weeks before the day of the actual concert 
that the DPRK agreed. In early February, when the New York Philharmonic Orchestra began 
its tour in China, the North Koreans asked Mehta if the concert had to be broadcast live. 
Mehta responded that if the concert was unable to be broadcast live, then the New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra would not go to North Korea.59 The DPRK relented, and agreed to 
have live broadcast inside North Korea. The New York Philharmonic was, therefore, able to 
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achieve what it believed would allow the orchestra to present a more positive image of 
Americans to not only the North Korean government, but also the North Korean public.  
 Some of the musicians of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra argue that the North 
Korean audience’s image of the US had changed, and that respectful, human-to-human 
relationships had been built, due to the orchestra’s visit.60 Jon Deak, Associate Principal 
Bass, recounts that when the orchestra played “Arirang,” a folk song that is well-known and 
cherished in both North Korea and South Korea, there was “that warmth, and the falling away 
of the veil between the two peoples. There it was, it was dropping. It was visibly, palpably 
dropping.”61 Deak underlines in his interview his firm belief that he saw the softening within 
the North Korean audience. Rebecca Young, Associate Principal Viola, also argued that the 
orchestra’s performance led to a building of re-humanized relations between themselves and 
the North Korean audience. She recalls how members of the orchestra waved at the audience 
to say,  
“We’re leaving. Bye, nice to have played for you. And they started, somebody waved 
back and then somebody else on the stage, a few more people started waving. And 
the whole audience was waving to us, and we were waving to them. And it was 
human-to-human, and not rehearsed. That was the moment of connection, where we 
all felt like they got us, and we got them and something can happen. It was very 
moving.”62  
 Young’s belief that a re-humanized relationship between the orchestra and the 
audience had been built is based upon the interaction between the North Korean audience 
and the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, as the orchestra was leaving the stage.  
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 Suki Kim’s interpretation of the North Korean audiences’ reception to the concert, 
which she establishes in her article, “A Really Big Show: The New York Philharmonic’s 
fantasia in North Korea,” is contrary to that of the musicians.63 Kim accompanied the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra to Pyongyang as a journalist. In her article, she writes that “the 
Koreans around me appeared amused, if not somewhat puzzled,” when the orchestra began 
to play “Arirang,” and that she “did not witness any tears” during the performance.64 Kim, 
therefore, expresses her scepticism about whether the concert had opened the hearts of the 
North Korean people. She makes the conclusion that the concert was, “in the end, just a 
concert.”65  
 This dissertation is unable to confirm whose interpretation of the North Korean 
audience’s reception is the most accurate, as there is currently no means to accurately 
measure whether the New York Philharmonic’s visit changed North Korea’s image of the 
United States. Through the various activities of its visit, the orchestra, however, did present 
to the North Korean government and North Korean public an alternative, non-adversarial 
paradigm for perceiving the United States. 
 
Disconnect between study of US musical diplomacy and diplomatic theory 
 In this section, I analyse the literature concerning music and US diplomacy. I 
demonstrate that this bulk of scholarship does not provide an adequate analytical framework 
that would explain the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang. The 
relationship between music and international relations has been subject to little scholarly 
research. International relation theorists focus upon economic or military factors, while 
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musicologists focus on analysing musical scores. 66  I choose the following articles as 
representative of the authorities work on musical diplomacy because the articles within the 
forum seek to examine the motivations and content of US-sponsored orchestra tours within 
the paradigm of cultural diplomacy. Moreover, one of the articles of this forum attempts to 
explain the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to the DPRK. These articles make up 
a special forum on US musical diplomacy, published by the journal Diplomatic History.67 
 The articles within this forum establish that music and American music ensembles 
were used by the US government as a tool of US diplomacy, particularly during the Cold 
War period. Moreover, the forum demonstrates that musical diplomacy had different 
meanings and purposes depending upon its various participants, who included US 
government officials, musicians, and organizers. The articles, however, do not contextualize 
their respective arguments within the discipline of International Relations or diplomacy. Nor 
do the articles engage with the scholarly literature on US foreign relations during the Cold 
War. They, therefore, do not demonstrate the ways in which the American musical 
diplomatic programs were related to American national security concerns of World War II 
and the Cold War period, or explain why the US government used music ensembles to 
implement its foreign policies. For these reasons, the articles within this forum do not provide 
a framework that would sufficiently explain the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to 
the DPRK.  
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 Gienow-Hecht aims to explain why state governments, including that of the United 
States, send symphony orchestras abroad. She challenges the narrative that governments send 
symphony orchestras abroad to improve relations, as she argues that this interpretation is 
problematic due to the lack of evidence that demonstrates that touring orchestras do indeed 
improve relations between adversarial states.68 Her scholarship, therefore, aims to provide 
an alternative explanation, as she argues that governments send symphony orchestras abroad 
to demonstrate the state’s legitimacy as a prominent international actor, and to display the 
state’s power.69 Gienow-Hecht explains her argument within a theoretical framework that 
derives from theatre and drama studies concerning the stage, particularly its concept that the 
stage serves “to establish a relation and a hierarchy, defined by the audience, performance, 
and the mediation and control of a leader.”70 Gienow-Hecht thereby supports her explanation 
using the scholarship of theatre and drama studies’ understanding of the stage. Gienow-
Hecht’s theoretical framework is, however, problematic for two reasons. She does not 
explain why the concepts of the theatrical stage drawn from drama and theatre studies are 
critically important for understanding musical diplomacy, other than her observation that 
both diplomatic historians and scholars of theatre and drama studies refer to the term “stage,” 
within their respective fields.71  
 According to Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, the historical facts must lend themselves to the interpretation that the theory has 
put upon them, and the conclusions which the theory arrives must be consistent with the 
facts.72 Gienow-Hecht, however, does not demonstrate how her theoretical framework is 
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consistent with the historical facts of state-sponsored symphony orchestras. For example, 
Gienow-Hecht argues that since World War II, the thinking of policymakers throughout the 
world, particularly in the United States, originated less in the ideals of public diplomacy, but 
in the basic assumption surrounding a performance of an orchestra on stage. 73 Gienow-
Hecht, however, fails to substantiate her claims. Her scholarship makes no referral to 
policymakers, which shows that these policymakers understood the assumptions surrounding 
a performance of an orchestra on stage, and that their decision to send orchestras to other 
countries was based upon these assumptions.  
 Gienow-Hecht misunderstands and misinterprets the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra’s visit to North Korea. Her article incorrectly portrays the visit as one that was 
sponsored by the US government. Gienow-Hecht states that the “US State Department 
financed Lorin Maazel and the New York Philharmonic’s tour to Pyongyang…in an effort 
to move forward the stalemated talks on trade and atomic weapons.”74 Although the US State 
Department helped with the logistics of the visit, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s 
visit to North Korea was financed by private sources.75 There was no financial support from 
the US government.76 Gienow-Hecht’s article does not provide any citation concerning her 
statement about US government funding, so the source of this information is unknown. 
Furthermore, the Bush administration significantly depreciated the visit.77 The New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang was treated by the White House as a “private 
invitation,” rather than a musical tour sponsored by the US government.78 The New York 
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Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang was, therefore, not under the auspices of the 
US government. The Bush administration did not support the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra’s visit to the DPRK in the same manner that the Eisenhower administration 
supported the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1959.  
 Campbell emphasizes that the American musical diplomacy began before the Cold 
War.79 Campbell’s scholarship is more about historical revisionism, as she challenges the 
conventional narrative that argues that US musical diplomacy was a product of the Cold War. 
Campbell reconstructs the efforts of the Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) Music 
Committee, which was established in 1940, in order to demonstrate that the model of US 
musical diplomacy began much earlier than the Cold War. Campbell establishes the 
objectives and artistic priorities of the committee members of the OIAA, and the processes 
by which the music projects were selected.80 Campbell’s scholarship is notable for examining 
the efforts of the OIAA in greater detail and with more insight than other works. 81  It, 
however, does not provide an adequate framework that explains the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang because her scholarship is more focused on bringing 
recognition to the efforts of the OIAA Music Committee and its role in the history of US 
musical diplomacy, rather than explaining why the US government sent orchestras abroad. 
 Ansari analyzes the American National Theatre and Academy’s (ANTA) Music 
Advisory Panel to argue that a nonstate actor was able to influence the agenda of the state 
actor.82 The ANTA’s Music Advisory Panel entailed a group of American composers who 
selected the musicians and repertoire that would be sent abroad for the President’s Special 
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International Program for Cultural Presentations.83 Although the ANTA was an agency of 
the state, it was comprised of non-state actors, as the group was made up of private citizens. 
The aim of Ansari’s article is to demonstrate that this group pursued its own personal agenda, 
which was to further the committee member’s own style of music that happened to be 
classical music, and thereby influenced state policy. It, however, does not mention the role 
of the state and the foreign policies of the Eisenhower administration. There is, therefore, a 
gap within her scholarship as she does not address the political context in which the members 
of the ANTA operated within. Addressing the political context would better explain what 
motivated the composers to act as they did. The lack of information concerning the foreign 
political agenda of the state makes it difficult to determine whether the ANTA Music 
Advisory Panel had actual influence over the Eisenhower administration. Ansari’s 
scholarship does not provide an adequate framework that would explain the New York 
Philharmonic’s decision to go to Pyongyang since her analysis excludes the state. Although 
the visit was not a state-sponsored cultural event, the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s 
visit to Pyongyang involved state and non-state actors. It is, therefore, crucial that the 
theoretical framework that explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to 
Pyongyang takes into account the role of the state and the non-state actor within the domain 
of diplomacy.  
 Fosler-Lussier challenges the conventional narrative that explains American cultural 
relations with other states as imperialistic and the implication that these state-cultivated 
relations had harmful intentions and results.84 Although her article acknowledges that the 
objective of the US State Department’s Cultural Presentation Programs was to spread 
American influence abroad, she argues that the objective of American cultural diplomacy 
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changed to engagement and creating meaningful personal contact with the people of the other 
state.85 Fosler-Lussier, therefore, argues that US musical diplomacy during the Cold War 
developed from a unilateral cultural invasion to a form of engagement. Her article is, 
however, atheoretical. Fosler-Lussier briefly mentions Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power, 
as she suggests that US musical presentations during the Cold War derived from the 
“attractive qualities of American cultural products.” 86 Her article does not elaborate as to 
why Nye’s work helps support her position. Fosler-Lussier’s article establishes that the US 
State Department changed the objective of its Cultural Presentation Programs, but it does not 
sufficiently explain why this change occurred. It, moreover, is not suitable for explaining the 
New York Philharmonic’s visit to Pyongyang as the unit of analysis differs. Fosler-Lussier 
focuses on US-sponsored orchestra tours. Although the US State Department helped with the 
logistics of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to North Korea, the orchestra’s visit 
to North Korea was not a US-state sponsored endeavour. Her argument, therefore, cannot be 
applied to the activities of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.  
 
New York Philharmonic’s visit conceptualized within Track II diplomacy 
 In this section, I establish the theoretical framework that helps explain why the New 
York Philharmonic’s visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a compensation of the US 
delegation’s inability to minimize diplomatic friction between the United States and the 
DPRK. The theoretical framework is derived from the concepts of the analytical framework 
that were established in Chapter 2. The two concepts are that non-state actors also engage in 
diplomacy, and that Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state 
actors compensate for constraints that state actors face in official diplomacy. This theoretical 
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framework helps explain the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang 
because it explains why a non-state actor engages in practices that have conventionally been 
defined as core diplomatic tasks. 
 
Theoretical framework: Non-state actors play a role in diplomacy 
 The theoretical framework that informs my argument, that the New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a partial compensation 
for the US delegation’s inability to minimize the effects of diplomatic friction between the 
US and the DPRK, derives from the analytical framework that was established in Chapter 2. 
The two concepts are that non-state actors also engage in diplomacy, and that Track II 
diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors compensate for 
constraints that state actors face in official diplomacy. 
 As argued by Langhorne and Kelley non-state actors are engaging in practices that 
have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks.87 The conceptualization of non-
state actors that informs this perspective can be understood through the paradigm of the 
International Relations theory of neoliberal institutionalism, which regards non-state actors 
as also being important actors in the international system.88 According to Langhorne and 
Kelly, one factor that induced the rise of the non-state actor’s influence over diplomacy is 
the widespread adoption of information communication technologies (ICT). 89  The 
information power gained through ICTs elevated the influence of the public domain to 
behave in ways that are not necessarily parallel with the system of the states. This 
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“communications revolution” led to the emergence of a wide range of human activities that 
has no connection or ties to government permission or regulation.90 According to Langhorne, 
much of these human activities are able to weaken governmental authority, diminish its role, 
and loosen the bonds of loyalty between the population and its government.91 The weakening 
of state structures leads to state collapse and domestic political violence.92 Langhorne argues 
that these types of situations have proven to be very difficult for the traditional international 
and diplomatic processes to resolve.93 The result is that non-state actors adopt higher profile 
roles as they fill in this gap because they promise levels of efficiency and responsiveness that 
the state cannot.94  
 Based upon Langhorne and Kelley’s scholarship, when there are conflicts that seem 
to lie beyond the control of the state and state-sanctioned actors, non-state actors emerge to 
play significant roles. 95  Non-state actors are, therefore, compensating for government 
inaction. Langhorne and Kelley are, however, not solely arguing that states are sharing the 
role of diplomacy with non-state actors, or that the state is coordinating with non-state actors 
to better manage international affairs. They are also arguing that in the near future, non-state 
actors will be producing the more innovative and novel forms of representation.96 Langhorne 
and Kelley, therefore, envision a world society where the non-state actors replace the state 
for the role of managing international transactions. This component of Langhorne and 
Kelley’s respective scholarship is, however, unconvincing, as Langhorne and Kelley do not 
adequately demonstrate their argument that diplomacy will be practiced in future not by the 
diplomat and foreign ministries, but by non-state actors. 
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 While non-state actors are engaging in practices that have conventionally been 
defined as core diplomatic tasks, it does not mean that the role of the state and state-
sanctioned representatives in diplomacy is insignificant or irrelevant, particularly since it is 
only the state that carries law-making and law-enforcement powers, as argued by Juergen 
Kleiner in his article, “The Inertia of Diplomacy.”97 The state is, therefore, still an important 
actor on the international stage. The relationship between the state and the non-state actor in 
the domain of diplomacy is not an inverse relationship in that if one gains power, the other 
actor loses it. Rather, the state and non-state actors coexist in what Ole Jacob Sending, 
Vincent Pouliot and Iver B. Neumann’s Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics call a 
“mutually constitutive relationship.”98 The tasks that the non-state actors perform add to and 
change ways of doing things for the state actors, and the non-state actors model their 
operations on the institution of diplomacy. This relationship can be seen in a specific form 
of diplomacy known as Track II diplomacy.  
 As established in Chapter 2, Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy 
where non-state actors assist state-sanctioned actors by compensating for the limitations that 
the officials of Track I diplomacy face.99 The non-state actor is unable to replace the state 
actor’s role as a conductor of diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is, therefore, not a substitute 
for Track I diplomacy, but rather an interdependent process of Track I diplomacy. According 
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to Montville, Track II diplomacy is a process involving unofficial, informal interaction 
between members of adversary groups with the aim of developing strategies, influencing 
public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve 
their conflict. 100  Montville assumes that state actors face limitations when conducting 
diplomacy, such as the need to be seen as strong, wary, and indomitable in the face of the 
enemy by their constituents, and that the resources and procedures of Track I diplomacy may 
not be enough to resolve the conflict.101 Track II diplomacy is thereby designed to assist the 
officials of Track I diplomacy and to compensate for the constraints imposed upon the state 
actors conducting Track I diplomacy.102  
 
New York Philharmonic compensates for a limitation of US diplomacy 
  The New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit can be understood as a contribution 
to fulfilling the normal diplomatic function of minimizing the effects of friction between the 
US and the DPRK. The New York Philharmonic’s aim to present a more positive image of 
the United States to the North Korean government and the North Korean public was 
influenced by Ambassador Hill’s agenda concerning the visit. Hill sought to use the 
orchestra’s visit as a means of shifting the North Korean government’s adversarial 
perspective of the Bush administration. 103  By going to Pyongyang to help achieve an 
objective that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks had difficulties achieving, the New 
York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit can be understood as a partial compensation for the US 
delegation’s inability to ease friction between the US and the DPRK. The theoretical 
framework offers specific insights into this understanding of the New York Philharmonic 
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Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang, because it explains why a non-state actor engages in practices 
that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks.  
 On 19 January 2007, Ambassador Hill met with Kim Gye-Gwan, vice minister of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK and head of the North Korean delegation to the Six 
Party Talks. During this meeting, Hill and Kim went through the September 19, 2005 Joint 
Statement, and discussed the implementation of the statement.104 There is speculation within 
the policy and scholarly community that the idea of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra 
visiting Pyongyang was alluded during this meeting.105 There is no exact explanation to how 
the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s invitation to play in the DPRK came about as neither 
the North Korean government nor the US State Department has provided an account of its 
respective contribution. One thing that is clear concerning this visit is that it was not initiated 
by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra.106  
 This chapter argues that it is more probable that the idea of the New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra playing in Pyongyang arose during Hill and Kim’s meeting in 
January 2007 as a premeditated opportunity to improve US-DPRK relations because of 
Ambassador Hill’s personal involvement to make this endeavour a reality.107 Hill’s efforts 
indicate that he may have been involved in developing the idea of this endeavour, or at the 
least, was aware that the North Korean government was planning this endeavour. The DPRK 
had proposed the idea of a cultural exchange between the US and the DPRK within the 
context of the denuclearization of North Korea, before the summer of 2007. This further 
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supports the argument that the orchestra’s invitation was a premeditated diplomatic 
opportunity.  
 During the National Committee on American Foreign Policy’s (NCAFP) Third 
Conference on Northeast Asian Security from 30 June to 1 July 2005, a participating North 
Korean government official asked the American speaker “whether the United States could 
engage in ‘ping-pong’ diplomacy with North Korea as it had done in the past with China.”108 
According to the 2005 NCAFP report, the American speaker replied that “it could happen 
once a new atmosphere develops.” 109  This discussion implies that the North Korean 
government was interested in some sort of cultural exchange with the United States in the 
summer of 2005, and, therefore, may have been waiting for a better moment to launch such 
a venture. The DPRK determined that the summer of 2007 was such a moment to send the 
invitation. The Six Party Talks was making visible progress concerning the denuclearization 
of North Korea, which was creating a more positive atmosphere among the participating 
states of the Six Party Talks.110 The Banco Delta Asia funds that the US had frozen had been 
transferred to North Korea in June 2007, and IAEA inspectors had been allowed into North 
Korea to monitor, inspect, and verify the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear facility.111 The 
IAEA confirmed the shutdown of Yongbyon in July 2007.112  
 In the autumn of 2007, Ambassador Hill visited David Geffen Hall, the location of 
the orchestra’s rehearsals, to speak to the musicians about why it would be a good idea for 
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the New York Philharmonic Orchestra to accept the invitation.113 The musicians’ decision to 
go to the DPRK was influenced by this meeting with Ambassador Hill. The New York 
Philharmonic Orchestra is a democratic body, in that the musicians have the right to give 
their opinion, and can refuse to perform in locations that have not already been pre-
approved.114 Since Pyongyang was not one of the orchestra’s regular locations of its Asia 
Tour, the musicians could decide to decline the DPRK’s invitation. When the musicians of 
the orchestra were informed of the DPRK’s invitation, there were people who were 
vigorously opposed to going.115 Eric Latzky and Zarin Mehta held a meeting with the full 
orchestra to discuss the invitation, and arranged to have Ambassador Hill and, at that time, 
his assistant, Foreign Service Officer Yuri Kim to attend so that they could talk to the 
orchestra musicians.116 At this meeting, Hill told the musicians what the “positive aspects of 
doing something like this would be,” and explained why he thought this invitation was 
something right to pursue.117 The New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s meeting with Hill 
changed many of the musicians’ minds concerning this endeavour. After the meeting, 
musicians gave their approval for the management of the New York Philharmonic to further 
explore the idea of preforming in the DPRK.118 Due to this sequence of events, I argue that 
the orchestra’s objective concerning its visit to the DPRK was derived from Ambassador 
Hill’s objectives concerning the orchestra’s visit. The orchestra was, therefore, not pursuing 
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its own political or cultural agenda, but rather supporting an agenda that the orchestra 
believed was that of the United States government. 
 Ambassador Hill supported the orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang due to his belief that 
the visit would demonstrate to the DPRK that the policy objectives of the Bush 
administration on the North Korean nuclear issue was not the collapse of the North Korean 
regime.119 Ambassador Hill stated to the Los Angeles Time editorial board that the presence 
of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra in Pyongyang would argue against the North 
Korean government’s allegation that the Bush administration’s policy towards the DPRK 
was regime change. 120  Hill strongly supported the visit, because he believed that the 
orchestra’s presence would allow for a shift within the North Korean government’s 
understanding of the Bush administration’s policy on North Korea. Ambassador Hill, 
therefore, believed that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra could achieve what the US 
delegation had difficulties achieving at the Six Party Talks, which was showing the DPRK 
that the Bush administration did not seek regime change within North Korea. Ambassador 
Hill did not explain why he believed that the orchestra’s presence would counter the North 
Korean government’s allegation about the Bush administration’s policy towards North 
Korea, but his statement indicates that Hill assumed that a touring symphony orchestra could 
improve relations between adversarial states. By sending the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra to Pyongyang, Ambassador Hill wanted the North Korean government to 
recognize that the Bush administration did not seek regime change within the DPRK. 
Ambassador Hill was, therefore, sending the orchestra to Pyongyang to achieve a diplomatic 
task that the US delegation had difficulties fulfilling, which is why the New York 
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Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a partial compensation 
for the limitation of American diplomacy between the US and the DPRK.  
  
Conclusion 
 The aim of Chapter 7 was to show that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit 
to Pyongyang can be understood as a contribution to fulfilling the normal diplomatic function 
of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the DPRK. In the first 
section, I introduced the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the 
second section, I demonstrated that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Assistant 
Secretary of State Ambassador Hill faced difficulties minimizing the effects of international 
friction between the US and the DPRK, because the US delegation was unable to adequately 
show the North Korean delegation that the policy objective for which the US delegation was 
seeking at the Six Party Talks was consistent with the interests of the DPRK. In the third 
section, I established the motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra concerning its visit to Pyongyang. In the fourth section, I analysed the literature 
concerning music and US diplomacy to demonstrate that this bulk of scholarship does not 
provide a sufficient framework that explains the New York Philharmonic’s visit to 
Pyongyang. In the last section, I demonstrated why the literature on post-Cold War literature 
on diplomacy explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to the DPRK.
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
 
Introduction 
 The concluding chapter contains my research question and hypothesis, analytical 
framework, and the conclusions of each chapter. I then provide suggestions for further 
research. I lastly discuss my research findings and implications.  
 
Research question and thesis 
 The prevailing view of the George W. Bush administrations concerning US foreign 
policy towards the DPRK was that the United States should not engage in Track I diplomacy 
with North Korea, as illustrated by the National Security Council, the president’s office, and 
the vice-president’s office. Although the US engaged with the DPRK through the multilateral 
diplomacy of the Six Party Talks between 2002 and 2008, the Bush administration continued 
to express a reluctance and disinterest to engage in Track I diplomacy with North Korea. 
Nonetheless, unofficial, or Track II diplomacy initiated by representatives of United States 
non-governmental organizations took place through the period of the Bush administration. 
Track II diplomacy, therefore, managed diplomatic channels between the US and the DPRK 
when official channels were closed. As demonstrated in the first chapter, there, however, is 
a lack of scholarly research on Track II diplomacy between the US and the DPRK. The 
question that arises from this research gap is why did influential United States non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) initiate and pursue Track II diplomacy with the 
government of the DPRK during the United States administrations of George W. Bush that 
began on January 20, 2001 and ended on January 20, 2009? My research thesis is that non-
governmental organizations initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy because these 
organizations believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for the shortcomings of 
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US Track I diplomacy that took place between the Bush administration and the North Korean 
government. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 To explain why non-governmental organizations initiated and pursued Track II 
diplomacy with the DPRK during the Bush administration, I developed an analytical 
framework that draws on concepts of diplomacy. The first assumption of my analytical 
framework is that diplomacy is conducted by the state and state-sanctioned actors, through 
the process of negotiations. The second assumption is that non-state actors are also engaging 
in core diplomatic functions. The emergence of non-state actors that are conducting 
diplomatic tasks, however, does not imply that the role of the state within the domain of 
diplomacy has become obsolete. The third assumption is, therefore, that the relationship 
between the state and non-state actors in diplomacy can be demonstrated in a specific form 
of diplomacy, known as Track II diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is a practice of diplomacy 
that is designed to assist state actors by compensating for the constraints imposed upon them. 
 
Chapter conclusions 
 In this section, I present the conclusions of each chapter. In Chapter 1, I first 
demonstrated that there is a lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the US and the 
DPRK. Through the analysis of literature pertaining to US foreign policy, US foreign policy 
towards East Asia, and US foreign policy towards North Korea, I demonstrated five research 
gaps. I next introduced the research question and hypothesis of my dissertation. I then 
discussed my methodology, and lastly introduced the chapter structure of my dissertation.  
 In Chapter 2, I established the analytical framework to explain why influential US 
non-governmental organizations initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the DPRK 
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during the Bush administration. In the first section, I introduced my analytical framework. In 
the second section, I analysed the classical literature on diplomacy to argue that diplomacy 
is conducted by the state and that negotiation is a core component of diplomacy. I then 
addressed the limitations of the classical literature on diplomacy. I argued that non-state 
actors are also engaging in diplomacy, as argued by the post-Cold War literature on 
diplomacy. In the last section, I analysed the literature on Track II diplomacy to demonstrate 
that Track II diplomacy is a specific practice of diplomacy where non-state actors help 
compensate for the limitations that state actors face during Track I diplomacy.  
In Chapter 3, I argued that the constraint of US Track I diplomacy, which US Track 
II diplomacy helps compensate for, is due to the moralistic underpinning of US diplomacy. 
The moralistic underpinning can be understood through the ideology of American moral 
exceptionalism, which is based upon the normative claim that the US is morally superior to 
other states because the US’ conduct of foreign affairs is guided by ethical principles. In the 
first section, I explored the two dominant understandings in which Americans conceive 
exceptionalism to better demonstrate that the American exceptionalism that influences US 
foreign policy is based upon the US’ sense of moral superiority, and consequently stems from 
normative claims rather than empirical case studies. In the second section of this chapter, 
through the analysis of the scholarship on the history of US foreign policy, I showed that the 
US government makes use of the conceptual insights of the ideology of American 
exceptionalism, which have been identified in the first section, within its policy stance of 
diplomatic isolation towards states it considers as adversarial. The ideology of American 
moral exceptionalism, therefore, constrains the US government’s negotiating options with 
non-democratic states, because it is used as a rationale by American policymakers and 
politicians who seek to avoid diplomatic engagement with non-democratic states.  
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 In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that the actual practice of US diplomacy towards the 
DPRK during the Bush administration was constrained. The US delegation to the Six Party 
Talks was unable to fulfil the normal functions of diplomacy due to the underlying 
philosophy of the ideology of American moral exceptionalism, which impeded active 
diplomatic engagement with the North Korean government. In the first section of this 
chapter, I established the main objectives, aims, and implementations of the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy towards the DPRK. In the second section, I argued that 
negotiation was not a core component of US diplomacy during the Six Party Talks, as the 
US delegation was unable to gather information about the adversary’s position, or facilitate 
communication between the US and the DPRK. I, therefore, established the limitations of 
US diplomacy towards the DPRK that non-state actors sought to compensate for through 
Track II diplomatic processes. In the third section, I argued that US diplomacy during the 
Bush administration was constrained by the conceptual insights of the ideology of American 
exceptionalism, the lack of a concise and coherent policy on the DPRK, and the Bush 
administration’s overreliance on the Chinese government. 
In Chapter 5, I argued that the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 
(NCAFP), a non-profit policy organization, pursued and initiated a series of Track II 
meetings from 2003 to 2005 to compensate for the US delegation to the Six Party Talks’ 
inability to clearly communicate US policy objectives to the DPRK. In the first section, I 
introduced the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. I then analysed 
Herbert C. Kelan and Stephen P. Cohen’s model of the problem-solving workshop, as I used 
their model to help explain the NCAFP’s Track II diplomatic approach. In the third section, 
I demonstrated the significance of the NCAFP as a nongovernmental organization that 
practices Track II diplomacy. In the fourth section, I established the assumptions that inform 
the NCAFP’s Track II approach, the purpose of the NCAFP’s Track II meetings concerning 
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the North Korean nuclear crisis, the objectives, the methodology, and the participants that 
the NCAFP invited to its Track II meetings. I lastly established that while the NCAFP was 
able to partially achieve its objectives, it had difficulties in meeting all of them. 
 In Chapter 6, I argued that the Stanford University and the Nautilus Institutes’ science 
diplomatic activities can be understood as contributing to fulfilling one of the normal 
functions of official Track I diplomacy, due to the unsuccessful efforts by the Bush 
administration to obtain information about the DPRK’s nuclear program. By gathering 
information and transferring their findings back into the official policymaking process, the 
Stanford University academics and the Nautilus Institute were able to compensate for the 
Bush administration Track I diplomatic limitations, and its inability to adequately gathering 
information about the DPRK nuclear program. Although the visits by the Stanford University 
academics to Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the activities of the Nautilus 
Institute for Security and Sustainability’s DPRK Energy Experts Working Group can be 
perceived as science diplomacy, these activities can also be understood as an identifiable 
manifestation of United States Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK. In the first section, I 
introduced the primary data, which includes data from interviews and policy reports, that 
pertains specifically to this chapter. In the second section, I critiqued the scholarly and policy 
literature on science diplomacy. I then drew on diplomatic theories introduced in previous 
chapters to establish a theoretical framework for discussion in the following section of the 
significant science diplomacy conducted by Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute in 
the DPRK. In the final section, I linked the theoretical framework with the empirical material 
to conclude the chapter. 
 In Chapter 7, I argued that the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to 
Pyongyang can be understood as a contribution to fulfilling the normal diplomatic function 
of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the DPRK. In the first 
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section, I introduced the supplementary data that pertains specifically to this chapter. In the 
second section, I demonstrated that the US delegation to the Six Party Talks led by Assistant 
Secretary of State Ambassador Hill faced difficulties minimizing the effects of international 
friction between the US and the DPRK. The US delegation was unable to adequately show 
the North Korean delegation that the policy objective for which the US delegation was 
seeking at the Six Party Talks was consistent with the interests of the DPRK. In the third 
section, I established the motivation, aim, and outcome of the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra concerning its visit to Pyongyang. I then analysed the literature concerning music 
and US diplomacy to demonstrate that this bulk of scholarship does not provide an 
appropriate framework that explains the New York Philharmonic’s visit to Pyongyang. In 
the last section, I demonstrated why the literature on post-Cold War literature on diplomacy 
explains the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to the DPRK than the literature on 
music and US diplomacy that was analysed in the earlier section.  
 
Further research 
 While my dissertation focuses on the George W. Bush administrations, United States’ 
Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK began before, and continued after the Bush 
administrations. The Track II diplomacy that took place during the Clinton administration 
(1993) and the Obama administration (2009) remains under-researched and deserving of 
attention. Further research should be taken in this direction, investigating why non-state 
actors, such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACS) and the Council for 
Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), pursued and initiated Track II diplomacy 
towards North Korea.  
 While there is still more research to be done on the topic of Track II diplomacy 
between the US and the DPRK, this dissertation aims to contribute to the study of US foreign 
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policy on the DPRK by providing another interpretation of US diplomacy towards the DPRK; 
the Bush administration limited its practice of official diplomacy concerning the North 
Korean nuclear issue, hence the opening for Track II diplomacy. Influential non-state 
governmental organizations initiated and pursued Track II diplomacy with the North Korea 
government because they believed that Track II diplomacy could compensate for these 
limitations. It is, therefore, my hope that this dissertation serves as another chapter to the 
academic, governmental, and public understanding of American negotiations with North 
Korea. 
 
Research findings and implications 
My dissertation examines three cases of United State Track II diplomacy to North 
Korea: Track II diplomatic conferences of the National Committee of American Foreign 
Policy; the New York Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang, the capital of North 
Korea; and US science diplomatic activities to North Korea, which include the Stanford 
delegation’s visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and the Nautilus 
Institute’s DPRK Energy Experts’ Working Group. The analysis demonstrates that each case 
of United States Track II diplomacy partially compensated for the US delegation to the Six 
Party Talks’ inability to fulfil a normal function of diplomacy.  
The Track II diplomatic conferences of the National Committee of American Foreign 
Policy partially compensated for the United States delegation’s inability to clearly 
communicate United States policy objectives to the DPRK. The New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra’s visit to Pyongyang can be understood as a contribution to fulfilling the normal 
diplomatic function of minimizing diplomatic friction between the United States and the 
DPRK. The delegation of academics from Stanford University and the Nautilus Institute for 
Security and Sustainability’s DPRK Energy Experts Working Group helped fulfil the 
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diplomatic function of obtaining information about another state, as both organisations 
gained much information about the DPRK’s unclear program.  
My research findings indicates that the Bush administration limited its practice of 
official diplomacy concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, hence the vacancy for Track 
II diplomacy. It is, thereby, contentious to claim that diplomacy is no longer a viable solution 
based upon the Bush administration’s practice of diplomacy with the North Korean 
government. My research findings, moreover, imply that Track II diplomacy can play an 
important complementary role to the different stages of the negotiation process. This finding 
can prove to be significant to the Trump administration, who, at this time of writing, is 
currently in a negotiation deadlock with the North Korean government. The Trump 
administration could use the processes of Track II diplomacy to help compensate for the 
constraints imposed upon United States government officials to be, or at least to be seen, 
strong, wary, and indomitable, or it can use them to re-open communication channels, as 
proven by the NCAFP Track II diplomatic conferences.  
 
Conclusion 
 This research came about due to my concern that within the realm of academia and 
United States government, scholars and policymakers are arguing that diplomacy is no longer 
a viable option towards dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program. An aim of my research 
was to, therefore, demonstrate that it is too early to declare diplomacy as a failed solution, 
due to the lack of research on Track II diplomacy between the United States and North Korea. 
Further research concerning the field of Track II diplomacy is necessary, such as the question 
of impact that Track II diplomacy has or does not have upon Track I diplomacy, or the 
question of the ideal participant of Track II diplomacy. Moreover, additional research 
concerning United States Track II diplomacy towards the DPRK is necessary, as Track II 
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diplomacy began before and continued after the Bush administration. It is, however, hoped 
that this dissertation will contribute to a better understanding of Track II diplomacy, and the 
contribution of Track II diplomacy to official, Track I diplomacy.  
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